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PREFACE
Preface
This dissertation consists of three empirical essays on questions related to
health, wealth, and politics. Each study constitutes a self-contained chapter.
While chapters 1 and 2 contribute to the literature of health economics and
are closely connected to one another, the final chapter 3 investigates an
entirely unrelated topic from the area of political economics.
The first two essays deal with one of the most fundamental questions in
health economics: Why are the economically successful not only wealthier
but also healthier than the less affluent? There is little doubt about the exis-
tence of this so-called socio-economic gradient in health, but there remains
a vivid debate about its source (see Cutler et al., 2011). The traditional
view, most prominently advocated within epidemiological research, argues
that economic resources determine health. Social scientists were among the
first to suggest that causality may also work in the opposite direction, with
health influencing future economic success via the development of human
capital. Yet another plausible explanation is that some unobserved third
factors have a common impact on wealth and health, without there being
any causal relationship between the two.
Certainly, these three views need not be mutually exclusive. In fact,
there is reason to believe that reality is best described by a lifelong inter-
play between economic conditions and well-being, with different pathways
being relevant at different stages of the life cycle. Similarly, the links be-
tween health and wealth are arguably dynamic in nature: Socio-economic
status (SES) at one point in time may impact future health, which in turn
has implications for economic outcomes that lie even further ahead. This
complicates the already demanding task of disentangling the many plau-
sible channels underlying the health-wealth nexus. Yet, the discrimination
among these rivalling hypotheses is paramount since policy recommenda-
tions will critically depend on the nature and the sources of the gradient.
For instance, if causal links between wealth and health were confirmed, so-
ciety would likely benefit from more universal access to health care and
redistributive economic policy. Yet, if the notion of causality were rebutted,
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resources would be better spent on influencing health knowledge, prefer-
ences, and ultimately the behavior of individuals.
Chapter 1, which is based on joint work with Florian Heiss, Daniel Mc-
Fadden and Joachim Winter, starts by reviewing the methodological chal-
lenges – simultaneity and omitted-variable bias – involved in testing the
causal relationships between SES and health. This is followed by a discus-
sion of the conventional solution to both of these problems, which consists
of instrumental-variables (IV) approaches that exploit exogenous variation
from natural experiments. Since IV strategies are not always persuasive in
practice, we continue by describing an alternative approach of testing for
the absence of causal channels developed by Adams et al. (2003). Their
methodology seeks identification without the need to isolate exogenous
variation in economic variables by resting on the purely statistical concept
of Granger causality. Their finding that socio-economic status is unlikely to
be causal for mortality and a wide range of health incidences in the US
American population over the age of 70, has sparked much controversy
in the subsequent literature. Given that – besides methodological issues –
most of the criticism centers around the external validity of their results,
we repeat their analysis using the full range of data that has since become
available in the longitudinal Health and Retirement Study (HRS). Compared
to the original study – which uses a subsample of HRS – this represents a
much more comprehensive set of data, both in terms of observations years
and age ranges covered. In stark contrast to the original study, we find that
it is much harder to statistically reject the activity of causal links in more
encompassing samples. Importantly, this result is not solely driven by the
inclusion of younger individuals, as the mere growth in sample size already
leads to higher rejection rates for causality tests, hinting at Adams et al.’s
results being partly driven by insufficient test power.
In light of these findings, we discuss three important methodological
drawbacks of Adams et al.’s original framework that merit attention in fu-
ture research. First, the underlying notion of health dynamics, with health
being modelled as a first-order Markov process, is arguably an inadequate
description of latent health capital as envisioned by Grossman (1972). Sec-
ond, the failure to account for individual heterogeneity complicates the
discrimination between true causal links and unobserved common effects.
Third, even if third factors were convincingly controlled for, their approach
would fail to uncover the exact mechanisms through which SES influences
health. Yet, while knowledge of the general presence of causal links is im-
portant in its own right, the identification of specific pathways is equally
crucial from a policy perspective.
2
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The second chapter aims at addressing all three of these methodolog-
ical weaknesses by exploiting the recent availability of retrospective data
within HRS: To begin with, the information on early-life circumstances en-
ables the incorporation of longer health histories, which arguably provides
a better description of health dynamics. Furthermore, ample information
on family background and family SES should allow for reasonable proxy-
control of individual heterogeneity that drives a wedge between Granger
causality and causation in a more structural sense. Moreover, conditioning
on both historic and contemporary information, will shed light on the ques-
tion when the SES gradient in health is established, which, once again, has
important implications for optimal policy. In addition to this, I decompose
the broad effect of SES on morbidity to gauge how wealth, income and
education leave their mark on an individual’s general health.
Succinctly, the main conclusions of chapter 1 remain intact if longer
health histories and proxies for individual effects are incorporated, which
lends support to a causal interpretation of observed correlations. While
there is not much evidence for causal links from SES to acute health in-
novations in an elderly population, causality appears likely for mortality,
changes in mental health and general well-being. Results for chronic dis-
eases and functional health are a bit mixed, as they suffer from low test
power. In line with the literature on early life circumstance (see Almond
and Currie, 2011), I find that childhood health has lasting effects for adult
outcomes. This, however, does not render contemporary factors unimpor-
tant. Furthermore, it seems that economic status exerts its influence both
through the accumulation of health conditions, as well as via more direct
channels. Interestingly, there is no evidence that wealth or income can act
as a shield from the health consequences of illnesses – at least not in a post-
retirement US population that enjoys near-universal health care coverage
through Medicare. However, the prevalence of chronic conditions appears
to have stronger adverse effects on overall health among the lower edu-
cated. This is indicative of difficulties for this group to take measures of
disease management that are necessary to alleviate further negative health
consequences from illnesses such as lung disease or diabetes.
For the third and final chapter of this thesis, which is joint work with
Florian Englmaier, we abandon the nexus of health and wealth and turn
our attention to something completely different: the political economics of
savings bank lending. We contribute to the literature of political business
cycles (see Nordhaus, 1975; and MacRae, 1977), by testing the hypothesis
that even local incumbent politicians try to boost economic conditions in
pre-election periods. We exploit a peculiarity in the German public bank-
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ing system where municipal politicians are by law involved in the man-
agement of local savings banks. We use the different timing of municipal
elections across states and the existence of cooperative banks as a control
group to estimate the causal effect of elections on lending policy of Ger-
man savings banks. To this end, we use a novel, largely hand-collected
dataset, merging municipal election outcomes for a subset of German states
with accounting information of local banks. Econometrically, we conduct
difference-in-difference as well as triple-difference estimation embedded
in a fixed-effects panel data setup.
In line with our predictions, we find that savings banks systematically
extend more credits in pre-election periods. This effect is not only statis-
tically significant but also economically relevant: it amounts to a 2%–3%
election-induced increase in the stock of lending, when our preferred em-
pirical specification is used. Note that this increase is relative to the total
stock in bank lending. If we were to model the extension of new credit con-
tracts alone, relative effect sizes would certainly be substantially larger. To
provide a better sense for the actual magnitude of the effect, consider that
its absolute size amounts to an average of EUR 30.6 million extra stock in
lending per bank.
The election effect is robust to various alternative specifications. Im-
portantly, it is not present with cooperative banks that are very similar to
savings banks but that lack their political connectedness. Our hypotheses
are further strengthened by the fact that lending cycles only occur with mu-
nicipal but not with state or federal elections. Furthermore, we find weak
evidence for overly prudent lending policies after elections, consistent with
a binding credit constraint that banks face so that they have to make up for
excessive pre-election lending. Our evidence also suggests that the ability to
induce political lending cycles depends on the degree of dominance of the
incumbent party. Finally, we find significant differences in effect sizes across
states, suggesting an interaction with other details of the institutional envi-
ronment, which we intend to further investigate in future research.
Our results stand in contrast to the empirical finance literature, which
has long suspected that the behavior of government-controlled banks is
rather different from that of private financial institutions, but which has
not yet found compelling evidence for politically induced lending in highly
developed countries such as Germany (see Dinç, 2005). Given that savings
banks are holding the largest market share in the German private-customer
deposit market and that they are the most important lender to the Mittel-
stand (SMEs) – that is considered the backbone of the German economy –
it is potentially worrisome to find their policies distorted.
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Chapter 1
“Healthy, wealthy, and wise” revisited:
An analysis of the causal pathways from
socio-economic status to health
1.1 Introduction
In health economics, there is little dispute that the socio-economic status
(SES) of individuals is positively correlated with their health status. The
size of the body of literature documenting that wealthy and well-educated
people generally enjoy better health and longer life is impressive.1 The ro-
bustness of this association is underscored by the fact that the so-called
socio-economic gradient in health has been detected in different times,
countries, populations, age-structures, and for both men and women. More-
over, the results are largely insensitive to the choice of SES measures (such
as wealth, income, education, occupation, or social class) and health out-
comes.
While the existence of the gradient may be uncontroversial, the same
cannot be said about its explanation. Medical researchers, economists and
other social scientists have developed a large number of competing theo-
ries that can broadly be categorized as follows: there may be causal effects
from SES to health, causal effects that work in the opposite direction, and
unobserved common factors that influence both variables in the same di-
rection without a causal link between the two. Distinguishing among these
explanations is important since they have different implications for public
policy aimed at improving overall well-being. For instance, if causal links
between wealth and health were confirmed, society would likely benefit
1Smith (1999) and Goldsmith (2001) provide extensive surveys of the earlier literature.
A brief summary of more recent contributions to this field can be found in Michaud and van
Soest (2008).
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from more universal access to health care and redistributive economic pol-
icy. Yet, if such causal links were rebutted, resources would be better spent
on influencing health knowledge, preferences, and ultimately the behavior
of individuals.
Besides its importance, the discrimination between these alternative hy-
potheses also poses a great methodological challenge since the variation
found in observational data is typically endogenous. This is especially true
for cross-sectional data, which only offers a snapshot of the association be-
tween health and wealth. Without further information on the history of
both variables, the researcher faces a fundamental simultaneity problem,
which makes the identification of causal paths a hopeless venture. A pos-
sible remedy consists of finding some sort of exogenous variation in SES
or health to infer causality and the direction of its flow. This search, how-
ever, is typically quite difficult because convincing instrumental variables
are very hard to come by. As a consequence, researchers often face the
unattractive choice between the easy path of ignoring the endogeneity prob-
lem, which casts serious doubts on any drawn conclusions, and the more
involved use of IV strategies that critically rely on the untestable quality of
the instruments.
The nexus of health, wealth, and wisdom is also the subject of the study
by Adams et al. (2003) (HWW henceforth). The authors propose an innova-
tive approach that attempts to solve the above trade-off, on the premise that
causal inference may be possible without having to isolate exogenous vari-
ation in SES. Their identification strategy consists of two main ingredients:
First, they exploit the dynamic nature of panel data, focusing on health in-
novations rather than the prevalence of medical conditions. Second, they
make use of the so-called Granger causality framework, which represents a
purely statistical approach to the theory of causation. The great advantage
of working with this alternative concept is that the detection of potential
Granger causality is a rather easy task. While knowledge on the existence
of Granger causality may not be useful in its own right, it allows for tests
on the absence of “true” causality in a structural sense.
Applying this framework to the first three waves of the Asset and Health
Dynamics among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) survey study, HWW find that in an
elderly US population, causal channels that operate from wealth to health
are an exception rather than the rule: while causality cannot be ruled out
for some chronic and mental conditions for which health insurance cover-
age is not universal, SES is unlikely to be causal for mortality and most
other illnesses. Considering these strong results, as well as the methodolog-
ical novelty of HWW’s approach, it is not surprising that their work has
6
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subsequently been the subject of vivid debate within the literature.2 So far,
the focus has clearly been on the validity of HWW’s identification strategy
in general, with some calling into question the ability to truly infer causal-
ity with a concept that arguably is a rather sparse characterization of causal
properties.
We certainly agree that HWW’s model would benefit from certain method-
ological refinements and plan to implement these in future research. For
the present project, however, we deliberately leave the econometrics un-
changed, to study a different aspect that also merits attention: the stability
of HWW’s results when confronted with new data that allows for hypothesis
tests of greater statistical power. Special interest lies in assessing whether
the somewhat surprising absence of direct causal links from SES to most
medical conditions is a robust finding or perhaps the artifact of a particular
data sample. Since the publication of HWW’s original article, the AHEAD
survey has been incorporated into the more-encompassing Health and Re-
tirement Study (HRS). This permits deviations from HWW’s data benchmark
along the following dimensions: the same individuals can be tracked for a
longer period of time, the analysis can be extended to new cohorts of re-
spondents, and the working sample can be widened by including younger
individuals aged 50 and older. The last point is of special interest as it of-
fers variation in health insurance status that is not available in a Medicare-
eligible population. To understand which of these data changes contribute
to any deviating conclusions, we do not apply the whole bundle of modifi-
cations at once. Instead, we estimate the model multiple times, by applying
it to several different data samples, which are gradually augmented along
the dimensions just outlined.
We lay out the theoretical background of our analysis in section 1.2,
where we review the potential explanations for the association between
SES and health and specify the econometric challenges that arise when try-
ing to discriminate among them. This is followed by a discussion of how to
address these challenges. The conventional solution consists of employing
IV methods whose identification strategy is assessed in section 1.3. Sec-
tion 1.4 describes the approach proposed by HWW. A reanalysis of HWW
with new data is presented in section 1.5. Section 1.6 concludes and out-
lines topics for future research.
2As an example, consider the comments to HWW by Adda et al. (2003), Florens (2003),
Geweke (2003), Granger (2003), Hausman (2003), Heckman (2003), Hoover (2003),
Poterba (2003), Robins (2003), and Rubin and Mealli (2003) published in the same issue
as the original article.
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1.2 The difficulty of causal inference
1.2.1 The issue: Potential channels between SES and health
Correlation does not necessarily imply causation. This insight is one of the
main lessons every empiricist needs to internalize. At times, however, it
can be tempting to neglect this admonition, especially when a causal in-
terpretation of a joint motion of two variables is very intuitive. The rela-
tionship between SES and health is a prime example for such a situation.
As an illustration, consider table 1.1, which lists household median wealth
of HRS respondents arrayed against self-reported health status. Here, the
socio-economic gradient is prominently on display as median wealth mono-
tonically decreases with impairing health self-reports – an observation that
is remarkably stable over time.
What could be more natural than to interpret this strong correlation as
a causal influence of wealth on health? After all, it is the explanation best
in line with conventional wisdom: money can buy (almost) anything – even
better health. Yet, the most intuitive conclusion may not necessarily be the
only valid one. In fact, there are two additional hypotheses for the asso-
ciation of SES and medical conditions: the causation could flow from the
latter to the former, and the correlation may actually be spurious, with third
factors affecting health and wealth in a similar way. This section describes
these rivalling theories and gives an overview of the most commonly-cited
potential pathways between SES and health (see Adler and Ostrove, 1999;
Smith, 1999; Goldsmith, 2001; and Cutler et al., 2011 for more extensive
reviews).
Table 1.1. The socio-economic gradient in health
Median wealth by self-rated health status
Self-rated health 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008
Excellent 155.6 192.0 256.0 331.4 363.0
Very good 122.1 159.0 202.6 240.0 304.0
Good 82.5 106.2 130.6 160.0 194.0
Poor 46.7 62.2 69.0 75.1 86.1
Fair 19.5 35.0 36.5 39.7 48.1
Notes: Calculations by authors based on HRS data. Numbers reported in thousands
of 1997 USD.
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Hypothesis A: SES has a causal influence on health ouctomes
This is the hypothesis most energetically advocated within the epidemiolog-
ical literature. While it is true that the main contribution from economists
consists of formulating alternative interpretations of the socio-economic
health gradient (see hypothesis B, below), it should be emphasized that
they are not on record of categorically challenging hypothesis A, either. Be-
low, we list the most prominent theories of channels through which SES
may have a causal effect on health.
Channel A1: Affordability of health care. This potential channel is arguably
one of the most intuitive explanations and may be active both before
and after an individual is diagnosed with an illness. For one, vary-
ing SES may be responsible for differentials in the onset of health
conditions as poorer people may be overly sensitive to the costs of
preventive health care. In addition, wealth could play a crucial role
in determining the quality or even the plain affordability of medical
treatments, once they become necessary.
Channel A2: The psychological burden of being poor. Medical scientists in-
creasingly emphasize the importance of psychological consequences
of low SES. They argue that low-wage employment is typically as-
sociated with a high degree of work monotonicity and low job con-
trol, leading to psychosocial stress. Similarly, economically disadvan-
taged individuals are believed to be repeatedly exposed to episodes
of high emotional discomfort, either due to long phases of unemploy-
ment or a general feeling of social injustice. When accumulated, these
stressful experiences may well have strong adverse effects on physi-
cal health as well. Furthermore, adverse wealth shocks – such as the
loss of life savings in a stock market crash – are likely to cause anxi-
ety and depression, representing a more immediate avenue through
which SES may impact health.
Channel A3: Environmental hazards. Another line of argument is that the
exposure to perilous environments is considerably higher for the poor.
This may concern job-related risks since it can be argued that work-
place safety is lower and physical strain higher for poorly-paid occu-
pations. The reasoning also extends to people’s living environments
as neighborhood safety, dwelling condition, air and water quality, etc.
are usually much better in exclusive residential areas.
Channel A4: Health knowledge. Considering that education is an integral
component of SES, it is conceivable that part of the correlation be-
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tween SES and health is attributable to differences in health knowl-
edge. According to this argument, information on medical risk fac-
tors or the importance of preventative care may be more widespread
among the highly educated and wealthy, leading to healthier lifestyles
and lower morbidity rates among this group.
Channel A5: Risk behaviors. An often-cited pathway through which SES
may influence health is the asymmetric distribution of unhealthy life-
styles such as smoking, drinking and poor diet. To the extent that
all of these vices are less common among the rich, health differen-
tials may in fact be driven by SES variables. Note that the question of
why smoking, excess alcohol consumption, and obesity are especially
prevalent in lower social classes, is interesting in its own right, with
channels A2 and A4 potentially accounting for part of this relation-
ship.
Hypothesis B: Health has a causal influence on SES outcomes
Economists and other social scientists were among the first to challenge
the conception that causal mechanisms would work their way exclusively
from SES to health. Much of this research is inspired by Grossman’s (1972)
health production framework, which models the impact of health capital on
savings, labor market participation, and retirement decisions. We believe
the following three channels to be the most important in describing causal
effects from health to SES outcomes.
Channel B1: Productivity and labor supply. Arguably, the most relevant rea-
son why health may be causal for SES outcomes can be found on the
labor market. The productivity of an individual in poor health is gen-
erally lower than that of someone whose physical robustness allows
for longer working hours, less absenteeism, and better career options.
As a consequence, frail people will tend to earn lower wages and accu-
mulate less assets throughout their life course. Adverse health shocks
may even be so severe that people are forced to leave the labor mar-
ket altogether, depriving them from any realistic chance to improve
their SES.
Channel B2: Life expectancy and time preferences. To the extent that severe
illnesses increase mortality risks, there may be an impact of poor
health on time preferences. Life-cycle models predict that the opti-
mal response to a perceived reduction in life expectancy is to move
consumption from an uncertain future towards the presence. Thus, a
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history of dire medical events may induce individuals to dissave faster,
establishing a causal link from health to SES.
Channel B3: Medical care expenditures. The most immediate form of im-
pact health events can have on financial endowments are out-of-pocket
costs of medical care. While it can be argued that the influence of this
pathway should only be modest in size, this is certainly untrue for peo-
ple without health insurance. In many cases, not even the insured are
completely shielded from medical bills: the existence of deductibles
and lifetime coverage limits poses great financial threats especially
for the chronically ill.
Hypothesis C: SES and health are jointly caused by an unobserved third factor
This hypothesis makes the case that the association between health and
wealth could have other reasons than causal mechanisms between the two:
There may be hidden third factors with a common influence on both SES
and health, rendering the correlation among the latter spurious. This dis-
tinction is vital since policies that aim at improving health outcomes by,
say, redistributing wealth are bound to be ineffective, as long as the true
common cause remains unaffected.
Channel C1: Unobserved genetic heterogeneity. A good candidate for an un-
observed common cause is genetic disposition. For instance, genetic
frailty may reduce the physical resistance as well as the intellectual
and professional skills of an individual. In such cases, health will
be poorer and SES will be lower despite the absence of causal links
among the two.
Channel C2: Unobserved family background. Genetic endowment is not the
only determinant of people’s physical and personal traits. Similarly
influential are matters of parentage and upbringing. Especially pre-
natal and early-childhood nutrition as well as stress are believed to
have lasting negative effects on well-being and functional abilities,
establishing an association between health and SES that is similar to
that of Channel C1.
Channel C3: Unobserved preferences. Irrespective of whether they are in-
herited or learned, preferences that influence certain behavior and
lifestyles are another often-cited source of common effects. The prime
example are descendants of dysfunctional families, who adopt both
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the unhealthy lifestyles (such as poor diet or smoking) and the un-
ambitious attitudes towards education and work by which they are
surrounded. Another example are time preferences: overly myopic
people will underinvest in preventative medical care and in educa-
tion since in both cases pay-offs will materialize in a distant future,
to which only little importance is attached.
1.2.2 The challenges: Simultaneity and omitted variables
The fact that all of the aforementioned hypotheses are generally plausible,
makes the inference on causation a methodologically challenging task. Sup-
pose – as is the case for the remainder of this paper – we were interested in
testing the validity of hypothesis A, that is whether SES has a causal effect
on health outcomes. Ideally, we would want our analysis to rely on truly
exogenous variation in SES variables, similar to that attained in controlled
experiments. The reality for economists, however, is far from being ideal
since the sources of variation we find in observational data is unknown to
us. As a consequence, causal variables are potentially endogenous them-
selves.
The possible sources of endogeneity in the wealth-health case have
been described in section 1.2.1. Ultimately, they generate two fundamental
econometric challenges: we have to distinguish hypothesis A from hypoth-
esis B, and hypothesis A from hypothesis C. As we discuss below, the first
consists of dealing with a simultaneity problem, and the second of finding
a solution to the problem of omitted variables.
Challenge 1: The simultaneity problem (hypothesis A vs. hypothesis B)
Imagine for a moment that hypothesis C could be dismissed, so that any
association between SES and health had to be due to either hypothesis A
or B. Even with this kind of simplification in place, the identification of SES
causality for health is still difficult. Of course, we could regress our health
variable of interest (Hi) on SES (Si) and a vector of exogenous control
variables (Xi), estimating the following equation with OLS:
Hi = θ0+ θsSi +X
′
iθx +ηi , (1.1)
where i denotes the unit of observation and ηi is the residual. Yet, the cru-
cial question is if we could interpret the parameter estimate bθs as the causal
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effect of SES on health. The answer would be affirmative if the structural
model were to look like
E(Hi|Si ,Xi) = α+ βSi +X′iγ,
E(Si|Hi ,Xi) = E(Si|Xi).
This model describes a world in which causality only flows from SES to
health, with β capturing the true causal effect. In this world, bθs would in-
deed have a causal interpretation, with plim bθs = β . However, the existence
of hypothesis B indicates that the above model may not be a realistic de-
scription of reality. In fact, the true structural model is likelier to look like
E(Hi|Si ,Xi) = α+ βSi +X′iγ, (1.2)
E(Si|Hi ,Xi) = a+ bHi +X′ic, (1.3)
with β again measuring the true causal effect of SES on health, and b
capturing any causation working its way in the opposite direction. Equa-
tions 1.2 and 1.3 describe a standard simultaneous-equation model (SEM)
as both dependent variables are jointly determined with each being a func-
tion of the other. When trying to estimate this SEM by simply running
regression equation 1.1, bθs will be subject to simultaneous-equation bias,
picking up the information conveyed in b as well. As a result, the param-
eter of interest, β , is not identified, making a test for causation of SES to
health all but impossible.
Challenge 2: The omitted-variable problem (hypothesis A vs. hypothesis C)
Even in the absence of challenge 1, we would still face the problem of hav-
ing to discriminate between hypotheses A and C. Presume we were able to
plausibly exclude causal paths from health to SES. In this case, the iden-
tification problem no longer consists of confounding the causal effect of
wealth on health with reverse causality. Instead, the question arises if an
association between both variables is attributable to causality at all since
it could also stem from a joint reaction to a third factor. As the review of
hypothesis C has shown, all of these potential common causes (such as ge-
netics or preferences) are inherently unobservable, rendering challenge 2
an omitted-variable problem.
Suppose the true structural model is best described by
E(Hi|Si ,Xi, Ci)= α+ βSi +X′iγ +δCi , (1.4)
with Ci standing for an individual-specific variable that influences both SES
and health. If this common cause were observable, we could simply include
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it in our regression function and the causal effect, β , would be readily
identified. However, given its omitted-variable nature, Ci will be swamped
into the error term, as the comparison of the structural model in error form
(equation 1.5) with the estimable model (equation 1.6) demonstrates:
Hi = α+ βSi +X
′
iγ +δCi + εi , (1.5)
Hi = α+ βSi +X
′
iγ + ui . (1.6)
Here, the well-behaved structural error is denoted by εi, whereas the com-
posite residual is ui = δCi + εi. Given that Ci has an impact on our explana-
tory variable of interest, Si, the latter will be endogenous since cov(Si , ui) 6=
0. As a consequence, the estimation of this model by means of regression
equation 1.1 will yield a parameter estimate bθs that suffers from omitted-
variable bias, with plim bθs 6= β . Importantly, bθs will absorb any causal impact
that Ci may have on Hi. As a result, the presence of common effects could
easily lead to erroneous conclusions of active causal links between wealth
and health in cases where β actually equals zero.
Causal inference in the face of both challenges
Naturally, there is no reason to believe that both econometric problems
are mutually exclusive. As a rule, they will be present at the same time,
aggravating causal inference even more. Ultimately, we have to estimate a
structural model that takes the following form:
Hi = α+ βSi +X
′
iγ +δCi + εi
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ui
, (1.7)
Si = a+ bHi +X
′
ic+ dCi + ei
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=vi
, (1.8)
with ei denoting a structural error and vi representing the composite un-
observable. Given this multitude of potential confounders, we truly cannot
expect the simple regression function 1.1 to uncover β , the structural pa-
rameter of interest. While this assessment is certainly sobering, it also sets a
clearly defined bar for any alternative identification strategy: in order to be
convincing, it has to live up to the challenges of simultaneity and omitted
variables.
1.3 The conventional solution: Instrumental variables
A common way of dealing with the potential endogeneity of SES is the use
of IV estimators. The virtue of this approach is that – at least in theory – it
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solves both of the above challenges at once. All we need is an instrumental
variable, Zi, with the following three properties:
Exogeneity in the population. Zi should be as good as randomly assigned
and must not suffer from the same problems as the endogenous vari-
able it seeks to “replace”. In our case, it should neither be influenced
by health status nor the unobserved common causes.
Relevance for Si. Zi must be partially correlated with the endogenous vari-
able, once the effect of the other exogenous regressors is controlled.
So, loosely speaking, the instrument must have a direct influence on
the SES variable under consideration.
Redundancy for Hi. Zi does not belong in the structural equation 1.7,
which means that there is no direct effect of Zi on the dependent vari-
able, Hi. This exclusion restriction guarantees that any impact the
instrument may have on health is exclusively through the indirect
route via SES.
With a valid instrument at our disposal, we can consistently estimate β by
substituting the endogenous Si in equation 1.7 by its reduced-form predic-
tion, bSi(Zi ,Xi). Intuitively, instead of exploiting the whole observed varia-
tion in SES (which also contains endogenous parts), we concentrate on the
fraction that is explained by the exogenous instrument.
Yet, as good as this solution sounds in theory, IV estimation typically
causes great headaches in practice. The greatest caveat is that a convincing
instrument is usually very hard to find. In their search, social scientists often
turn to unexpected real-world events that could be interpreted as natural
experiments. Whether these provide valid instrumental variables, however,
is not always clear and more often than not a matter of faith. The fact
that the exogeneity and redundancy assumptions above are inherently non-
testable, makes matters even worse. Furthermore, even the availability of
a valid instrument does not solve all of our problems. For one, the use of IV
estimators is accompanied by considerable loss of precision since the exoge-
nous variation in SES evoked by the instrument will not be devoid of noise.
Moreover, IV estimators are biased in finite samples even if asymptotically
consistent. As is well-known, both problems are especially pronounced if
the correlation between instrument and endogenous variable is only weak.
Besides these textbook-established weaknesses, the IV approach can ad-
ditionally be problematic if the instrument of choice is an exogenous wealth
shock that occurs late in the life cycle. In fact, it is exactly this sort of natu-
ral experiment that is predominantly exploited in the literature: Meer et al.
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(2003) as well as Michaud and van Soest (2008) use inheritances, argu-
ing that – unless anticipated – they provide a good instrument for wealth
changes. In a similar vein, Smith (2005) interprets the strong stock-market
surge in the 1990s as a positive wealth shock, and it is probably just a mat-
ter of time until we will see the first papers that make use of the exogenous
variation in wealth caused by the recent global financial crisis. While all
of these instruments may be exogenous and certainly have an impact on
wealth, it is not entirely clear if the SES variation they induce is really that
relevant for health. According to Grossman’s (1972) standard economic
model of health, an individual’s general health status can be viewed as a la-
tent capital stock that reflects the entire history of medically relevant events
and behaviors. As a result, the human body will certainly react to current
influences but it will not forget how it was treated in the past either. This
“memory effect” likely extends to any influence SES may have had during
one’s lifetime. In light of this, it is questionable whether sudden changes
in wealth are really that informative when testing for causal links between
SES and health.
As an illustration, consider the somewhat hyperbolic case of an indi-
vidual without a high-school degree whose low-income occupation did not
allow for significant asset accumulation or any of the amenities that usually
come with money. Now, in a happy turn of events, this person wins the lot-
tery at the age of 62 – a natural experiment that could arguably be used for
an IV approach as well. Which of the two available SES measures will be
more relevant for predicting the jackpot winner’s health status: the long his-
tory of education, income, and wealth (which is not used for identification
of β due to the potential endogeneity of these variables) or the one-time
wealth shock close to retirement age? Sure enough, the IV estimator would
– provided the instrument is truly exogenous and sample size sufficient –
avoid the comparison of apples and oranges by effectively matching the
health of the above person with that of a non-winner whose pre-shock SES
is equally scant. But the central problem remains: while wealth may have
had a causal, incremental impact on well-being throughout life, this may
no longer be the case at a later stage because one’s physical condition is
predetermined after years of continuous investment (or the lack thereof)
into the health capital stock. Given this inertia, it is unrealistic that our fic-
titious lottery winner – who is at risk of being in poor health, considering
his subpar economic history – will suddenly be regenerated just because
her bank balance improved.
Since an IV estimator makes use of this potentially ineffective variation
in wealth to identify β , there is a great chance that causal links from SES to
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health are statistically rejected, even though they are operating in general.3
Admittedly, an IV estimator will still capture any instantaneous impact a
wealth shock would have on health outcomes. As a renewed look at the
potential causal pathways for hypothesis A suggests, immediate effects are
most likely to arise through channel A.2 if wealth shocks are severe enough
to have direct psychological consequences.
1.4 The approach of the HWW study
The previous section demonstrates that the identification of causal paths
between health and wealth with IV approaches is not always feasible. Espe-
cially the isolation of truly exogenous and yet meaningful variation in SES
poses considerable problems. On this account, HWW propose an alternative
identification strategy that avoids this critical step altogether. In fact, they
make use of the entire observed variation in SES variables, tacitly accepting
that some of it may well be of endogenous nature. The authors argue that,
in spite of this methodological simplification, their approach still allows for
at least indirect inference of causal links from SES to health.4
Naturally, HWW need to find convincing answers to the two econo-
metric challenges described in section 1.2.2. When testing hypothesis A,
they face challenge 1 of excluding the possibility that any observed co-
movement of wealth and health is in reality due to reverse causality. In
addition, they have to tackle challenge 2 of ruling out that the association
is driven by unobserved common effects.
Challenge 1: Ruling out hypothesis B
Distinguishing hypotheses A and B without the aid of instrumental vari-
ables is a difficult task. We may observe that the poor are less healthy but
we have no information on which happened first: were people already poor
before they got sick, or were they already sick before they became poor?
With cross-sectional data that only offers a snapshot of this association,
there is no way of finding out. Panel data, on the other hand, provides valu-
3In this light, it is not too surprising that none of the aforementioned studies using
wealth shocks as an instrument for SES, was able to find evidence supportive of hypothe-
sis A.
4In their article, HWW also formulate tests on causality working in the opposite direc-
tion. However, the authors themselves are quite skeptical about this part of their analysis,
admitting that it is likely subject to model misspecification. As they stop short of endors-
ing their own results, we follow their lead and concentrate on the more promising test of
hypothesis A.
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able information on transitions in health and wealth, making it possible to
analyze the dynamics of their relationship and to identify the direction of
the causality flow. Imagine we were to analyze the dependence of health
innovations on past levels of SES. As long as one agrees that a cause must
precede its effect, we can be sure that the (unanticipated) onset of an ill-
ness at time t cannot have caused the amount of wealth or education at
time t − 1. Given there is any causation at work, it must flow from the past
to the present, or – as in this case – from SES to health innovations.
HWW take this insight to heart by applying their framework to the first
three panel waves of the aforementioned AHEAD survey study, which spans
the years between 1993 and 1998 and is representative of the US popula-
tion aged 70 and older. They propose a dynamic model of health incidence
that takes the following form:
f (HI ji t |HI
k< j
i t ,Hi t−1,Si t−1,Xi t−1), (1.9)
where i once again stands for the unit of observation (in this case: house-
hold) and the newly introduced t denotes time. The index j stands for
the respective health condition as the authors apply their model to 20 dif-
ferent medical outcomes.5 The dependent variable, HI ji t measures a new
incidence of a given health condition.6 According to this model, a health
innovation is potentially influenced by the following explanatory variables:
Past level of SES: The vector Si t−1 includes five SES variables, namely
wealth, income, years of education, dwelling condition, and neighbor-
hood safety. These are the variables of main interest. Conceptually, if
SES had any direct causal impact on health, we would expect to ob-
serve that rich individuals are less likely to develop a new medical
condition compared with poor individuals. While this finding alone
would not yet prove the existence of a causal link from SES to health,
confounding with reverse causality could be ruled out since Si t−1 pre-
cedes HI ji t .
5These include acute illnesses (cancer, heart disease, stroke), mortality, chronic condi-
tions (lung disease, diabetes, high blood pressure, arthritis), accident-related events (in-
continence, severe fall, hip fracture), mental problems (cognitive impairment, psychiatric
disease, depression), as well as information on interview status (self vs. by proxy), BMI,
smoking behavior, ADL/IADL impairments, and self-rated health.
6Note that this measure of health innovation cannot be interpreted as a simple change in
health status (∆H ji t = H
j
i t −H
j
i t−1) since HI
j
i t generally captures deteriorations in health only.
For chronic illnesses, such as diabetes, it measures when the condition was first diagnosed.
For acute health events, such as stroke, HI ji t indicates every new occurrence.
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Past health status. New medical events are likely influenced by the re-
spondent’s health history as well. This may take the form of state de-
pendence (e.g., past cancer influences the onset of new cancer) and
co-morbidities (e.g., past cancer influences the onset of depression).
For this reason, HWW control for vector Hi t−1, containing the past
levels of all 20 health conditions.
Current health incidences with immediate impact. In theory, health inno-
vations could also be influenced by contemporaneous shocks in SES
or other health conditions. This constitutes a problem for HWW’s con-
cept of dealing with simultaneity as it critically relies on the ability
to observe the timing of innovations in both variables. HWW solve
this problem by imposing further structure: On the one hand they
make the assumption of no instantaneous causation of SES to health
shocks, arguing that any causal action as described by channels A.1
to A.5 takes time.7 On the other hand, they impose a chain struc-
ture on contemporaneous health innovations, grouping them in the
order in which instantaneous causality is most likely to flow.8 Thus,
they include the vector HIk< ji t containing the incidence variables for
all health conditions (1, ..., k) that are causally arranged upstream of
condition j.
Demographic control variables. Finally, the authors control for a number
of demographic factors that could have an impact on health events,
too. The corresponding vector, Xi t−1, includes the respondent’s age,
marital status, as well as information on the parent’s mortality and
age at death.
Building on model 1.9, HWW design a test for non-causality of SES
in the spirit of Granger (1969) and Sims (1972). This so-called Granger
causality (or G-causality) approach is a purely statistical take on the con-
7The authors themselves make the point that this assumption loses its innocuousness if
the time intervals between panel waves become too large since even the more inertial causal
links will then have enough time to unfold. Given that the AHEAD study is conducted bien-
nially, the time aggregation to observation intervals may indeed reintroduce some degree
of simultaneity.
8HWW list cancer, heart disease, and stroke first because they can have an immediate
impact on mortality. The other medical conditions are grouped such that degenerative ill-
nesses can cause chronic diseases, which in turn may influence accidents and finally mental
health. Importantly, instantaneous causality is not designed to flow in the opposite direc-
tion.
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cept of causation, having its origin in the time-series literature. Formally,
SES is not Granger causal for health condition j if
f (HI ji t |HI
k< j
i t ,Hi t−1,Si t−1,Xi t−1)= f (HI
j
i t |HI
k< j
i t ,Hi t−1,Xi t−1), (1.10)
i.e., HI ji t is conditionally independent of Si t−1, given HI
k< j
i t ,Hi t−1, and Xi t−1.
Intuitively, given health history, knowledge of SES history must not con-
tribute to the predictability of health innovations. The test is implemented
by estimating the model by maximum likelihood (ML) both unconstrained
(with Si t−1 as regressors) and constrained (without Si t−1) and by subse-
quently comparing the log likelihoods of both versions. The motivation for
this likelihood ratio test is that the two values should be the same if the
null hypothesis of non-causality is true.
The detection of Granger causality, however, does not guarantee the
presence of “true” causality in a structural sense, which is the concept we
are ultimately interested in.9 Admittedly, information on the presence of
G-causality is helpful when predicting health innovations for an individual
with given health and SES history. However, the reduced-form nature of
G-causality renders it unsuitable to predict the effects of (economic) policy
interventions. If SES is Granger causal for health innovations, we only know
that, for instance, the onset of an illness is likelier for a person with low SES.
Yet, we do not know if this statistical dependence is due to a real causal link
from wealth to health (hypothesis A) or due to unobserved common effects
(hypothesis C). Given the diverging policy conclusions both interpretations
would trigger, HWW also need to address the second methodological chal-
lenge of dealing with the omitted-variable problem.
Challenge 2: Ruling out hypothesis C
Most of the omitted variables identified in section 1.2.1 to potentially have
a common influence on health and SES are unobservable by definition. As
a result, challenge 2 cannot simply be resolved by improvements in data
quality and the addition of missing variables to the vector of covariates.
9There are three major “schools” of causal analysis: The structural approach (S-causality)
described by Hoover (2001) and Hausman (2003) that is grounded in econometric simul-
taneous equations models, the potential-outcomes approach (P-causality) characterized by
Rubin (1974) and Heckman (2000) that is based on the analysis of experimental treatments
and the time-series prediction approach (G-causality) employed here. The conventional in-
terpretation of “true” causality is arguably best described by S- and P-causality treatments.
In fact, Pearl (2000) demonstrates a formal equivalence between the two concepts. Both
of these schools are critical of G-causality, arguing that its purely positivistic approach does
not realistically characterize causal properties.
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HWW also refrain from making use of fixed-effects estimation, which repre-
sents another common strategy to heal omitted-variable bias in cases where
panel data is available. In fact, the efforts made by the authors to distin-
guish between structural causality and common effects are limited to using
a rich set of covariates in the hope that this will mitigate the importance of
unobservables. They argue (p. 6) that,
[f]or example, genetic frailty that is causal to both health problems and
low wages, leading to low wealth, may be expressed through a health con-
dition such as diabetes. Then, onset of new health conditions that are also
linked to genetic frailty may be only weakly associated with low wealth,
once diabetic condition has been entered as a covariate.
Despite this conciliating argument, HWW acknowledge that the failure to
cleanly identify causal structures questions their approach’s ability to gauge
the effects of “out-of-sample” policy changes. To address this issue, they
scrutinize the generality of their results by adding invariance tests to the
analysis. Intuitively, a model is only suitable for the sort of predictions
HWW have in mind if it remains valid under different scenarios than those
covered by the data, or – as the authors put it – if it has the invariance
property of being valid for each possible history. For instance, if the ap-
plication of the model to different populations, time periods, and policy
regimes had a negligible impact on estimation results, there would be rea-
sonable hope that the Granger non-causality tests are indeed informative.
The invariance tests as implemented by HWW mainly inspect the stability
of findings across time. Model 1.9 is estimated by stacking the data for the
two available panel wave transitions (i.e., W1→W2 and W2→W3) above
another. The same model is also estimated for both wave transitions individ-
ually, and a test statistic is constructed that compares the log-likelihoods of
these three estimations. The motivation for this likelihood ratio test is simi-
lar to that of a Chow test. If the null hypothesis of model invariance is true,
estimated parameters of the stacked model should not differ from those of
the two single-transition models.
All told, HWW apply the following system of non-causality and invari-
ance tests to the estimations of all 20 health conditions: First, they test for
Granger non-causality of SES for health innovations in the stacked version
of the model under the maintained assumption of invariance (S|I). Then,
they employ an unconditional invariance test, as described above (I), fol-
lowed by an invariance test with non-causality imposed (I|noS). Finally they
implement a joint test of invariance and non-causality (S&I). Conceptually,
HWW condition the validity of their non-causality tests on the outcome
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of the corresponding invariance test: only if invariance is confirmed, they
will put faith in the model’s results. The authors are optimistic that with
these refinements in place, their model is well-placed to make meaningful
predictions even if it fails to identify true causal links, stating (p. 10) that
[i]t is unnecessary for this policy purpose to answer the question of whether
the analysis has uncovered a causal structure in any deeper sense. Econo-
metric analysis is better matched to the modest task of testing invariance
and non-causality in limited domains than to the grander enterprise of
discovering universal causal laws. However, our emphasis on invariance
properties of the model, and on tests for Granger causality within invari-
ant families, is consistent with the view of philosophers of science that
causality is embedded in “laws” whose validity as a description of the true
data generation process is characterized by their invariance properties.
They even go a step further and suggest that their approach – while not
powerful enough to distinguish between causation and common effects –
permits at least the one-sided test for the absence of true causal links. Essen-
tially, they view Granger causality as a necessary but insufficient condition
for a structural causal pathway from SES to health. Their decision criteria
when interpreting results are as follows: If the invariance test fails, one
should question the validity of the model for this particular health variable
and refrain from drawing any conclusions. If invariance holds and Granger
causality is present, one cannot distinguish between a direct causal link and
a common factor. Yet, if invariance holds and Granger causality is ruled out,
it should be safe to deduce that SES does not have a causal impact on the
health condition under consideration.
Summary of HWW’s findings
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the evidence from applying HWW’s ap-
proach to the elderly US population is not universally supportive of hypoth-
esis A. In fact, they find that SES is unlikely to be causal for mortality,
most acute health conditions, accidents, and a large number of degenera-
tive diseases. Medical conditions, for which direct causal links cannot be
ruled out, include self-rated health status, most mental illnesses and some
chronic conditions such as diabetes, lung disease and arthritis. This pattern
loses some of its mysteriousness when viewed in the context of US health-
policy characteristics. The population under examination is of advanced
age and eligible for Medicare, which will likely weaken any causal impact
wealth could have on well-being via the affordability of health care. Yet,
even Medicare coverage is not fully comprehensive and tends to focus on
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acute care procedures, while generally failing to limit out-of-pocket costs
for treatments of chronic and psychological conditions.10 This lends indi-
rect evidence for the importance of channel A.1 since the socio-economic
gradient emerges exactly for those health conditions, for which the ability
to pay is most likely to be an issue.
Reflecting the substantial degree of ambiguity in these results, the pol-
icy conclusions formulated by HWW are rather contained in both phrasing
and substance. On the one hand, they cannot overcome the methodologi-
cal challenge of inferring true causality when G-causality is detected. This
leaves open whether SES-linked preventive care induces onset of chronic
and mental illnesses or whether persistent unobserved factors are to blame
for the observed health-wealth association. On the other hand, even con-
vincing evidence for the absence of direct causal links might not neces-
sarily warrant the bluntest form of policy recommendation. Sure enough,
SES-linked therapies for acute diseases do not appear to induce health and
mortality differentials, which – to quote HWW (p. 10) – should theoretically
permit the strong conclusion that
policy interventions in the Medicare system to increase access or reduce
out-of-pocket medical expenses will not alter the conditional probabilities
of new health events[.]
However, the authors stop short of actually drawing this conclusion, which
reflects their reluctance to base overly aggressive policy proposals on a con-
cept whose ability to simulate the effect of system shocks is not indisputible.
Discussion of HWW’s approach
All things considered, what should we make of HWW’s approach of infer-
ring causality and yet avoiding the cumbersome search for exogenous vari-
ation in SES? Does their reliance on Granger causality and their decision to
focus on health innovations really do the trick of solving the endogeneity
problem, or have they entered a methodological dead-end street? Overall,
the response within the literature has been fairly critical, albeit not excori-
ating, pointing out a number of issues briefly discussed below.
Existence vs. activation of channels It is important to understand the limi-
tations of an approach that focusses on innovations in health, rather
than health status itself. HWW detect a strong and ubiquitous as-
sociation of SES and prevalence of health conditions in the initial
10Note that the study was conducted well before the introduction of Medicare Part D in
2006 that especially benefited the chronically ill by improving the coverage of prescription
drugs.
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wave of their sample. This suggests that the elderly population un-
der consideration has potentially been affected by some of the causal
channels between health and wealth in the past. This history, how-
ever, remains a blind spot for HWW’s model: by concentrating on
future health events, they are unable to explain what factors lead to
the pre-existing SES gradient. By contrast, they study the question
whether SES has an impact on the onset of additional medical con-
ditions, given an individual is already old, still alive, and has gone
through a long and unexplained health-wealth history. While the anal-
ysis of an elderly population is not illegitimate and certainly inter-
esting in its own right, one should entertain some doubts about its
external validity. In theory, HWW’s findings could – if extrapolated
backwards – also provide a retrospective explanation for the early re-
lation between SES and health. However, as pointed out by Adda et al.
(2003), Heckman (2003), Poterba (2003), and HWW themselves, this
extreme form of time invariance over the entire life cycle is unlikely
to hold as certain causal channels are probably relevant at different
stages in one’s life.11 In light of this, an accepted non-causality test
should perhaps not be taken as evidence against the plain existence
of a causal link but rather against its activation within the class of
invariances under consideration.
Unobserved common effects. As argued above, one weakness of HWW’s
approach is that it cannot separate true causality from hidden com-
mon effects. Yet, according to the authors, this will only constitute a
problem if Granger causality is detected. In the absence of G-causality,
causation in a structural sense should be ruled out as well. This in-
terpretation implies that the detection of conditional dependence is
a prerequisite for an active causal link – an assumption that is ques-
tioned by Heckman (2003), who argues that persistent hidden factors
may also work in the opposite direction of causal pathways and offset
them. If this were the case, information on G-causality might actually
not tell us anything about true causal mechanisms, rendering HWW’s
strategy ineffective. However, the likelihood of direct causal effects
being exactly offset by unobserved common factors should be practi-
cally zero, making this argument irrelevant for identification. Then
11For retirees, pension income is not affected by (contemporary) ability to work, occu-
pational hazards vanished on the day of retirement, and Medicare provides basic health
insurance, rendering channels B.1, A.3, and A.1, respectively, of little importance when late
in the life cycle. At younger ages, however, all of these pathways may well have played an
important role.
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again, there are obvious limits to this defence in finite samples, so
that statistical inference of causation could indeed be seriously jeop-
ardized by the failure to account for hidden common causes.
Invariance tests. Anticipating that their framework might fall short of in-
ferring deep causal structures, HWW subject their model to the afore-
mentioned invariance tests. On a conceptual level, model invariance
would arguably justify predictions of policy effects but there are legit-
imate concerns whether the actual tests implemented in their paper
are statistically powerful enough. Granger (2003), Hausman (2003),
Heckman (2003) and, once more, HWW themselves point out that in-
variance under historical interventions is of little use when the panel
is as short as AHEAD, offering hardly any in-sample variation in pop-
ulations, age structures, and – most importantly – policy regimes. As
a consequence, an accepted invariance test as implemented by HWW
is unlikely to be a sufficient condition for the sort of model validity
necessary to make out-of-sample predictions. On top of that, Poterba
(2003) even questions whether one should view the acceptance of
HWW’s invariance tests as a necessary condition for meaningful anal-
ysis. Instead of discarding results when invariance tests are rejected,
one could follow up on the reasons for time invariance failures as they
may be informative of structural breaks in causal relationships. For in-
stance, certain causal pathways may switch on or off in the course of
policy changes or as the observed cohort grows older. In such cases,
failed invariance tests would actually shed light on the circumstances
under which causal links will be active or unexpressed, allowing for
sharper, channel-specific causality tests.
Health dynamics. Another reason for concern is the fact that HWW model
health dynamics as a first-order Markov process, which cannot be ex-
pected to properly capture the medium and long-run evolution of
health. Intuitively, this is because the Markov model assumes that all
relevant information about the whole past is captured in the observed
variables one period ago. This is unrealistic since knowledge of longer
histories would better capture the stock characteristics of health cap-
ital as envisioned by Grossman (1972). Taking functional limitations
as an example, a respondent who reported difficulties with walking
one year ago and no limitations previously has a different outlook
than a respondent who consistently reported difficulties with walk-
ing for the last ten years.
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Instantaneous causality. Finally, Florens (2003), Geweke (2003), and Heck-
man (2003) express their skepticism about HWW’s handling of instan-
taneous causality. The hierarchy imposed on health conditions (with
the assumption that incidence of each condition is conditioned on up-
stream incidences but not on downstream ones) may be acceptable as
a reduced-form assumption and is etiologically fairly reasonable. Yet,
it likely falls short of the structural stability explored by invariance
tests and is a potential source of serious model misspecification, mak-
ing it a prime target for methodological improvements in the course
of future research.
1.5 Reanalysis of HWW with new data
The preceding discussion indicates that HWW’s approach of disentangling
the association between health and wealth while avoiding the often futile
struggle of finding exogenous variation in SES comes at the price of lim-
ited methodological persuasiveness. However, since the generic alternative
– instrumental variables – is not exempt from substantial criticism either,
we certainly feel that this identification concept merits methodological re-
finement rather than being dismissed altogether. Some weaknesses, such as
the treatment of common effects, health dynamics, or instantaneous causal-
ity, require significant modifications to the original model and we plan to
implement these in future research.
Yet, one of the major downsides of HWW’s study – the lack of invari-
ance test power – can be addressed without the need for complex changes
but instead by applying the largely unaltered model to a more apposite
set of data. Recall that the root of this problem is that the invariance tests
are based on rather limited variation in “histories” of states relative to the
universe of potential histories. Increasing the N as well as the T dimension
of the panel data will arguably raise the number of histories and enhance
the power of these tests. Of course, we can also expect larger sample sizes
to boost the statistical power of non-causality tests, effectively reducing
the risk of committing type-II errors. But sample size is not everything. We
believe that the analysis will also greatly benefit from larger sample “diver-
sity”, with data covering different kinds of populations that are subject to
varying institutional setups. For instance, the inclusion of younger respon-
dents could shed light on the question if the activation of causal links is
stable throughout the life cycle or if reaching the retirement age induces
some sort of structural break.
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Given that the HRS survey study provides panel data that meets all of
the above requirements, the present analysis keeps methodological changes
to an absolute minimum and assesses the stability of HWW’s results when
applying their model to new and more encompassing data.12 Of particular
interest is the question whether HWW’s somewhat surprising result of SES
not having any direct causal impact on most health conditions is confirmed
as test power increases.
1.5.1 The HRS panel data
Sample characteristics
Our data – which is representative of the non-institutionalized US popu-
lation over the age of 50 – comes from the Health and Retirement Study
(HRS), a large-scale longitudinal survey project that studies the labor force
participation and health transitions of individuals toward the end of their
work lives and in the years that follow. While the data is collected by the
University of Michigan Survey Research Center for the National Institute of Ag-
ing, we use the public-release file from the RAND Corporation that merged
records from the nine panel waves available to date. The wave 1 interviews
were conducted in 1992 and then repeated every two years, so that HRS
incorporates data from 1992–2008. Due to significant changes to the sur-
vey design between waves 1 and 2, the first cross-section cannot be directly
compared to subsequent observations and is therefore not used in our anal-
ysis. To ensure that HRS stays representative of the population as time goes
by, the panel is periodically refreshed with new cohorts of respondents. Up
to now, the sample consists of five different entry cohorts: the original 1992
“HRS” cohort (born 1931–1941), the 1993 “AHEAD” cohort (born 1923 or
earlier), the “CODA” (born 1924–1930) and “WB” (born 1942–1947) co-
horts entering in 1998, and the “EBB” cohort (born 1948-1953) added in
2004.
At baseline in wave 2 (covering interviews conducted between 1993
to 1994), the dataset contains 18,694 individuals with usable records. The
panel is subject to considerable attrition, which reduces sample sizes from
wave to wave – a trend that is only temporarily disrupted when a refresh-
ment cohort is added to the sample (see figure 1.1). The two sources for at-
12In fact, this study exactly replicates HWW’s model of health incidence with one notable
exception. For simplicity, we skip their treatment of interview delay, which accounts for the
fact that interview timing appears to depend on health status. While this potentially calls
into question the comparability of responses from healthy and severely ill individuals, we
find that results are virtually unaffected by this non-random distribution of time at risk.
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Figure 1.1. The five HRS cohorts
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trition are mortality (especially for the elderly AHEAD cohort) and “sample
fatigue”. Death-related attritors are kept in the working sample since mor-
tality is one of the key outcomes of interest. With respect to all others attri-
tors, we apply two alternative sampling schemes. The first exactly mirrors
HWW’s benchmark in that it categorically excludes non-respondents from
the working sample, irrespective of when their drop-off occurs or whether
they rejoin the survey in later waves. As detailed below, the second sam-
pling procedure assures that the information of these households is used
for as long as they are part of the sample.
Much like in HWW’s original study, we exclude all individuals with miss-
ing information on critical variables. This includes item nonresponse for key
demographic variables as well as cases where information on health condi-
tions is generally unavailable. If respondents merely fail to answer isolated
health queries, these gaps are filled by means of simulation-based impu-
tation. Certain health questions on cognitive ability, severe falls, and hip
fractures are not asked to participants below the age of 65, which is why
these variables are excluded from all estimations that include younger sub-
populations. While HWW went to great lengths to impute a large number
of wealth and income observations with first-order Markov cross-wave hot
deck imputation methods, we are in the more convenient position to rely on
the imputations that are now readily available within the RAND/HRS data.
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We should note that, in spite of this data cleaning, self-reported wealth and
income measures are still suspect of considerable measurement error. Sum-
mary statistics for all variables used in our analysis are given in appendix
table 1.6.
Comparison with HWW’s data benchmark
HWW’s original data sample consists of the AHEAD cohort of US Americans
aged 70 and older who are tracked through panel waves 2 to 4. Using the
HRS data that is available to date, allows for deviations from this bench-
mark along several dimensions. Naturally, we can follow the same individu-
als for more time periods since the AHEAD cohort is now biennially observed
between 1993/94 and 2008. Given the introduction of the four additional
entry cohorts, the analysis can also be extended to different individuals with
potentially diverging histories compared to those in the original study. In
addition, it is now possible and certainly interesting to also widen the work-
ing sample by incorporating younger individuals, aged 50 and older. Finally,
it should be noted that there is an additional, albeit minor, deviation from
HWW’s data benchmark even for the same observations as in the original
study. One reason for this is that the early AHEAD data has subsequently
been subject to data updates and revisions within the HRS project. Simi-
larly, there may be differences between the SES imputations carried out by
HWW and those conducted by RAND/HRS.
1.5.2 Results
Following the strategy described in section 1.4, we fit model 1.9 as binomial
probits except for BMI and ADL/IADL impairments, which are estimated
with OLS and ordered probit, respectively. Appendix tables 1.7 and 1.8 con-
tain the empirical significance values for the system of non-causality and
invariance tests specified above. For a more concise overview of results, re-
fer to tables 1.2 and 1.3. In a nutshell, the reanalysis with fresher and more
encompassing data suggests that direct causal links from SES to health can
be ruled out for much fewer health conditions than in the original study.
This casts some doubt on the stability of HWW’s findings. In order to under-
stand which of the data changes contribute to these deviating conclusions,
we estimate the model multiple times, using several different datasets by
augmenting them stepwise along the dimensions outlined above. In the
first step, we rerun HWW’s benchmark study for the same cohort and time
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periods, yet reverting to the current version of HRS data instead.13 This
will detect any impact arising from data revisions and differences in im-
putations. The second step consists of extending the analysis to the other
three cohorts in the sample, hence testing whether HWW’s conclusions are
also valid for different individuals. The third step addresses the question
of how results are affected by increasing the number of time periods un-
der consideration. Since in HWW’s model there is no self-evident way to
aggregate the information from multiple time intervals, we compare two
different sampling approaches: one that refills the sample after each wave
with applicable observations and one that does not. In the fourth and final
step, we evaluate the impact on estimation results when younger individu-
als are included in the analysis as well. This stepwise decomposition of all
data and sampling changes appears to be more informative than applying
the whole bundle of modifications at once.
Step one: Re-estimating HWW with revised data
In order to gauge the result’s sensitivity to data revisions and imputations,
the model is re-estimated with fresh HRS data for the exact same cohort
(AHEAD) and time periods (waves 2 to 4) as in the original study. The dif-
ferences between the new results and HWW’s benchmark are quite modest,
and outcomes of causality test are mostly unchanged. The most notable ex-
ception is diabetes for which the non-causality test had to be previously re-
jected among male respondents. With revised data, however, a direct causal
link from SES to diabetes seems unlikely to exist. For further details, com-
pare columns (B) and (C) of table 1.7.
Step two: Adding new cohorts
While the relative stability of results in face of data revisions is certainly
encouraging, a much stricter test is posed by extending the analysis to all
available cohorts. To achieve this, we run three separate estimations on
13To ensure that none of the observed changes is confoundedly rooted in the way certain
variables are constructed and program codes are implemented, we also reran HWW’s study
verbatim using their original data. While the goal to exactly reproduce HWW was ultimately
achieved, it should be noted that results are identical to those published as log files within
the appendix of the original 2003 paper, but not to those in the article itself. This differ-
ence is attributable to data revisions that HWW accounted for shortly after the paper was
published, which means that the outcome from the appendix should be preferred as the
ultimate benchmark. As is evident from comparing columns (A) and (B) of table 1.7, said
differences are not always trivial in size. Most strikingly, invariance tests tend to fail less
frequently when applied to HWW’s post-publication dataset. Yet, the impact on causality
tests is negligible, thus not challenging the author’s main conclusions from the article.
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the following samples: First, we revisit waves 2 to 4 but allow members of
cohorts other than AHEAD to be part of the working sample. This barely
changes the sample composition because the only other cohort that is part
of the survey in this early stage is HRS, which hardly contains any individ-
uals aged 70+. For the other two estimations, HWW’s data benchmark is
additionally changed inasmuch as later waves are used. The second estima-
tion starts at wave 4, when the new cohorts CODA and EB are interviewed
for the first time. Note that we do not restrict analysis to these two cohorts.
Rather, all respondents who are at least 70 years old at wave 4 and who are
not subject to subsequent sample attrition are followed until wave 7. This
closely mirrors HWW’s approach of analyzing a three-period panel, hence
still keeping the deviations from the benchmark to a minimum. The third
estimation repeats the second for waves 7 to 9, coinciding with the entry
of the most recent cohort, namely WB.
Not surprisingly, the first estimation (table 1.7, column (D)) yields re-
sults that are almost identical to those of HWW’s benchmark with revised
data (table 1.7, column (C)). The hypothesis tests associated with the
other two estimations, however, prove to be rather different. As far as non-
causality tests are concerned, the differences seem to be unsystematic. For
some medical conditions, such as depression and ADL impairments for fe-
males and incontinence for males, causality from SES can no longer be
ruled out as non-causality tests are now consistently rejected. For other
health conditions, namely diabetes and lung disease for males as well as
psychiatric disease for females, the opposite holds true, as non-causality
tests can no longer be rejected. In addition, there are a number of diseases
for which the benchmark causality test results are not confirmed for only
one of the sub-samples. For further details compare columns (D), (E), and
(F), respectively with column (C) of table 1.7. Invariance tests, on the other
hand, tend to be accepted more often than those under the benchmark sce-
nario. At first glance, this may seem contradictory since causality tests have
yielded fairly different results depending on which panel waves are under
consideration. One should, however, not forget that the invariance tests
merely check whether the model is time invariant within each of the three
estimations but not among them. This is changed in the third step when
the information from more than just three waves is incorporated.
Step three: Increasing the number of time periods
Step two has indicated that results depend on which panel waves are cho-
sen to form the working sample. In order to reduce this arbitrary element
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Table 1.2. Results for steps 2 to 4
Tests for Granger non-causality
Health Test results
condition HWW (70+) Step 2 (70+) Step 3 (70+) Step 4 (50+)
W234 W234 W456 W789 W2-9 W2-9
F M F M F M F M F M F M
Cancer • •
Heart • • •• ••
Stroke • ••
Mortality • •• ••• •••
Lung • • ••
Diabetes • •••
High bp. • •
Arthritis •• ••• •• •
Incontinence • • • ••• •• ••• •••
Fall • • n.a. n.a.
Hip fract. •• n.a. n.a.
Proxy • ••• •• •• ••• ••• •••
Cognition •• • •• • • •• • ••• ••• n.a. n.a.
Psychiatric •• • ••• • ••• •
Depression • •• •• •• ••• • ••• ••• ••• •••
BMI • •• ••
Smoke
now
• ••• •••
ADL • • ••• ••• •••
IADL ••• •• ••• ••• ••• •••
S.-r. health •• • ••• • •• •• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• •••
Notes: Results are for white females (F) and males (M). Abbreviations are as follows: Granger
non-causality rejected at 5% level (•), rejected at 1% level (••), or rejected at 0.1% level (•••).
Gray symbols indicate that the corresponding invariance test is rejected at the 5% level. Blank
cells indicate that Granger non-causality cannot be rejected. A “n.a.” entry reflects the fact that
information on certain health conditions is not available for the pre-Medicare population.
and to maximize the use of available information in the data, it makes
sense to increase the number of panel waves. Since there is no unequivocal
way to implement this in practice, we propose two different sampling ap-
proaches. The first approach is a simple extrapolation of HWW’s sampling
method. The working sample consists of all individuals who participated in
the survey in wave 2 and who were not subject to sample-fatigue-related
attrition in later waves. This cohort is then followed for as many waves
as possible. This sampling scheme has two major disadvantages. First, by
restricting the sample to individuals who were part of the survey from the
very start, we exclude refreshment cohorts CODA, EB, and WB, basically
discarding useful information. The second drawback is of a more practical
nature: death-related attritors cause the sample to dramatically thin out
over time, so that sample sizes eventually become too small to conduct
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any meaningful analysis. Moreover, as time moves on, the sample arguably
becomes less representative of the true population because the ongoing at-
trition will select against the most frail. Nevertheless, and for the sake of
maximum comparability with HWW, we estimate two versions of this first
approach. One that follows individuals from wave 2 until wave 6 (cover-
ing cohorts HRS and AHEAD) and another that follows individuals from
wave 4 until wave 9 (covering HRS, AHEAD, CODA, and EB). The number
of waves is chosen so that sample sizes in the last respective wave are still
reasonably large.
The alternative sampling scheme directly addresses the downsides of
the approach above. Instead of limiting the sample to respondents who are
part of the survey from the very beginning, it is now refilled in each wave
with all available respondents who meet the respective age criterion (i.e.
70+) and who answer all relevant questions for two consecutive waves.
That way, all cohorts are used for analysis, sample sizes never diminish to
levels too low for efficient estimation, and, consequently, all 8 waves can
be used simultaneously. As a positive side effect, attrition bias is reduced as
well, as the mortality-induced loss of observations is offset by filling up the
sample with new respondents, once they become age-eligible. One might
object that this approach reduces the power of panel analysis as it does not
make much use of its potential time-series length. For the purpose of repro-
ducing HWW, however, we deem it suitable since the original model does
not use the theoretical length of the panel either, assuming that health and
wealth trajectories are sufficiently described by single lags. Given that the
models are estimated by simply stacking the data of all two-waves transi-
tions above another, it is irrelevant how long an individual is part of the
survey. The information conveyed in the responses of a person who only
participates in, say, waves 4 and 5 is no less valuable than that of a re-
spondent who participates from the very beginning to the end, and should
therefore not be excluded.14
It is noteworthy that the invariance tests of both sampling schemes have
slightly different interpretations. In both cases, they test whether parameter
estimates stay constant over time, by comparing the log likelihood when all
single wave transitions are pooled together with those when estimated sep-
arately. For a sample with refilling, an accepted invariance test indicates
that the uncovered (non-)causal relationships hold for different popula-
tions at different times, underlining the generality of results. Invariance
14Of course, the validity of this argument relies on HWW’s conceptualization of health tra-
jectories as a first-order Markov process. The future development of more realistic models
of health dynamics will require a more sophisticated sampling procedure as well.
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tests for samples without refilling, however, cannot answer the question
whether causal links hold for different populations since only one cohort is
being followed. They rather check whether these links remain constant as a
steadily diminishing cohort becomes older over time, ultimately comparing
the frail (who exit the sample early) with the medically more robust.
The main change in results from using a larger number of sample waves
is that causality from SES to health can no longer be ruled out for a large
array of conditions, even for an elderly population, aged 70 and older. This
observation holds, no matter which of the two above approaches is used,
even though there are some differences. As columns (G), (H), and (J) of
table 1.7 reveal, there are seven health conditions for which the samples
without refilling yield a rejection of non-causality tests, even though this
was not the case for shorter samples. This number even increases to ten
conditions, if the sample with refilling is used instead. The most unambigu-
ous evidence exists for six conditions (mortality and falls for males, proxy
and BMI for females, and cancer irrespective of gender) for which both
approaches suggest that, contrary to earlier evidence, causality may well
play a role. The reversed case of causality becoming less likely to exist as
panel length grows, is as good as non-existent. The influence of analyzing
more time periods at once on invariance tests is about the same for both
approaches and not very strong. If anything, invariance failures tend to be
somewhat likelier – a result that makes sense because it is more demanding
for a model to be valid for eight waves than a mere three.
Step four: Adding younger individuals
So far, the consequence of applying HWW’s model to data that includes
more individuals and time periods, is that the number of medical condi-
tions for which SES causality may play a role has considerably increased.
However, for a population aged 70 and older there remains a large number
of diseases for which causal links are not detected, despite the fact that high
SES is associated with a lower prevalence of these conditions. While this
cross-sectional correlation cannot be interpreted causally, it indicates that
causal channels may have been at work earlier in life, before the individual
even entered the sample. In light of that, it is interesting to also include
younger individuals, to test if the data will pick up additional causal links
that are already mute in an elderly population.
First, the sample is opened up to people who are at least 65 years old,
so that it represents (with some exceptions) the whole Medicare-eligible
subpopulation. This yields a net-increase of 3 to 6 health conditions (de-
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Table 1.3. Pre- vs. post-retirement population
Tests for Granger non-causality
Health Test results
condition Step 4 (0-64) Step 4 (65+)
W2-9 W2-9
F M F M
Cancer
Heart •
Stroke •
Mortality •• • ••
Lung •
Diabetes ••• •• •
High bp. •
Arthritis ••• •••
Incontinence ••• ••• •••
Fall n.a. n.a. • •
Hip fract. n.a. n.a.
Proxy ••• ••• •••
Cognition n.a. n.a. ••• •••
Psychiatric ••• •
Depression ••• ••• ••• •••
BMI • ••
Smoke now ••• •••
ADL ••• ••• ••• •••
IADL ••• ••• • •••
S.-r. health ••• ••• ••• •••
Notes: The same abbreviations as in table 1.2 apply.
pending on whether samples with or without refilling are used) for which
causality can no longer be rejected, affirming the speculation above. See
columns (B), (F) and (K) of table 1.8 for details. A similar effect can be
observed when the sample is opened up even further to include individuals
aged 50+, exploiting the entire age range available within HRS. This time,
the net-increase amounts to another 3 to 9 conditions, rendering cases
for which causal links can be ruled out the exception rather than the rule.
Among the latter are illnesses such as strokes and high blood pressure for
males, lung disease for females, and cancer for both men and women. For
all other health conditions the existence of causal links cannot be refuted.
For further details, consider columns (C), (G) and (L) of table 1.8.
It is also worthwhile to split up the sample into older (65+) and younger
(50–64) individuals to study how the activation of causal channels differs
between a mostly retired, Medicare-eligible population and people who are
typically still on the labor market and not quasi-universally health insured.
As table 1.3 shows, there is quite a number of medical conditions for which
SES may be a causal driving force irrespective of age. These include de-
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pression fpr both genders, IADL impairments, incontinence, and diabetes
for women as well as ADL impairments for men. For other conditions like
arthritis, heart disease, strokes for females, or incontinence for males, SES
is only a good predictor of new medical incidences at a higher age. On the
other hand, smoking behavior as well as psychiatric problems for women
are among the conditions for which a causal link may only be active at a
pre-retirement age. Intriguingly, when young and old people are studied
separately, results appear to be sensitive to whether samples with or with-
out refilling are chosen (see table 1.8). For older individuals, the sample
with refilling suggests more cases of Granger causality than its counterparts
without refreshment do. The exact opposite, however, is true for younger
individuals as for these, rejected causality is a less frequent outcome in
samples without refilling. The latter observation is likely an artifactual side
effect of the way the sampling methods are defined: Sampling with refill-
ing effectively excludes people from the 50–64 sample once they become
older than 65, whereas sampling without refilling follows all individuals
until they die, even if they grow much older. As a consequence, unrefilled
“young” samples may arguably pick up some of the causal effects that are
exclusively active for the older subjects of the cohort.
Model invariance is not systematically influenced by adding younger
individuals to the dataset. The fact that the seeming structural breaks in
the relation of SES and health as people grow older are not detected by
HWW’s invariance tests, should, however, not be surprising. Recall that
the test design does not pit the young against the old but the past against
the future. The idea is to check parameter invariance as time progresses.
Since the age structure within the sample varies only little from wave to
wave (especially when it is regularly refreshed), the invariance test will not
permit a direct comparison of, say, pre- and post-retirement populations. In
light of this, the results in table 1.8 merely suggest that the time stability
of the model is rather insensitive to changes in the age composition of the
sample.
Changes in results of the underlying prediction models
Given the strong dependence of non-causality test results on both the size
and age coverage of the estimation sample, it seems natural to investigate
how these changes are related to the size and the precision of coefficients
of the underlying prediction models.15 As table 1.4 exemplifies, precision
15HWW did not report the coefficients of the prediction models, but these estimates are
also available in their online appendix.
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of SES coefficient estimates does generally increase with the size of the re-
spective sample, even though this relation is not perfect. While standard
errors remain fairly constant across estimations based on similarly sized 3-
waves samples (step 2), they surprisingly spike upwards once all waves are
pooled together in step 3. This observation may well be rooted in the afore-
mentioned switch from a sampling procedure without (steps 1 and 2) to
one with refilling (steps 3 and 4). Precision follows a more predictable pat-
tern within step 4, as standard errors are invariably smaller, the larger the
respective sample (note that N50+ > N65+ > N70+ > N0−64). The same pat-
tern emerges when comparing results by gender, as the number of women
exceeds that of men in each of the subsamples.
Despite increased precision, table 1.5 suggests that the number of sta-
tistically significant SES coefficients does not seem to be systematically af-
fected as samples become more encompassing. In HWW’s benchmark sam-
ple, there is a total of 29 SES regression coefficients that are significant at
the 5% level. This number stays rather constant across the performed steps.
Yet, note that in the benchmark case there is a fair amount of cases for
which coefficients have an unintuitive sign, suggesting that respondents
with high SES are likelier to develop a new health condition. The share
of these cases stays rather high for all 3-waves samples and drops signifi-
cantly once all waves are used at once. This means that, while the overall
number of significant SES coefficients does not increase, the direction of
effects is now more in line with theory. This is an additional insight since
non-causality tests as implemented here do merely check whether health
innovations are conditionally independent of SES variables, whereas the
quality of this dependence is not under consideration.
Table 1.4. Prediction model
Average standard errors of SES coefficients
Sex Standard errors of SES coefficients (average of all health cond. and SES regressors)
HWW Step 2 (70+) Step 3 (70+) Step 4 (W2-9)
W234 W234 W456 W789 W2-9 65+ 50+ 0-64
Female 0.081 0.083 0.087 0.091 0.126 0.107 0.085 0.172
Male 0.108 0.105 0.111 0.110 0.167 0.135 0.098 0.185
Notes: Reported are average standard errors of SES coefficients obtained from estimating model 1.9.
Each entry is an average of 160 single standard errors (20 health variables and 8 SES regressors).
Individual standard errors follow the depicted pattern quite uniformly.
37
1.6. Conclusion and future research
Table 1.5. Prediction model
Significant SES coefficients
Health SES regression coefficients that are significant at 5% level
condition HWW (70+) Step 2 (70+) Step 3 (70+) Step 4 (50+)
W234 W234 W456 W789 W2-9 W2-9
F M F M F M F M F M F M
Cancer E E H W
Heart I I I E NH N
Stroke I E E W H I W
Mortality E E W W
Lung W W W W H E WH W
Diabetes E E W W E WE
High bp. E E W E
Arthritis E E I W E
Incontinence N E N I E I W H
Fall E E n.a. n.a.
Hip fract. W I W I W n.a. n.a.
Proxy I E I E E W I E
Cognition WIN I WINI E E E n.a. n.a.
Psychiatric I W I W
Depression N N E IH EH E E WE
BMI H IH E E H
Smoke
now
W W W N W W E W I
ADL E E IE WI W
IADL WI WIHIE N E H W N W
S.-r. health EH WE EH WE N EH INHIEH IEH NH WIENH IEH
Notes: Results are for white females (F) and males (M). Abbreviations are as follows: Signif-
icant coefficients at 5% level for wealth (W), income (I), education (E), neighborhood (N),
or housing quality (H). Boldfaced (e.g. W) symbols indicate that signs are in line with theory.
Italic (e.g. W) symbols denote the opposite case. Empty cells indicate that none of the SES
variables have a statistically impact on the respective health outcome. A “n.a.” entry reflects
the fact that information on certain health conditions is not available for the pre-Medicare
population.
1.6 Conclusion and future research
All in all, re-estimating HWW’s model of health incidence with new HRS
data, alters conclusions about SES causation quite significantly. While the
impact of data revisions within HRS is encouragingly small, the addition of
new cohorts shows that causal inference critically depends on which time
periods are used for estimation. Using the information of many – ideally
all – waves at once has the greatest effect on results, with many health
conditions moving to the column of illnesses for which SES causality may
well play a role. Adding younger individuals to the sample has a very similar
effect, reducing the number of medical conditions for which the existence
of causal links can be statistically rejected even further. As a consequence,
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the only health conditions for which SES causation can be ruled out when
estimation is based on the most encompassing dataset with refilling, are
cancer (irrespective of gender), lung disease for females and high blood
pressure for males. For all other health incidences, SES is either G-causal
or the failure of invariance tests does not permit reliable conclusions. This
represents a stark contrast to HWW’s original findings, where the rejection
of structural causality was the most frequent outcome.
Given that the greatest changes are triggered by the addition of panel
waves (step 3), the main driving force behind this reversal in results is
most likely an increase in test power as sample sizes soar. After all, in
HWW’s stacking model, a longer panel is equivalent to a larger sample
(with respect to N) since all waves are pooled together and treated as if
they formed one cross section. This interpretation is corroborated by the
fact that test results from long panels do not always reflect the average out-
come of the respective three-wave panels they consist of. As the example
of cancer in table 1.7 illustrates, non-causality tests are often rejected in
the long samples, even though they are consistently accepted in each of
the short panels. Similar observations can be made when comparing test
results by age group. In some cases, a non-causality test is only rejected for
the largest, most-encompassing sample of all individuals aged 50 and older.
However, in all smaller sub-samples (50–64, 65+, and 70+) the same null
hypothesis cannot be rejected. As an example for the latter case, see heart
disease for females in table 1.8. All of this evidence permits the emergence
of a clear picture: the larger the sample under consideration, the likelier
the rejection of non-causality.
We also find that causal inference depends on the age structure of the
underlying population, with certain conditions being Granger caused by
SES at younger or older ages only. This yields at least indirect evidence
that the activation of causal links may indeed change over the life cycle.
However, we recommend to take these results with a grain of salt since their
lack of robustness is far from comforting, as evidenced by the sensitivity
to the choice of sampling schemes. In addition, we should note that the
dataset for the 65+ population is about three times as large as that of the
pre-retirement group. As a consequence, we face the risk of confounding
the true effect of age structures with the impact of varying sample sizes
identified above. This may well provide an alternative explanation for the
failure to detect many cases of G-causality among the 50 to 64 year olds if
estimation is based on a refilling sample – a result that is not confirmed if
samples without refilling are used instead.
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From a methodological point of view, the results of this study pose bad
news for a model whose identification strategy relies on Granger causal-
ity. Recall that the reduced-form nature of G-causality cannot discriminate
between structural causation and ecological association due to common un-
observed effects if G-causality is detected. Ultimately, HWW’s framework al-
lows only the one-sided test for the absence of direct causal links, which is
confirmed if G-causality is rejected as well. While HWW’s original dataset
provided us with a large number of such cases, the more-encompassing
data samples analyzed here, do not do us this favor. As a result, we find
ourselves in the unfortunate situation that little can be learned about the
true links between SES and health, making it impossible to draw meaning-
ful policy conclusions.16
In light of this, the need to improve the empirical model within future
research so as to account for the confounding influence of hidden common
factors, becomes even more pressing. In our view, there are two alterna-
tive ways to achieve this. The first mirrors the identification strategy of IV
approaches: instead of using endogeneity-stricken SES histories as regres-
sors, one could concentrate on the impact of clearly exogenous changes in
these variables. If these SES innovations meet the critical IV assumptions
described in section 1.3, we would be able to formulate two-sided tests that
permit the clean identification of causality in a structural sense. Among the
natural experiments one could exploit, are the major negative shock to
housing and financial wealth that many people experienced during the on-
going financial market crisis of 2008/09, the positive shock Medicare house-
holds received as a result of the introduction of the heavily subsidized Medi-
care Part D program in 2006, and the shocks some employed individuals
received from changes in employer-provided health insurance.17 Particular
attention could be given to the differential exposure to wealth shocks in the
presence of health care delivery systems that vary in the financial impact of
16While invariance tests have arguably gained power by the inclusion of different time
spans, cohorts, and age structures, we are still doubtful that their acceptance would attest
the model the kind of stability necessary to make out-of-sample predictions of policy effects.
The reason for this is that – with the notable exception of the introduction of Medicare Part
D in 2006 – the observed variation in relevant policies remains rather low.
17When it comes to the recent financial crisis, we acknowledge that the equity shock
might not be large enough to provide strong identification. Using HRS data, Gustman et al.
(2010) report that equity accounted only for about 15% of assets prior to the 2008/09 crisis.
Whether this is sufficient exogenous variation would have to be scrutinized as part of future
research. Alternatively, one could explore negative shocks to housing wealth which repre-
sent another aspect of the financial market crunch. Exogenous variation in these shocks is
provided by regional differences in house prices and the severity of declines in real estate
value during the crisis.
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copayments, premiums, and coverage, particularly for chronic conditions
and preventative and palliative therapies. Provided that the causal link in
questions even exists, wealth shocks will take some time to affect health
outcomes. Therefore, we expect any effects of the 2008/2009 financial cri-
sis or Medicare Part D to leave their marks only in future waves of the HRS
dataset.
However, the use of such natural experiments is not immune to objec-
tion, which leads to a fundamental trade-off. On the one hand, we can try
to infer causality by relying on wealth shocks like the ones just described,
which has the advantage of not having to worry about endogeneity issues.
Yet, as argued in section 1.3, there is a risk that these shocks may not be all
that relevant for health, especially when occurring late in life. On the other
hand, the information contained in past levels of SES – the regressor used
in HWW’s G-causality framework – is certainly of great relevance, as it re-
flects the entire history between SES and health status. The disadvantage is
that this pool of information may also include confounding elements, such
as the impact of hidden common causes, calling into question the exogene-
ity of such explanatory variables.
The other alternative we deem feasible of discriminating among hy-
potheses A and C, seeks to solve this trade-off by exploiting the relevant
information contained in SES histories, while eliminating the misleading in-
fluence of common effects. As extensively argued in the fixed- and random-
effects literature, this may be achieved by interpreting the problem of com-
mon effects as an issue of unobserved individual heterogeneity, whose ef-
fect is controlled by fully exploiting the panel structure of HRS. This being
said, the choice of a suitable estimator is not trivial because it needs to
combine three important features that often tend to be mutually exclusive.
First and foremost, the estimation strategy must allow heterogeneity to be
correlated with SES, which makes FE estimators a logical candidate. How-
ever, FE estimation is generally ridden by matters of inconsistency, once
confronted with the other two features, namely a dependent variable that
is both binary (requiring a non-linear specification) and state-dependent
(reflecting the dynamic nature of the model). A feasible way of tackling
these three issues at once, promises to be a dynamic correlated RE Probit
approach as implemented by Contoyannis et al. (2004). It solves the usual
trade-offs between FE and RE setups, by allowing for correlated heterogene-
ity and the estimation of time-invariant regressors even when confronted
with non-linear data structures and lagged dependent variables.18 We ac-
18Michaud and van Soest (2008) adopt a similar strategy, by eliminating the effect of
individual heterogeneity with GMM estimators in the spirit of Arellano and Bond (1991).
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knowledge that this alternative strategy of coping with common effects is
not devoid of criticism either, which is why we consider it reasonable to
independently explore both routes in what lies ahead. This is especially
true inasmuch as both approaches are expected to uncover different causal
channels: while the latter strategy of modeling individual heterogeneity
may allow the detection of average causal effects as manifest in SES histo-
ries, the exploitation of natural experiments will predominantly shed light
on the most immediate (mental) health consequences of wealth shocks.
A second opportunity for future research lies in improving the limited
microfoundation of causal pathways, which is inherent in the reduced-form
nature of Granger causality. Even if we were able to univocally confirm
the presence of causal effects from wealth to health, we still would not
know the channels through which they operate. Yet, the latter information
is absolutely critical from a policy perspective: interventions to increase
the affordability of health insurance would be warranted if channel A1
were to be active, but would prove ineffective if the causal link were to
work through, say, channel A3 instead. To address this issue, we intend
to specify and test more differentiated hypotheses that may facilitate the
discrimination among these channels. For instance, if channel A1 is truly
relevant, we should observe a certain sensitivity of results to the availabil-
ity and generosity of health care systems. Possible comparisons include the
time before and after Medicare Part D or cross-country differences in health
care regimes.19 Another way of gauging the importance of health care af-
fordability is to compare individuals with and without health insurance. Of
particular interest will be the pre-retirement population not yet eligible for
Medicare, as their insurance status will be endogenous unless they are cov-
ered by employer-provided health care. Even if health insurance proves to
be of little importance for the onset of a health condition, it may well be
decisive in determining whether and how it is treated, given that the in-
dividual has already gotten sick. On this account we intend to follow the
health trajectories as well as medical care use of respondents that share the
characteristic of having developed a certain medical condition.
In analyzing the HRS population aged 51–61, they find that causal effects of wealth on
health can be ruled out if unobserved heterogeneity and a more realistic lag structure are
accounted for. However, given that their approach is incompatible with non-linear models,
it is not directly applicable to our research question.
19In fact, Hurd and Kapteyn (2003) find that causal effects from SES to health status
are less pronounced in the Netherlands than in the USA. Given that the Dutch health care
system is basically universal, they see this result as an indication of the general importance
of differential access to health care: SES gradients in health are strongest in institutional
environments in which affordability should a priori matter most.
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Finally, the model would certainly benefit from addressing another of
the methodological shortcomings identified in section 1.4: the treatment of
health dynamics. In our view, there are several ways to accommodate the
long memory effects that prove to be so critical for a realistic description
of health trajectories. A straightforward fix consists of adding higher-order
lags of health condition prevalences to the list of explanatory variables. A
more demanding alternative is a hidden Markov structure in which health
is controlled by a latent random process that drives the onset of health
conditions, self-rated health and mortality. According to Heiss (2011), such
models are parsimonious and capture the observed dynamics better than
commonly applied random-effects or conditional Markov chain models.
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1.A Appendix: Additional tables
The following three tables contain summary statistics for the dataset used
in our analysis as well as detailed results of Granger non-causality tests.
Due to their large dimensions, tables start on the next page.
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CHAPTER 2. UNDERSTANDING THE SES GRADIENT IN HEALTH
Chapter 2
Understanding the SES gradient in health:
The roles of childhood circumstances and
disease management among the elderly
2.1 Introduction
It is the health economic version of the classic “chicken and egg” prob-
lem: We know that people with high socio-economic status (SES) tend to
be in better health and live longer than their economically disadvantaged
counterparts but we are not sure which came first. Do economic resources
determine health (hypothesis A)? Does health influence economic success
(hypothesis B)? Or, are both health and wealth dependent on some third
unaccounted factor (hypothesis C)? The body of literature dealing with this
so-called socio-economic gradient in health is impressive (for an overview
see Smith, 1999; Cutler et al., 2011; and Stowasser et al., 2012).1 The
traditional view that causality flows from SES to health is especially com-
mon among – but not exclusive to – epidemiologists. Often-cited causal
pathways are the affordability of health services, better health knowledge
and lifestyles among the higher educated, environmental hazards associ-
ated with poorly paying occupations and low-income living conditions, or
the mere psychological burden that comes with a life of constant economic
struggle. Economists were among the first to argue that causality may also
work its way from health to economic outcomes, the most important chan-
nel being the development of human capital: Physical frailty is likely to
have adverse effects on educational attainment, occupational productivity
and, consequently, the accumulation of wealth. Finally, the statistical lit-
erature such as Heckman (1981b) stresses the point that the persistent
1Note that Stowasser et al. (2012) largely coincides with chapter 1 of this dissertation.
59
2.1. Introduction
correlation between morbidity and SES may in fact be spurious and due
to unobserved individual heterogeneity with a common influence on both
health and wealth. Prime candidates for such hidden third factors are ge-
netic disposition and other family effects with an impact on preferences
and health-relevant behaviors.
The discrimination among these rivalling hypotheses is paramount since
policy recommendations will critically depend on the nature and the sources
of the gradient. Methodologically, the estimation of credible causal effects
in population data requires addressing the challenges of simultaneity (hy-
pothesis A vs. hypothesis B) and unobserved common effects (hypotheses
A/B vs. hypothesis C).2 The conventional solution to both of these problems
is to exploit natural experiments that provide instruments for either health
or SES. While this strategy of isolating exogenous variation certainly works
well on paper, it is not always persuasive in practice. The main caveat is
that convincing instruments are generally in short supply. As discussed by
Stowasser et al. (2012), even the availability of instruments that are clearly
exogenous and that have an impact on the endogenous regressor they seek
to replace, may cause problems if the variation they reflect is not all that
relevant for the dependent variable of interest. Moreover, since IV strategies
usually rely on rather case-specific events, any uncovered effects may well
be causal in nature but of questionable external validity.
For these reasons, Adams et al. (2003) (HWW henceforth) propose an
alternative approach of uncovering causal links that makes use of the entire
variation in health and economic variables. Using panel data, they test for
Granger non-causality of SES for innovations in health, which deals with
the econometric challenge of distinguishing hypotheses A and B.3 Their
purely statistical causality concept deviates from “true” causality in a struc-
tural sense, as their approach does not specifically address the issue of
unobserved individual heterogeneity. As a consequence, the detection of
Granger causality would not necessarily imply the validity of hypothesis A,
since unobserved third factors may be at work instead. However, a finding
that economic status is not Granger causal for health and that the relation-
ship is invariant across a wide range of SES and health histories would be
informative, as this would rule out true causality as well.4 Applying their
2For a detailed discussion, see Stowasser et al. (2012).
3While HWW studied both wealth-to-health and health-to-wealth causation, this study
concentrates on the question whether hypothesis A is correct.
4The rationale for this reasoning is that Granger causality – or conditional dependence
across time – is thought of as a necessary but insufficient condition for causality in a more
structural sense.
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framework to a representative sample of US Americans over the age of 70,
HWW are unable to reject the hypothesis that economic status has no causal
effect on mortality and most health innovations, once health history is con-
trolled for. Despite the fact that this result may not be overly surprising in
light of the subgroup’s quasi-universal access to Medicare and considering
that causal links may well have been active in the past5, their study stimu-
lated much controversy in the literature, which scrutinized methodological
issues as well as the external validity of HWW’s findings.
On this account, Stowasser et al. (2012) (denoted HWWR for the re-
mainder of this paper) revisit HWW’s approach and investigate whether
the original findings are confirmed when their methodology is applied to
a more encompassing set of data that covers health histories of different
lengths and varying age compositions.6 In stark contrast to the original
study, they find that it is much harder to reject the existence – or the activity
– of causal links in more comprehensive samples. Importantly, this result is
not exclusively driven by the inclusion of younger individuals, as the mere
growth in sample size already leads to higher rejection rates of Granger
non-causality, hinting at HWW’s results being partly driven by low test
power. In light of their findings, HWWR discuss three important method-
ological weaknesses of HWW’s approach that merit attention in future re-
search. First, the underlying notion of health dynamics, with health being
modelled as a first-order Markov process, falls short of reflecting the stock
characteristics of latent health capital as envisioned by Grossman (1972).
Second, the failure to account for individual heterogeneity makes it im-
possible to distinguish between true causal links and third-factor effects in
case Granger causality is detected. Third, even if common effects were con-
vincingly controlled for, HWW’s approach is only informative of the mere
presence of causality but not of the exact mechanisms through which SES
influences health. Although knowledge of this general link is important in
its own right, the identification of specific pathways is equally critical from
a policy perspective.
The present study aims at addressing all three of these drawbacks and
gauges whether HWWR’s main conclusion, that it is impossible to statisti-
cally reject SES-to-health causality even in a retired population aged 65
and older, is robust to adequate methodological refinements. The research
5Indeed, HWW find a steep gradient in the initial cross section, suggesting that a great
deal of the relationship between health and wealth has already been determined during the
(unexplained) first seven decades of respondent’s life courses.
6It should be noted, that one of the authors of HWW, Daniel McFadden, is also part of
the research team that forms HWWR.
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strategy rests on the increasing availability of retrospective life-history data
within large panel studies that link economic and health data, such as the
US American Health and Retirement Study (HRS) used for this analysis.7
These data innovations are the response to the rapidly growing literature
on childhood health that makes the point that a meaningful analysis of
the gradient should incorporate respondent’s early-life information (for an
overview, see Smith, 2009; Almond and Currie, 2011; and Currie, 2011).
For instance, Case et al. (2002) suggest that part of the adult SES gradient
in health originates in early childhood, as they find a strong relationship
between parental economic status and childhood health that accumulates
as children age. In another cohort study, Case et al. (2005) document that
these early conditions have a lasting impact on adult health and – in line
with hypothesis B – other outcomes such as education, labor supply and in-
come. As Currie (2009) notes, these findings are supported by many, albeit
not all, of the myriad of studies that complement the literature by exploit-
ing data from natural experiments.
Not only does this evidence suggest the use of available information on
childhood circumstances, to avoid bias from omitted variables when study-
ing causal pathways in adulthood – the retrospective look at the beginning
of life additionally has the potential to alleviate all three of the aforemen-
tioned problems of HWW’s framework: First, it provides an opportunity
to incorporate longer health histories and, thus, a more realistic model of
health dynamics. Second, to the extent that retrospective data also covers
information on family backgrounds and parental SES, it will be possible
to proxy-control for some of the individual heterogeneity that is suspect of
exerting a common influence on health and wealth. Third, controlling for
both historic and contemporary variables may elucidate when the associ-
ation between SES and health is established, which has important policy
implications: If future outcomes are predetermined during childhood, re-
sources spent on policies that aim at improving access to health care for
adults and retirees may in fact be more wisely invested into educative and
financial measures for young families.
In addition to these refinements, I pursue an alternative strategy – unre-
lated to the early-life literature – to provide further microfoundation of the
causal pathways from SES to health. By decomposing the overall gradient
into direct and indirect effects, this final part of the analysis sheds light on
the question of how wealth, income, and education influence latent health
7Comparable data projects that follow the same trend include the Survey of Health, Age-
ing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), the English Longitudinal Study of Aging (ELSA), or
the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS).
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capital: Does causation work its way through diverging rates of accumula-
tion of health conditions? Are asymmetries in disease management – given
the occurrence of adverse health events – the main driving force? Or, are
other, non-disease specific channels responsible for the fact that general
health status monotonically increases with economic well-being?
In summary, the results of this study suggest that HWWR’s findings are
largely insensitive to varying models of health histories. While SES is un-
likely Granger causal for innovations in acute health insults, Granger non-
causality can be statistically rejected for mental health conditions, mortality
and changes in overall health. Evidence for chronic diseases and functional
health is a bit more inconclusive. However, since the detection of Granger
causality for these health conditions is adversely related to sample size, it is
possible that we merely observe the statistical artifact – as already reported
by HWWR – that test power suffers considerably in small datasets. The
fact that results are also quite robust to the introduction of proxy controls
for individual heterogeneity, lends support to a causal interpretation of the
observed gradient. In line with the literature on early life circumstance, I
find that childhood health has lasting predictive power for adult health.
This, however, does not render contemporary factors unimportant. As to
the specific pathways between SES and general health, it seems that eco-
nomic status exerts its influence both via differentials in disease incidence
as well as through more direct channels. Notably, there is no evidence that
ample financial resources can act as a shield from the health consequences
of illnesses – at least not in a post-retirement population that enjoys near-
universal health care coverage. However, the prevalence of chronic con-
ditions appears to have stronger adverse effects on overall health among
the lower educated, suggesting that they have considerable difficulty in
successful disease management, necessary to diminish the negative health
consequences from illnesses such as diabetes or respiratory diseases.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 presents the
data used for analysis. This is followed by a brief description of the method-
ological framework – which closely resembles that of HWW and HWWR –
in section 2.3. The empirical analysis is presented in section 2.4. Section 2.5
concludes.
2.2 Data
As was the case for HWW and HWWR, the present paper uses data from
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), which is a representative panel of
63
2.2. Data
the US population aged 50 and older. Since the general characteristics of
this survey study have already been discussed in chapter 1, this section is
kept rather brief.8 Due to substantial deviations in survey design, observa-
tions from the first panel wave are dropped. As a result, the main working
sample consists of 8 biennial waves covering interviews conducted between
1993–2008. Close to the spirit of the original HWW study that focuses on
the gradient in an elderly population, I restrict analysis to a mostly retired
population of the age of 65 and above. On average, each wave contains
roughly 11,400 individuals with usable records on health outcomes, SES
variables and demographic information.9 Attritors and members of refresh-
ment cohorts are kept in the sample for as long as they participate in the
survey. This corresponds to HWWR’s “refilling” sampling scheme and en-
sures that sample size is kept high enough for precise estimation and that
up to 8 waves can be used simultaneously.
In a notable deviation from HWWR, this study no longer estimates the
incidence of 20 separate health conditions but combines some of them into
disease clusters. As a result, health dimensionality is reduced to just 6 out-
comes, which should considerably facilitate concise interpretability of re-
sults. The new list of health outcomes reads as follows: The number of
acute – and immediately life-threatening – conditions (cancer, heart dis-
ease, and strokes), the number of chronic diseases (lung disease, diabetes,
hypertension, and arthritis), the number of functional health limitations
(incontinence, severe falls, hip fractures, ADL/IADL impairments, and an in-
dicator for obesity), the number of mental illnesses (cognitive impairment,
psychiatric disease, depression, and whether interviews were conducted
with a proxy respondent), self-rated health status, and – finally – mortal-
ity. Summary statistics for these health indicators as well as for all SES
variables used for analysis – namely wealth, income, education, dwelling
condition, and neighborhood safety – are presented in appendix table 2.7.
This contemporary data is complemented with information from retro-
spective questionnaires on respondents’ health, living conditions, and fam-
ily backgrounds when they were children, that has subsequently become
available within HRS. While this method of retrieving information about
panel members’ lives before the survey’s baseline year provides advantages
– in the form of low cost, speed, and reduced sample attrition – over lon-
8For further details on HRS, please refer to section 1.5.1.
9Just as in HWWR, I exclude individuals that generally failed to disclose information on
their health. Gaps from insular item nonresponse are filled via simulation-based imputation.
For missing wealth and income measures, I use imputations readily available in the public
release files provided by the RAND Corporation.
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gitudinal cohort studies that follow respondents from cradle to grave, one
may express doubt about the accuracy of responses. After all, interviewees
are asked to recall circumstances that date back at least 50 years.10 Yet, the
growing literature on the reliability of retrospective surveys, finds recall
bias to be generally negligible (see Berney and Blane, 2010; and Garrouste
and Paccagnella, 2010). For instance, while Smith (2009) reports some un-
systematic recall error in retrospective HRS data, he finds no evidence for
“coloring” – the selective recall of health histories induced by adverse health
events late in life – of responses.
Retrospective information on childhood health has been introduced to
HRS in two stages. A general index of self-rated health (SRH) before age 16
– which is constructed in the same way as the 5-point-scale measure for con-
temporary SRH – is already available since panel wave 4, hence covering
a rather large share of the entire HRS population. On the other hand, ef-
fective sample sizes are considerably smaller for the multitude of detailed
child-health measures introduced in wave 9, since these are only available
for respondents, who were still sample members at this late stage. The lat-
ter list of variables includes 21 health conditions and whether respondents
missed school for more than a month due to health problems. Once again,
the individual health conditions are grouped to reduce complexity: I distin-
guish severe health problems (such as cancer or heart disease), less severe
conditions (such as ear infections or allergies), mental health problems
(such as depression or psychological problems), and classic child diseases
(measles, chicken pox, and mumps).
HRS early-life data also covers the economic living conditions during
childhood as well as family background measures and certain child behav-
iors. Again, some measures are available as early as wave 4. These include
a 3-point index of self-assessed family SES, information on parental edu-
cation, paternal unemployment, and whether the family ever solicitated
financial help or had to move due to economic dire straits. Information
on maternal labor-force participation and parental smoking were added in
waves 8 and 9, respectively. In addition, starting with wave 9, HRS provides
information on childhood smoking, drug and alcohol use, and whether the
respondent experienced significant learning problems at school. Another
pair of measures – already used by HWW and HWWR – that also capture
family effects, but which are not considered part of HRS’s retrospective
module, are the ages at death (or just the ages, in case they are still alive) of
the respondents’ parents. Similarly, respondents’ adult height is often used
10The HRS questionnaire defines childhood as life before the age of 16.
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Table 2.1. HRS early-life data
Summary statistics
Variables N Mean StDev.
Childhood health
- Poor/fair self-rated health 25,266 0.654 0.247
- No. of severe conditions 11,624 0.243 0.526
- No. of less severe conditions 11,625 0.345 0.665
- No. of mental conditions 11,693 0.068 0.289
- No. of “child diseases” 10,565 2.228 0.982
- Missed school due to health problem 11,681 0.113 0.316
Family background
- Self-rated family SES above average 25,389 0.066 0.249
- Self-rated family SES below average 25,389 0.317 0.465
- Family needed financial help 24,994 0.125 0.331
- Moved due to financial problems 25,246 0.180 0.384
- Father’s Education (in years) 24,806 8.9 3.5
- Mother’s Education (in years) 26,010 9.1 3.3
- Father ever unemployed 25,045 0.290 0.454
- Mother always worked 17,633 0.171 0.376
- Mother sometimes worked 17,633 0.327 0.469
- Any parent smoked 11,677 0.634 0.482
- Both parents smoked 11,677 0.169 0.375
- Smoked as child 15,219 0.185 0.389
- Drugs or alcohol as child 11,722 0.005 0.071
- Learning problems at school 15,218 0.027 0.162
- Father’s age (at death) (in years) 29,482 71.6 14.4
- Mother’s age (at death) (in years) 29,482 75.3 15.1
- Adult height (in meters) 29,482 1.69 0.10
Notes: N denotes the number of respondents for who information
on the respective variable is available.
as a proxy for health at birth and is correlated with the uterine environment
the family provides (see Case and Paxson, 2008; and Currie, 2011).
Summary statistics for all early-life data used for analysis are provided
in table 2.1. As indicated, the number of available observations differs con-
siderably among variables. This needs to be taken into account when decid-
ing which of these information to use for analysis in section 2.4, as statisti-
cal power will certainly suffer in case of severe sample-size loss.
2.3 Methodology
Given that this study keeps modifications to HWW’s methodological frame-
work to a minimum and since their approach has been thoroughly discussed
in chapter 1, the present section is kept fairly concise. Again, you should
feel free to reconsider section 1.4 for further details.
The analysis in section 2.4 builds on the following dynamic model of
health incidence:
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f (HI ji t |HI
k< j
i t ,Hi t−τ,Si t−1,Xi t−1, Ii), (2.1)
where i denotes the respondent and t indicates time. The dependent
variable, HI ji t measures a new incidence of a given health condition, where
j stands for one of the six health clusters introduced above. As in HWW,
health innovations are thought to be influenced by the following explana-
tory variables: Instantaneous causal effects from concurrent health shocks
on HI ji t – such as the development of cancer that is followed by death within
the same inter-wave spell – are captured by HIk< ji t , containing the incidence
variables for all health indicators (1, ..., k) that are causally arranged up-
stream of indicator j.11 Furthermore, the model controls for health histo-
ries, Hi t−τ, that capture state dependence and co-morbidities, respectively.
The vector Xi t−1 includes demographic controls. The vector of main inter-
est, Si t−1, contains lagged levels of wealth, income, educational attainment,
and indicators for subpar living environments. If SES is truly causal for
health changes in an elderly population, we should expect significant coef-
ficients for at least some of these variables. Moreover, the null hypothesis
that
f (HI ji t |HI
k< j
i t ,Hi t−τ,Si t−1,Xi t−1, Ii)= f (HI
j
i t |HI
k< j
i t ,Hi t−τ,Xi t−1, Ii), (2.2)
i.e. that past SES is not Granger causal for health deteriorations, should
be rejected, while invariance tests, as described in section 1.4 , are expected
to be confirmed.
Model 2.1 deviates from HWW’s original specification – model 1.9 – in
the following four aspects: First, health histories are no longer assumed to
be first-order Markov, as τ may take on values larger than one, to better
accommodate the stock characteristics of latent health capital. This part of
the analysis, in which I estimate model 2.1 with alternative specifications
for Hi t−τ, is presented in section 2.4.1. Second, the model acknowledges
the hypothetical presence of individual heterogeneity, Ii, that may induce
spurious correlation between health and SES (see hypothesis C). The anal-
ysis in section 2.4.2 seeks to contain the confounding influence of such
common effects by using proxy controls for family backgrounds and be-
havioral factors. Of main interest is whether HWWR’s findings, that SES
11Similarly to HWW, the six health indicators are grouped in the order in which instan-
taneous causality is most likely to flow: Acute conditions are listed first, as they can have
an immediate impact on mortality. The remaining indicators are stacked as follows: Acute
conditions upstream of chronic conditions upstream of functional conditions upstream of
mental conditions upstream of SRH.
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Table 2.2. Benchmark results
Tests for Granger non-causality
Health indicator Test results
(65+)
W2-9
(N=50,993)
F M
Acute conditions
Mortality • ••
Chronic conditions ••• •••
Functional conditions •• •••
Mental conditions ••• •••
Self-rated health status ••• •••
Notes: Results are for white females (F) and
males (M). Abbreviations are as follows:
Granger non-causality rejected at 5% level
(•), rejected at 1% level (••), or rejected at
0.1% level (•••). Gray symbols indicate that
the corresponding invariance test is rejected
at the 5% level. Blank cells indicate that
Granger non-causality cannot be rejected. N
denotes the number of respondent-year ob-
servations.
is Granger causal for innovations in health, even in an elderly population,
survive when more realistic health dynamics and a richer set of control vari-
ables are incorporated. A confirmation of their results would lend support
to a causal interpretation of the observed association.
In a third departure from HWW’s model, I vary the way of controlling
for SES when fitting the model for self-rated health status. Instead of merely
including the most recent histories of economic variables, I additionally in-
teract wealth, income, and education with the prevalence of health condi-
tions. As argued in section 2.4.3, this will shed light on causal pathways,
as it decomposes the overall influence of economic circumstances on gen-
eral health status into three different effects: a direct effect on well-being,
not transmitted by medical conditions; an indirect effect via higher inci-
dence rates of diseases among the poor; and an interaction effect, which
measures the additional impact of SES on health, given the detection of
a health problem in the past. The last effect is of particular interest as it
will provide information on the role of financial resources and educational
status in limiting the negative health consequences of illnesses.
The final deviation from model 1.9 concerns the reduction in health
dimensionality by grouping certain medical conditions together. As a con-
sequence, model 2.1 is now fitted by ordered probit (except for mortality
and the indicator for poor/fair SRH, which continue to be estimated with a
68
2.4. Empirical analysis
probit model). To ensure the innocuousness of this modeling choice and to
provide a benchmark to which results from section 2.4 can be directly com-
pared, I estimate model 2.1 with identical health histories and controls as
in HWWR. Note that, since the present sample consists of individuals aged
65 and older, results in table 2.2 – which represent test results for Granger
non-causality of SES, conditional on model invariance – need to be com-
pared to the two final columns of table 1.3. Evidently, results are largely
insensitive to the aggregation of health measures and mirror HWWR’s find-
ing that – with the exception of acute diseases – SES Granger causality
cannot be rejected for medical events after the age of 65.12 These results
are at least significant at the 5% level, in many cases even at the 1% or
0.1% level, although model invariance across time is not always supported
in a sample that spans over all 8 available panel waves.
2.4 Empirical analysis
2.4.1 Health dynamics
The notion of health being a latent capital stock that reflects the entire his-
tory of medically relevant events is not new. Ever since Grossman (1972)
proposed his seminal health production framework, most health economists
acknowledge the existence of “long memory effects” of the human body and
mind. Heiss (2011) confirms that this feature characterizes the HRS popu-
lation, too, as he detects a surprisingly high degree of state dependence in
respondents’ SRH: Studying the first seven panel waves, he finds that, even
if the maximum number of six lags of SRH are included to predict SRH in
the seventh wave, all historic variables have significant explanatory power
on their own.
In light of this, and as discussed by HWWR (p. 494), HWW’s treatment
of health dynamics – which is viewed as a first-order Markov chain struc-
ture – will not provide an appropriate description of the evolution of health:
Intuitively, this is because the Markov model assumes that all relevant in-
formation about the whole past is captured in the observed variables one
12While the aggregation of health conditions appears to occult HWWR’s weak evidence
of Granger causality for heart problems and strokes among women, robustness checks – not
reported here due to space considerations – which repeat the analysis of section 2.4 with
all 20 separate health conditions, suggest that this result was rather unstable to begin with
and quickly disappears once modifications along the lines described above are implemented.
In fact, this robustness analysis – available upon request – asserts that the findings of this
study are not driven by the decision to use health-condition clusters.
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period ago. This is unrealistic since knowledge of longer histories would
better capture the stock characteristics of health capital [...]. Taking func-
tional limitations as an example, a respondent who reported difficulties
with walking one year ago and no limitations previously has a different out-
look than a respondent who consistently reported difficulties with walking
for the last ten years.
A straightforward way to improve HWW’s model of health dynamics
consists of increasing the length of health histories, model 2.1 controls for.
While the performance of higher-order Markov models probably falls short
of that of a fully-fledged hidden Markov model, such as Heiss (2011), they
will likely pick up many of the same effects. More importantly, however,
there are practical limits to this strategy: The more lags of health condi-
tions are incorporated, the smaller the effective sample size that remains
for analysis. On the one hand, it excludes all respondents that have been
part of the sample for fewer waves than required by the desired history
length. This may affect both sample attritors and members of refreshment
cohorts, meant to keep the panel representative of the underlying popula-
tion. On the other hand, the sample would even shrink if the panel was
completely balanced, as each additional lag of control variables requires
to drop one wave for the estimation of health innovations conditional on
health histories.
As mentioned in section 2.1, such large drops in sample size constitute
a severe problem for HWW’s approach because of its susceptibility of being
unable to reject Granger non-causality if test power drops too low. Given
this apparent trade-off between richer health dynamics and the risk to ob-
tain artifactual test results, the number of lags should only be increased
with great care. On this account, the knowledge of health during childhood
provides a promising alternative to control for even (much) longer histories
without having to forego the potential scale limits in the data.
At the same time, the availability of information on child health allevi-
ates the closely related problem of initial conditions – that is, life before re-
spondents enter the panel (see Heckman, 1981a). As Smith (2009) (p. 388)
notes,
[k]nowing health or economic status beginning at [survey] baseline is not
sufficient because the entire prior histories of health and economic trajecto-
ries may matter for current decision making. The absence of information
on pre-baseline health histories, including childhood health, means that
researchers have to rely on a key untestable assumption: baseline health
conditions sufficiently summarize individuals’ health histories. If they do
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Figure 2.1. Maximum health history lengths
Comparison between studies
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Notes: White boxes indicate known health histories. Black boxes depict unknown health histories.
“HH length” denotes the maximum length of health histories that can be exploited for analysis.
“Analyzed HI” stands for the age range used to analyze health incidence. HWW stands for the
study by Adams et al. (2003). HWWR denotes Stowasser et al. (2012).
not, new health events unfolding during the panel may be the delayed
(and perhaps predictable) consequence of some knowable part of an indi-
vidual’s health history. If so, health events within the panel cannot be used
to measure effects of new exogenous, unanticipated events.
The extent to which retrospective data enables a look into the “black
box” of early life, as compared to HWW and HWWR, is visualized in fig-
ure 2.1. Note that the effective health history length is depicted to be by
one wave (or 2 years) shorter than panel length theoretically permits.
Given these considerations, I gauge the sensitivity of model 2.1 to vary-
ing representations of health history by gradually increasing the lag length
of adult health prevalence, by the inclusion of child health, and by com-
binations of the two. As argued above and in section 2.2, these steps are
associated with considerable reductions in effective sample size, which en-
tails the risk of confounding any effect from longer health histories with
the mere decline in test power that plagued the analysis of HWW. In or-
der to separate these two effects, I also apply HWW’s unaltered health
history specification to these subsamples. These “dry runs” serve as the
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benchmarks, to which results from models with more sophisticated health
histories should be compared. The Granger non-causality test results for all
of these specification are summarized in table 2.3.
The first alternative specification, models health histories as a second-
order Markov process (i.e. the number of health-condition lags is increased
to two), which reduces the size of the analyzable sample from 50,993 to
42,367 respondent-year observations. As is evident from comparing columns
(C) and (D) with columns (A) and (B) of panel A in table 2.3, this has no sig-
nificant impact on SES Granger causality tests. The same picture emerges
when a third-order Markov model is used (see columns (G) and (H)). While
with the latter specification, empirical p-values tend to be a bit higher than
with the lower-ordered Markov model (as indicated by fewer dots), this is
clearly not driven by the inclusion of the additional lag but by the reduc-
tion in sample size. To see this, consider that p-values also increase for the
benchmark case – compare columns (E) and (F) with columns (A) and (B)
– whereas the actual switch to a higher-order Markov model – compare
columns (G) and (H) to columns (E) and (F) – has no systematic impact
at all. Results for even higher-order Markov models are not presented here,
as these imply sample sizes too low to conduct meaningful analysis that
stratifies by gender.
Panel B of table 2.3 contains results for specifications that use child
health to incorporate longer health histories. Recall from section 2.2 that
the number of respondents with data on childhood SRH greatly exceeds
that of individuals for who we have detailed information on early-life health
conditions. For this reason, I add these variables in two sequential steps.
Results in columns (L) and (M) are for model 2.1 when controlling for
first-order Markov health histories – HWW’s default – and self-rated health
during childhood. Once again, Granger non-causality tests are not systemat-
ically influenced by the incorporation of longer health histories and suggest
that, with the exception of acute diseases, causal links from SES to health
cannot be statistically rejected. In the second step, I additionally include
the more specific data on childhood health conditions, which roughly cuts
the available sample size in half (49,962 to 25,175 respondent-year obser-
vations). The corresponding results in columns (P) and (Q) require some
discussion: First of all, the effect of SES on mortality can no longer be
studied because information on childhood health conditions is only avail-
able for respondents who were still alive in wave 9, which happens to be
the most recent wave in the working sample. Furthermore, while it is true
that Granger causality of SES is no longer supported for functional health
conditions among women, this seems, once again, to be driven by the sub-
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Table 2.3. Results for varying health histories
Tests for Granger non-causality
Panel A: Higher-order Markov models
Health indicator Test results
Sample for 2 lags Sample for 3 lags
(N=42,367) (N=38,886)
HWW 2 lags HWW 3 lags
F M F M F M F M
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H)
Acute conditions
Mortality ••• ••• •• ••• •• •• •• ••
Chronic conditions ••• •• ••• •• ••• • •• •
Funtional conditions •• ••• ••• ••• •• ••• ••• •••
Mental conditions ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• •••
Self-rated health ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• •••
Panel B: Childhood health
Health indicator Test results
Sample for SRH Sample for Conditions
(N=49,962) (N=25,175)
HWW SRH HWW HC
F M F M F M F M
(J) (K) (L) (M) (N) (O) (P) (Q)
Acute conditions
Mortality •• ••• ••• ••• n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Chronic conditions ••• ••• ••• ••• •• ••• ••• •••
Funtional conditions •• ••• •• ••• •• •
Mental conditions ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• •••
Self-rated health ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• •••
Panel C: Third-order Markov model and Childhood health
Health indicator Test results
Sample for SRH Sample for Conditions
(N=34,136) (N=19,527)
HWW 3L & SRH HWW 3L & HC
F M F M F M F M
(R) (S) (T) (U) (V) (W) (X) (Y)
Acute conditions
Mortality •• •• •• •• n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Chronic conditions ••• • • • • • •
Funtional conditions •• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••
Mental conditions ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• •••
Self-rated health ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• •••
Notes: Results are for white females (F) and males (M). Abbreviations are as follows:
Granger non-causality rejected at 5% level (•), rejected at 1% level (••), or rejected
at 0.1% level (•••). Gray symbols indicate that the corresponding invariance test is
rejected at the 5% level. Blank cells indicate that Granger non-causality cannot be
rejected. N denotes the number of respondent-year obsservations. SRH stands for
self-rated health during childhood. HC denotes childhood health conditions. 3L ab-
breviates 3 lags. “n.a.” indicates that lack in variation impedes estimation of mortality
models.
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stantial reduction in sample size. Also note that, while the change in results
for functional conditions among men (when comparing columns (O) and
(Q)) seems substantial at first sight, a look at the actual p-values reveals
that the change – from 0.0089 to 0.0104 – is only marginal at best.
For results in panel C of table 2.3, I combine both ways of accommo-
dating health histories, which should arguably provide the most compre-
hensive description of the long memory effects of latent health capital–
although this comes at the cost of even greater sample-size loss. Test out-
comes in columns (T) and (U) are from a model with third-order Markov
health histories and childhood SRH. This specification is then amended
with the data on childhood health conditions (see columns (X) and (Y)).
Overall, test outcomes depicted here, corroborate the findings from pan-
els A and B. If anything, evidence for SES being Granger causal for the
development of chronic conditions becomes a little weaker, as the null
hypothesis of non-causality is only rejected at the 5% level for men and
the 5% to 15% level for women (the corresponding p-value in column (X)
equals 0.141). Similarly, results for functional conditions among females do
again become barely insignificant (p=0.120). While it is certainly possible
to dismiss these observations as artifactual side effects of dwindling sample
sizes, one should at least note that results are generally a bit less stable for
chronic and functional conditions than for mental health and SRH.
Finally, a look at the coefficients of the underlying prediction model 2.1
– not reported here – confirms the earlier finding in the literature that even
very long health histories have explanatory power for health innovations
in an elderly population. For instance, Heiss’ (2011) observation, that all
lags of SRH have highly significant predictive power for current SRH, is
confirmed even when controlling for SES and third-order Markov health-
condition histories. The fact that the same holds true for SRH during child-
hood, hints at an astounding degree of state-dependence in latent health.
In addition, to have been in subpar health as a child, significantly increases
the risk of developing a chronic condition among women over the age of
65. Interestingly, the addition of childhood health conditions renders coeffi-
cients of childhood SES insignificant. Now, it is the number of severe health
problems during childhood, which has explanatory power for innovations
in acute, chronic, functional and mental health conditions. The number
of less severe conditions only matters for the development of chronic con-
ditions among men. Mental problems as a child are highly predictive of
mental illness in adulthood as well as of functional health problems among
females. As expected, the number of classic child diseases has no explana-
tory power for any future health outcomes. All of this evidence confirms
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the long reach of childhood circumstances, established by the literature
summarized in section 2.1. It is encouraging to observe that test results for
Granger-non causality of SES are not significantly changed by accounting
for these formerly omitted variables.
2.4.2 Common effects
As argued in section 2.1, HWW’s Granger-causality framework cannot cleanly
distinguish between hypotheses A and C – that is, between “true” causality
and spurious correlation due to common effects. This identification prob-
lem arises because of unobserved individual heterogeneity – with respect to
genetic endowment, family backgrounds, and early-life experiences – that
influences both health and SES without there necessarily being a causal
relationship between the two. Methodological solutions to this problem ei-
ther require a set of valid instruments or the use of fixed-effects approaches.
Since HWW, HWWR, and the present paper study whether HWW’s frame-
work can serve as a viable alternative to IV estimation, it would not make
much sense to go down the first-mentioned route. Furthermore, while the
HRS panel is certainly of sufficient length to estimate equations with indi-
vidual fixed effects, it is not obvious that such models, which rely on the
assumption that coefficients are constant over time, make sense when look-
ing at health and wealth over a period spanning several decades.
For these reasons, this study follows a different strategy, which may well
fall short of providing an outright solution to the problem, but which should
alleviate the confounding influence of unobserved third factors. Acknowl-
edging the fact that the underlying problem is one of omitted variables –
namely unobserved individual heterogeneity – I add control variables that
should provide reasonable proxies for characteristics of the family and the
home environment, as the latter are likely to play a central role in shaping
individual preferences, behaviors and genetic endowment. Naturally, the
feasibility of this approach critically hinges on the data at hand. As exten-
sively argued in the childhood-health literature, early-life data provides a
number of variables that meet the above requirement (see – among several
others – Case et al., 2002; Berger et al., 2005; Case et al., 2005; Smith et al.,
2010; and Mazzonna, 2011). For instance, Case et al. (2005) (p.384)
[...] include a large set of variables in [the control vector] C, and assume
that this set of variables is rich enough to capture all individual heterogene-
ity. Indeed, our ability to control for a large set of childhood characteristics
is an advantage over much of the previous literature that examines health
and SES dynamics.
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Table 2.4. Results for varying family-background controls
Tests for Granger non-causality
Health indicator Test results
Sample for tier 1 Sample for tier 2
(N=42,271) (N=21,250)
HWW Tier 1 HWW Tier 2
F M F M F M F M
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H)
Acute conditions
Mortality •• ••• •• •• n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Chronic conditions ••• •• ••• •• ••• ••• •• ••
Funtional conditions •• ••• • •• •• •
Mental conditions ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• •••
Self-rated health ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• ••• •••
Notes: Results are for white females (F) and males (M). Abbreviations are as fol-
lows: Granger non-causality rejected at 5% level (•), rejected at 1% level (••), or
rejected at 0.1% level (•••). Gray symbols indicate that the corresponding invari-
ance test is rejected at the 5% level. Blank cells indicate that Granger non-causality
cannot be rejected. N denotes the number of respondent-year obsservations. For
definitions of tier 1 and tier 2 see text. “n.a.” indicates that lack in variation im-
pedes estimation of mortality models.
The 15 family-background variables used to proxy-control for individ-
ual effects are listed in table 2.1. As was the case for childhood health con-
ditions, the number of available observations differs substantially among
variables, which is why they are also added in two sequential steps. The
first tier of controls includes the four proxies for family SES, parental edu-
cation, paternal unemployment status, parental age (of death) and respon-
dents’ adult height. The second tier consists of the aforementioned data to
which maternal labor-force status, parental and own smoking behavior as a
child, drug use, and information on learning problems in school are added.
Again, I estimate benchmark dry-runs like those described in section 2.4.2
to distinguish the effects of adding the controls from those that are due
to reductions in sample size. Results for Granger non-causality tests, condi-
tional on model invariance, are summarized in table 2.4.
While p-values slightly increase across the board by the inclusion of
both tier 1 and tier 2 variables, the changes in test results are not very
substantial. Overall, the conclusion that Granger-non causality is statisti-
cally rejected for non-acute health events remains intact even after control-
ling for family backgrounds. The notable exception is functional health, for
which results are a bit inconclusive. This underscores the earlier finding
that the association between SES and this health dimension appears to be
weaker than for other conditions.
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Table 2.5. Results for all controls
Tests for Granger non-causality
Health indicator Test results
(N=16,335)
HWW All controls
F M F M
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Acute conditions
Mortality n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Chronic conditions • •
Funtional conditions •• •
Mental conditions ••• ••• •• •••
Self-rated health ••• ••• ••• •••
Notes: Results are for white females (F) and males
(M). Abbreviations are as follows: Granger non-
causality rejected at 5% level (•), rejected at 1%
level (••), or rejected at 0.1% level (•••). Gray
symbols indicate that the corresponding invariance
test is rejected at the 5% level. Blank cells indicate
that Granger non-causality cannot be rejected. N de-
notes the number of respondent-year obsservations.
“n.a.” indicates that lack in variation impedes esti-
mation of mortality models.
In a final step, I estimate a version of model 2.1 that combines controls
for family backgrounds with a more adequate model of health dynamics as
developed in section 2.4.1. Note that, inasmuch as these longer histories
capture the effect of latent health capital, they may also absorb some of the
endogeneity imposed by genetic traits, with severe health problems in child-
hood being a signal for general frailty. To achieve the most conservative as-
sessment for the presence of Granger causality, I model health histories as
third-order Markov with controls for all available childhood health condi-
tions and include the more encompassing second tier of early-life controls.
Results are presented in table 2.5 and should be compared to columns (X)
and (Y) of table 2.3 and columns (G) and (H) of table 2.4. Even in this most
encompassing specification – that comes at the cost of an even smaller and
less representative sample of just 16,335 respondent-year observations –
SES Granger non-causality for mental health conditions and general health
status is clearly rejected, which lends credibility to the interpretation that
these associations do in fact reflect causal relationships. While results for
chronic and functional health conditions are certainly less robust, it is not
entirely clear how much of the increase in p-values is driven by the intro-
duction of controls – which would in fact suggest the importance of third
factors – and how much is due to dwindling test power that may occult the
presence of true, albeit relatively weaker, causal links. A conclusive answer
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to this question will have to wait for the addition of refreshment cohorts,
which will eventually increase the number of available observations for
early-life conditions as well.
2.4.3 Causal pathways
So far, the focus of this study has been the ability of HWW’s approach to
discriminate between true causality and the influence of third factors, in
case Granger causality is detected. While this general distinction is certainly
of interest in its own right, it is equally important to go beyond broad
causality tests and investigate more narrowly focused questions about the
mechanisms that connect specific health outcomes to specific dimensions in
SES. This is especially true from the perspective of policy makers in search
for economic policy levers that can improve the health of the general public.
Yet, as discussed by HWWR (p. 512), one of the major downsides of HWW’s
approach lies exactly in the limited discrimination among causal pathways:
Even if we were able to univocally confirm the presence of causal effects
from wealth to health, we still would not know the channels through
which they operate. Yet, the latter information is absolutely critical from
a policy perspective: interventions to increase the affordability of health
insurance would be warranted if channel A1 [affordability of care] were
to be active, but would prove ineffective if the causal link were to work
through, say, channel A3 (health knowledge) instead. To address this is-
sue, we intend to specify and test more differentiated hypotheses that may
facilitate the discrimination among these channels [in future research].
In this spirit, the present section explores the relative importance of
pathways suggested in the literature. For this, I deconstruct the general
gradient to study how wealth, income and education leave their mark on
the general health of individuals. Specifically, I vary the way of controlling
for SES when estimating model 2.1 for SRH: Instead of only including the
most recent histories of economic variables, I additionally interact wealth,
income, and education with the prevalence of health conditions. This al-
lows the decomposition of the overall influence of SES into the following
three effects:
Direct effect. This is the effect on well-being not transmitted by medical
conditions. One possible pathway that could account for such an in-
fluence of SES is channel A213 – the psychological burden of being
13Note that the classification of causal channels used here, follows the nomenclature
proposed by HWWR. For their discussion of potential pathways see section 1.2.1.
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poor – where constant economic distress may cause general discom-
fort or frailty even in the absence of measurable disease. Similarly,
low SES may be causal for health conditions not used for analysis –
such as migraines or back pain – which would, however, represent an
instance of omitted variables rather than a true direct effect.
Indirect effect. This is the effect on general health status that is due to
the accumulation of health conditions. Here, low SES may be causal
for the development of certain illnesses, for instance via channel A3 –
environmental hazards – where the proximity of low-income housing
to smokestack factories may induce lung disease among the poor. The
severity of the gradient that works through this link also depends on
the importance of the respective condition for overall health, which
will be larger for, say, cancer than for hypertension.
Interaction effect. This effect measures the additional impact of SES on
health, given the presence of a health problem. The effect is of par-
ticular interest as it provides information on the role of financial re-
sources and educational status in limiting the negative health conse-
quences of illnesses. Potential pathways, whose plausibility can be put
to test, include channel A1 – the affordability of health care – where
certain treatments may be too costly for the financially constrained as
well as channels A4 and A5 – health knowledge and risk behaviors, re-
spectively – that stress the prominent role of educational attainment
in adhering to certain lifestyles or regimens if medically demanded.
Probit regression results presented in table 2.6 come from estimating
model 2.1 with interactions between health-condition indexes and wealth,
income, and education years, respectively. To make use of maximum sam-
ple size, I do not stratify by gender and use HWW’s benchmark specification
without longer health histories and controls for family effects. Results, not
presented here, are qualitatively similar but less precise when the more so-
phisticated specifications are used. Boldfaced numbers indicate significance
at the 1% level. As is evident from the first six rows, all SES measures en-
ter the model with intuitive signs – note that the dependent variable is an
indicator for poor or fair SRH – and are highly statistically significant. This
suggests that direct effects of SES that are not transmitted through medical
events play an important role in determining health. A similar statement
can be made about indirect effects, since – unsurprisingly – the presence
of any health problem increases the probability to rate ones health as sub-
par. Given that SES is (at least Granger) causal for mental conditions and
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Table 2.6. Results for interaction model
Dependent variable: Indicator for poor/fair SRH
Explanatory variables Probit regression
Coefficients (SE)
SES variables
- Low wealth 0,2161 (0.0434)
- Low income 0,1864 (0.0375)
- High school -0,1596 (0.0224)
- College -0,0925 (0.0224)
- Poor neighborhood 0,1060 (0.0268)
- Poor dwelling 0,2359 (0.0241)
Health conditions
- Acute 0,1188 (0.0428)
- Chronic 0,2998 (0.0325)
- Functional 0,0931 (0.0261)
- Mental 0,0953 (0.0336)
Interactions
- LowWealth∗Acute -0,0821 (0.0273)
- LowWealth∗Chronic 0,0231 (0.0217)
- LowWealth∗Functional -0,0295 (0.0167)
- LowWealth∗Mental -0,0417 (0.0222)
- LowIncome∗Acute -0,0291 (0.0245)
- LowIncome∗Chronic -0,0147 (0.0198)
- LowIncome∗Functional 0,0103 (0.0155)
- LowIncome∗Mental 0,0435 (0.0209)
- EducationYrs∗Acute 0,0019 (0.0033)
- EducationYrs∗Chronic -0,0092 (0.0025)
- EducationYrs∗Functional -0,0027 (0.0020)
- EducationYrs∗Mental 0,0030 (0.0026)
N 50,993
LL -21,729.2
Notes: Results are for the HWW benchmark speci-
fication. All SES variables are defined as dummies.
Health conditions are count variables. Standard er-
rors are in brackets. Boldfaced numbers indicate sta-
tistical significance at the 1% level.
also likely for chronic and functional health problems, this establishes an
additional link between health and wealth.
Turning to the interaction effects, there is no evidence that financial re-
sources alleviate the health consequences of diseases, once they have been
diagnosed. This clearly speaks against the importance of channel A1, at
least in a population – like the one under consideration – that is Medicare-
eligible. In fact, the only statistically significant point estimate for an in-
teraction with a monetary SES variable has the opposite sign than theory
would predict. According to this result, being poor (as measured by being
in the bottom quartile of the wealth distribution) has a positive effect on
SRH, conditional on having developed an acute health condition in the
past. However, this anomalous result is likely due to a level effect: Given
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that respondents at the very bottom of the wealth distribution tend to be
already in poor health, the diagnosis of an acute disease will not have any
measurable additional impact on self-assessed health – which cannot be
rated worse than poor. This interpretation is confirmed by estimations, not
reported here, that stratify by wealth quartile: While the diagnosis of an
acute condition has a strong positive impact on reporting a deterioration in
health status among the top three quarters of the wealth distribution, the
same effect is much smaller and insignificantly different from zero among
the bottom quartile.14
While money does not seem to make a difference in alleviating the nega-
tive health consequences from diseases, there is some evidence that another
important SES marker does: Conditional on suffering from a chronic illness,
those with higher educational attainment report to be in better health than
individuals with fewer years of completed schooling. A possible interpre-
tation for this finding is that the latter group may have considerable diffi-
culty in disease management that often requires abrupt changes in lifestyle
and the adherence to complex treatments necessary to contain the adverse
health repercussions associated with illnesses, such as emphysema or di-
abetes. Hence, this finding provides suggestive evidence for the relative
importance of channels A4 and A5. Naturally, it is unclear whether the un-
covered role of education is causal, in the sense that the extra years spent
at college are responsible for changes in health knowledge and preferences,
or if education merely serves as a marker for unobserved – and immutable –
cognitive ability. To which degree personal traits and decision making about
health behaviors are malleable during this pivotal gateway period between
childhood and adulthood, is currently under study in the literature (see
Conti et al., 2010).
2.5 Conclusion
This study addresses three main methodological weaknesses of HWW’s ap-
proach of inferring causality in the health-wealth nexus. The analysis is
facilitated by the availability of retrospective data on early-life events that
allows for improved control of initial conditions and individual heterogene-
ity. The first shortcoming – the inadequate description of health dynamics –
is addressed by implementing higher-order Markov models and by control-
ling for information on childhood health to accommodate the long memory
14The point estimate for an acute condition equals 0.1294 (t=11.60) in the wealthier
sample. Among those in the bottom quartile, the estimate equals 0.0342 (t=1.48).
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effects of latent health capital. In line with the literature on early-life cir-
cumstance, I find that childhood health has lasting predictive power for
adult health. This, however, does not render contemporary factors unim-
portant. The results of this analysis suggest that conclusions are largely
insensitive to varying models of health histories. Furthermore, they con-
firm the findings by HWWR that SES is unlikely to be causal for the de-
velopment of acute health conditions but that Granger non-causality can –
even in an elderly population aged 65 and older – be statistically rejected
for mental health conditions, mortality and changes in overall health. Evi-
dence for chronic diseases and functional health is somewhat inconclusive.
However, since the detection of Granger causality for these health condi-
tions is adversely related to sample size, this may simply reflect HWWR’s
earlier finding that HWW’s Granger-causality tests require relatively large
sample sizes to obtain adequate power.
The second methodological drawback – the inability to distinguish be-
tween true causal links and common effects in case Granger causality is
detected – is alleviated by conditioning on early-life events that may func-
tion as proxies for unobserved individual heterogeneity, with health prob-
lems in childhood being a signal for physical frailty, and parental SES and
health-relevant behaviors capturing family effects. Results from this modi-
fication closely mirror those of accounting for longer health histories. The
fact that results for mental health and overall health status are remarkably
robust, lends support to a causal interpretation of the observed gradient for
these health dimensions. Ultimately, however, the assessment of this issue
will depend on how narrow one wishes to define “true” causality. In my
opinion, it is fair to argue that SES may even have a causal effect – in a
rather wide sense – on individual heterogeneity, rendering the distinction
between HWWR’s hypotheses A and C almost arbitrary. In fact, there is in-
creasing evidence that personal characteristics are not as immutable as was
once believed. For instance, part of the literature on the education-health
gradient argues that the years spent in education may not only change
health-relevant knowledge, but also preferences, behaviors, and the way
people think about their future (see Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2006). In a
similar vein, Currie (2011) reports evidence that even the activation of ge-
netic traits – once considered the holy grail of irrevocability – may depend
on environmental factors as well.
The third weakness of HWW’s approach – the lacking microfoundation
of pathways between health and SES – is addressed by decomposing the
overall influence of economic variables into direct effects, indirect effects
that work through the accumulation of medical events, and an interaction
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effect that measures the additional impact of SES, conditional of having
been diagnosed with an illness. The evidence suggests that economic sta-
tus exerts its influence both via differentials in disease incidence as well
as through more direct channels. Notably, there is no evidence that am-
ple financial resources can act as a shield from the health consequences
of diseases – at least not in a post-retirement population that enjoys near-
universal health care coverage. However, the prevalence of chronic con-
ditions appears to have stronger adverse effects on overall health among
the lower educated, suggesting that they have considerable difficulty in
successful disease management necessary to diminish the negative health
consequences from illnesses such as diabetes or respiratory diseases.
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2.A Appendix: Additional tables
The following table contains summary statistics for the dataset used in my
analysis. Due to its large dimensions, it is displayed on the next page.
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CHAPTER 3. ELECTORAL CYCLES IN SAVINGS BANK LENDING
Chapter 3
Electoral cycles in savings bank lending
3.1 Introduction
Politicians regularly rank highly in polls of people’s most mistrusted pro-
fessions, ahead of usual suspects such as car salesmen or estate agents.1
Arguably, the most important reason for this unflattering ranking is, ac-
cording to modern political economics, that politicians are not necessarily
interested in what is best for their constituency but rather in what they
can get out of it for themselves. This may take on drastic forms such as
outright corruption and illegal enrichment or more subtle ones like a pref-
erence for policies that benefit re-election prospects but are socially sub-
optimal. A prime example for the latter is the theory of (opportunistic) po-
litical business cycles (PBC) pioneered by Nordhaus (1975), and MacRae
(1977), which describes politicians’ incentives to enact expansionary fiscal
policies shortly before elections to boost their own popularity, only to coun-
termand them with contractionary policies afterwards. While this theory
has been empirically put to test in numerous studies (e.g. Alesina et al.,
1997; Mitchell and Willett, 2006; and Schneider, 2010), the literature so
far has concentrated on the behavior of politicians on the federal or state
level. As a consequence, only little is known about electoral cycles on the
municipal level, even though local office holders should have incentives to
strategically affect the regional economy as well.
Though local politicians are not known for having control over macro
policies like stimulus packages, the federal tax code, or interest rates, it
may not take large-scale measures to have a significant impact on a local
economy that is of small scale itself. It probably is enough to invest in long
overdue road maintenance, to inaugurate a recreational park, or to vigor-
1To name just a few of these recurring surveys, consider the “Veracity Index” by Ipsos,
YouGov’s “KRC poll” and the “Voice of the People” study conducted by Gallup International.
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ously – and, more importantly, visibly – fight for the preservation of jobs at
a local business in dire straits, to shift the mood of the electorate in one’s
favor. Moreover, the literature on political connectedness (PC) makes the
point that the ability to manipulate economic outcomes may not depend
on statutory authority alone, but also on social relationships that create
a more informal opportunity to achieve one’s goals. Most contributions to
the PC literature such as Fisman (2001), Johnson and Mitton (2003), Ra-
malho (2004), Sapienza (2004), Faccio (2006), and Faccio et al. (2006)
focus on the advantages for firms from entertaining close ties with politi-
cians. Yet, the reverse direction of these relationships is being documented
by academic work as well, as evidenced by Shleifer and Vishny (1994) who
develop the quid-pro-quo argument of favors being traded between (state-
owned) corporations and the political sector.
A key takeaway from the PC literature is that the degree to which po-
litical connections can affect real outcomes greatly depends on a country’s
institutional environment: in general, the weaker the institutions, the eas-
ier it will be for political and business elites to form networks that allow for
rent extraction. On this account, it is not surprising that most of the empir-
ical evidence of harmful political ties comes from developing or emerging
countries. A notable exception is the study by Bertrand et al. (2007) who
find that French firms destroy less jobs in election years, when they are run
by CEOs who are politically or socially connected with the head of the re-
spective local government. They argue that the seeds for these networks are
planted during higher education, as the vast majority of business and polit-
ical leaders attend the same very limited set of elite schools, the so-called
Grandes Ecoles. This example demonstrates that even in highly developed
countries, politicians may find ways to extend their influence beyond the
statutory powers that come with holding office – as long as the institutional
setup gives them the opportunity to do so.
In Germany, local politicians have such an opportunity, opened up by
an institutional peculiarity in the German savings bank system: Not only
is the board of directors of each regional savings bank staffed with a num-
ber of politicians from said region. On top of that, the board’s chairman
is usually the elected official of that respective community. This, taken to-
gether with the vital role savings banks play in local lending to private
households and small to medium-sized enterprizes (SMEs)2, provides an
alluring opening for municipal politicians to improve their electoral out-
look. The main research hypothesis we put to test is that incumbents may
2See Section 3.2.2.
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try to boost economic conditions – and voter satisfaction – by pushing for
more lavish lending policies within the bank’s board of directors, shortly be-
fore elections. We also expect negative fallouts of this policy intervention,
taking the form of higher credit default rates, as some of these loans should
probably not have been granted in the first place. Moreover, in order to be
sure to not measure any general booms around elections, we expect neutral
or overly prudent lending policies immediately after elections. Our identi-
fication strategy relies on the fact that we should only observe politically
motivated lending around election years, only in municipalities in which
elections are held at this point in time, and – importantly – only for polit-
ically connected savings banks. Econometrically, we conduct difference-in-
difference (DD) as well as triple-difference (DDD) estimation embedded in
a fixed-effects panel data setup.
To test our hypotheses we use a novel, largely hand-collected dataset
that combines detailed information on German municipal elections, macro-
economic data on the district level, and balance-sheet information on bank
lending. We find that savings banks systematically extend more credits in
pre-election periods. This effect is robust to various specifications. Impor-
tantly, the effect is not present with cooperative banks that are very similar
to savings banks, except for their lack of political connectedness. Our hy-
potheses are further strengthened by the fact that lending cycles only occur
around municipal but not around state or federal elections. We find weak
evidence for overly prudent lending policies after elections, consistent with
a binding credit constraint that banks face so that they have to make up for
excessive pre-election lending. Our evidence also suggests that the ability
to induce political lending cycles depends on the degree of dominance of
the incumbent party. Finally, we find significant differences in effect sizes
across states, suggesting an interaction with other details of the institu-
tional environment that we intend to further investigate in future research.
Our results complement the finance literature, which has long suspected
that the behavior of government-controlled banks is rather different from
that of private financial institutions. Caprio Jr. and Martinez Peria (2000),
Barth et al. (2001), and La Porta et al. (2002) find that politicians use
public banks to further their own political objectives and that government
ownership in banks is associated with increased risk of banking crises, re-
duced financial development, and subpar economic growth, respectively. In
related work, Khwaja and Mian (2005) find that politically connected firms
in Pakistan have easier access to credit but that this preferential treatment
is only granted by government banks. Once again, however, the evidence so
far is limited to case-studies in the developing world. In fact, Dinç (2005)
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studies in a framework similar to ours, whether the lending behavior of
public banks depends on the timing of elections, and finds that – as op-
posed to emerging markets – no such wrongdoing seems to be occurring
in developed economies. One potential reason for the discrepancy between
our results and those of Dinç is likely to be found in our decision to con-
centrate on municipal (instead of general) elections, reflecting that in the
German case, political connections are established on the local and not the
federal level.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The institutional
background that facilitates the creation of connections between local politi-
cians and savings banks is described in section 3.2 and followed by sec-
tion 3.3, in which we specify our research hypotheses and predictions. Sec-
tion 3.4 describes the data we use and discusses the problems that arise
from having to rely on balance-sheet information. Methodological issues
and our identification strategy are presented in section 3.5. Section 3.6
contains the empirical results while section 3.7 is reserved for robustness
analysis. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Institutional background
In this section we provide the institutional details relevant for understand-
ing the German public banking sector. In doing so, we lay out the case why
savings banks are a prime example for politically connected firms, how co-
operative banks are an ideal control group and how the German electoral
rules allow us to cleanly estimate causal effects of elections on banks’ lend-
ing behavior.
3.2.1 Public guarantee obligation
German law installs public guarantee obligation (Gewährträgerhaftung) for
public institutions. This rule provides that the creditor is going to be reim-
bursed by the government in case the public institution is not able to live
up to its contractual obligations. German savings banks have been founded
by the respective municipalities (see below), were considered public institu-
tions, and were covered by a municipal public guarantee obligation.3 Due
to these governmental guarantees, essentially transforming savings-bank
debt into Federal German AAA-rated bonds, savings banks had substantially
improved access to refinancing in the capital market. Given this important
3The European Court of Justice deemed this an obstacle to competition in retail banking
and savings banks were exempted from public guarantee obligation as of July 19, 2005.
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institutional linkage, the municipality holds substantial sway over the sav-
ings bank’s management, as will be detailed in section 3.2.2.
3.2.2 German banking system
Traditionally, the German banking systems relies on three pillars (Drei-
Säulen-Modell): private banks, savings banks (Sparkassen), and cooperative
banks (Genossenschaftsbanken). Whereas private banks are best described
as profit-maximizing firms, savings banks and cooperative banks are legally
bound to also pursue welfare enhancing policies, in particular within their
region. According to the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank), in
2010 there were roughly 1,100 cooperative banks, 431 savings banks and
218 private banks in Germany.4 Since savings banks and cooperative banks
are the focus of our empirical analysis, we describe these two bank types in
more detail.
Savings banks
The first “modern” savings banks in Germany were founded by local gov-
ernments in the late 18th century in Northern Germany. Initially, the num-
ber of savings banks increased from 300 (in 1836) to more than 3,000
(in 1913). Gradually, this number was reduced when for efficiency reasons
neighboring local institutions merged. Today there exist 431 savings banks,
i.e., roughly in every municipality (electoral district) there is one savings
bank.
The German savings-bank sector has a three-level structure: On the lo-
cal level there are the individual savings banks. On the state level there are
associations (Sparkassen- und Giroverbände) to realize economies of scale
for operative tasks. On the federal level, a further association (Deutscher
Sparkassen- und Giroverband (DSGV)) is primarily responsible for repre-
senting the interests of savings banks towards the federal government and
international institutions. All relevant decisions regarding an individuals
savings bank’s business policy are autonomously made on the local level.
Due to their local structure, and imposed by law, the savings banks’ op-
erational areas have a strong focus on their respective regions (Regional-
prinzip). Their main clientele are private customers and local businesses
and savings banks hold a large share in the retail banking markets. Accord-
ing to the DSGV, in 2009 they held more than 40% of all private deposits
and, important for our paper, more than 40% of all credits to SMEs and
4Currently, our sample covers four states with a total of 268 savings banks and 722
cooperative banks.
90
3.2. Institutional background
more than 70% of all credits to handicraft businesses. The latter two are
traditionally considered the backbone of the German economy.
Local politicians have strong influence over the banks’ decisions, in par-
ticular their lending activities. Since savings banks are founded by the local
governments and were covered by a public guarantee obligation, munici-
palities have the formal right to send representatives into the board of di-
rectors (Sparkassenverwaltungsrat) and the central credit committee (Kred-
itausschuss) of the local savings bank. As a result, their members are to
a large degree composed of local parliament members, roughly reflecting
the relative political powers in the electoral district. On top of that, the
chairmen of both chambers is, as a rule, the executive representative of the
respective district. By law, the directors are not bound by an imperative
mandate but are supposed to only consider the greater good of the savings
bank. Besides general guideline competence, board members also hold sub-
stantial sway over credit decisions that exceed the authority of the savings
bank’s management, as the board of directors or the central credit commit-
tee have to vote on those credits (that are either large in size or considered
rather risky).
Cooperative banks
The first cooperative banks in Germany were founded by Franz Hermann
Schulze-Delitzsch und Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen in the middle of the
19th century. They are organized as cooperatives, i.e. every customer is also
a “member”. They are locally organized, with basically every municipality
being the location of at least one cooperative bank and their main clientele
are private customers and local businesses. In 2010 they had a market share
of 16% for private deposits, 15% of all credits to SMEs and 28% of all
credits to self-employed persons.
Most local cooperative banks are organized in a federal association
of cooperative banks (Bundesverband der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raif-
feisenbanken). Cooperative banks are not covered by the public guarantee
obligation but their federal association provides an insurance fund to pro-
vide deposit guarantees. Since cooperative banks are independent from gov-
ernmental institutions and are not protected by public guarantees, politi-
cians have no formal way to influence cooperative banks’ business policies.
Hence, cooperative banks are an ideal control group for our purposes:
They share the regional structure and their clientele with savings banks5,
5Comparing the regulating laws (our translation) describing the purposes of cooperative
banks (here for Volksbanken) and savings banks (here for Baden-Württemberg) highlights
that they share basically the same objectives:
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but they are exempted from the direct control local politicians hold over
savings banks’ business policies.6
3.2.3 German electoral system
Germany has a federal system with three layers of government: the fed-
eral state, the 16 states (Bundesländer), and 399 municipalities (consist-
ing of 292 counties (Landkreise) and 107 urban municipalities (Kreisfreie
Städte)).7 Each layer has specific powers and responsibilities as well as sep-
arate parliaments and elected executives. These are elected in regular in-
tervals: every 4 years on the federal level, every 4-5 years on the state level
and every 4-9 years in the respective municipalities (depending on the state
and the form of the municipalities). We focus on the latter class of elections,
as it is the local ruling politicians that have direct influence on the policies
of their local savings bank.
There exist two types of municipal elections: elections of legislative bod-
ies (Kreistag in case of counties and Stadtrat in case of urban districts) and
of executive representatives (Landrat in case of counties and Bürgermeis-
ter in case of urban districts). The latter may occur in direct elections or
indirect elections (via the aforementioned legislative bodies).
Elections of legislative bodies
Each municipality has its own parliament. The elections of these legisla-
tive bodies are coordinated on the state level, i.e., within a state they all
take place on the same election day. These dates, however, generally differ
from election dates of federal or state parliaments (Bundestagswahlen and
Landtagswahlen, respectively); i.e., as a rule they are not held on the same
day. Furthermore, municipal election dates differ across states with inter-
vals between elections varying between 4 and 6 years. For the states used
in our analysis the elections are held every 5 years in Baden-Württemberg,
Hesse and Rhineland-Palatinate and every 6 years in Bavaria. The electoral
§1(1) Genossenschaftsgesetz: “[...] to foster the income or the enterprise of the members
[...]”
§6(1) Sparkassengesetz Baden-Württemberg: “[...] to ensure the provision with money and
credit in their region in particular for SMEs [...]”
6In contrast to this, private banks differ greatly from savings banks: First, their business
model solely focusses on profit-maximization and is unrestricted by welfare considerations.
Second, their outreach is usually not confined to a specific region. Third, and most impor-
tantly, their regional representation does not consist of independent regional units but of
mere branches that are legally part of operational headquarters. For these reasons, private
banks are not suitable as a control group for our purposes.
7Currently, our sample covers four states with a total of 202 electoral districts.
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system is one of proportional representation with a minimum vote share
requirement.
Elections of executive representatives
Executive representatives, on the other hand, are elected with majority rule
and runoffs. There are substantial cross-state differences in electoral laws
and various changes across time. Some states have direct elections of ex-
ecutive representatives, others indirect elections via municipal parliaments.
In the last decades there has been a strong trend towards more direct repre-
sentation, whereas up to the early 1990s indirect elections were the norm.
States also differ with respect to whether they hold the municipal legislative
and executive elections on the same time (minority of states) or on differ-
ing days (majority of states). In fact, executive elections are usually not
held at the state level but dispersed across time. Finally, there are substan-
tial differences regarding the intervals, from 4 to 9 years, between these
elections. The details for the states used in our analysis are as follows.
Baden-Württemberg: Elections are held every 8 years and on separate
dates from elections of legislative bodies. In counties the executive
representatives are determined in indirect elections via municipal par-
liaments, whereas urban municipalities choose their mayors in direct
elections.
Bavaria: All elections are direct and are held every 6 years. Election dates
coincide with those of legislative bodies.
Hesse: Since 1993 all elections are direct (before 1993 all were indirect
elections via municipal parliaments) and are held every 6 years. Elec-
tion dates do not coincide with those of legislative bodies.
Rhineland-Palatinate: Since 1994 all elections are direct (before 1994 all
were indirect elections via municipal parliaments) and are held every
6 years. Election dates do not coincide with those of legislative bodies.
3.3 Main hypothesis and testable predictions
The main hypothesis this paper seeks to test is whether local politicians take
advantage of the institutional environment described in section 3.2 and arti-
ficially expand lending in their respective districts in the wake of elections,
in hopes of swaying their prospects at the ballot box. The opportunities
and incentives for doing so certainly exist. To begin with, there should
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not be any real doubt about the connectedness between local politicians
and savings bank, as their relation is legally manifest in board-of-directors
membership or even chairmanship. Moreover, the board of directors does
not have mere representational functions that consist of rubber-stamping
the decisions made by the bank’s management. On the contrary, the bank’s
large-scale lending activities are one operational area where directors can
directly influence decisions and do not have to rely on taking indirect influ-
ence.
Our design that uses cooperative banks as control group allows us to dis-
tinguish the increased lending from a mere increase in demand for credit
in response to real economic growth around election years, caused e.g. by
traditional political spending cycles, as the latter would arguably affect co-
operative bank lending equivalently.
The question remains whether increased lending will help politicians to
tip the electoral scales in their favor. We argue that there is a number of
reasons why this may indeed be the case. First, given the legally mandated
local focus of savings banks, borrowers will almost certainly live – and vote
– in the region represented by the incumbent, and it is save to assume that
constituents will be more satisfied when they are not troubled by credit
rationing. This argument becomes even more powerful when loans to SMEs
are under consideration, as these may be paramount for the creation or
preservation of employment in the politician’s district. Second, in small
municipalities where little goes unnoticed, the politician’s role during credit
negotiations may well become common knowledge sooner or later. In that
case, hearsay about the mayor relentlessly fighting for her constituency will
even send a signal to voters that are not directly affected by the approval
of loans. Third, the option of affecting economic outcomes through lending
may be attractive inasmuch as the potential costs of this intervention (e.g.,
higher default rates on the marginally granted credits) are deferred until
the loans in question mature. As a consequence, the negative fallout is not
instantly visible and may in fact never be traced back to the responsible
politician.
The final argument in favor of our main hypothesis concerns the timing
of bank lending distortions. If politicians truly exploit their ability to sway
the credit operations of their local savings bank, we should expect a con-
centration of such behavior in times when it helps them most. Assuming
that voters are myopic, political gain is maximal when the incumbent’s fate
is on the line: in the wake of elections. Hence, it seems fair to assume that
politically motivated lending be focussed on election seasons rather than
equally distributed throughout the legislative period.
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As we do not want to rely on these theoretical arguments alone, we for-
mulate five predictions we expect to survive empirical testing, if politicians
truly behave as suggested above.
Prediction 1: Election effect. Before municipal elections, local savings-bank
lending should increase, compared to a hypothetical situation with-
out elections. Importantly, and facilitating identification, there should
be no increased pre-election lending for cooperative banks that are
similar in local organization and clientele but are not formally politi-
cally influenced.
Prediction 2: Election kind. Lending should react to municipal elections.
Elections on the state or federal level should have no (or at least a
much weaker) systematic impact, since politicians from these levels
of government are not institutionally connected with local savings
banks.
Prediction 3: Pre- and post-election lending. Politically motivated lending
increases should exclusively occur in the ultimate wake of elections.
Given voter myopia, they should not happen too far in advance as
this would represent premature flexing of political muscle. For simi-
lar reasons, the election effect should not be permanent, since incen-
tives to allure voters will instantly vanish once the polls are closed.
Whether post-election lending should return to its steady-state level
or whether the election increase should be compensated by overly
prudent post-election lending is not entirely clear, a priori. Which of
the two options is more plausible depends on the credit constraints
savings banks face. In addition, confirmation of prediction 3 would
reduce the risk of confounding political motives behind a surge in
lending with the effect of any general booms around elections, as the
latter would arguably create less abrupt patterns in the extension of
credit.
Prediction 4: Electoral competition. Does politically induced lending de-
pend on the contestedness of elections? Predicting the answer to this
question on theoretical grounds alone is not trivial, as electoral com-
petition may exert two offsetting effects. The first is a matter of effi-
ciency considerations, according to which election effects should be
more pronounced in districts with fierce current electoral competi-
tion. The assumption underlying this hypothesis is that – given pre-
diction 5 below holds – politically motivated lending will be costly for
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the savings bank and ultimately harm the politician’s reputation. As a
consequence, incumbents may not make much use of this distorting
instrument unless they genuinely fear for their re-election. By con-
trast, the second effect of electoral competition may curb the politi-
cian’s ability to influence savings-bank lending if the political process
is generally contested and has led to close election results in the past.
The rationale for this argument is one of dominance: A competitive
electoral environment will be reflected in the partisan composition
of the bank’s board of directors, reducing the likelihood of collusion
among board members who represent rivalling political parties. Sim-
ilarly, the degree of sway over lending decisions may well depend on
informal ties between politicians and the bank’s management, which
are likely to be stronger, the longer the incumbent has been in office.
As a result, regular changes in power and slim majorities would limit
the scope of electoral lending cycles.
Prediction 5: Increased default risks. Loans granted during the height of
an election season should have a higher tendency to default, since
some marginal loans would not have been been approved, if finan-
cial fundamentals alone had played a role in determining the credit
rating.
Whether our hypothesis is verified by empirical testing, is investigated
in section 3.6. Before turning to this analysis, however, we continue with
the description of our data and discuss which of the above predictions are
ultimately testable with the information at hand.
3.4 Data
We use a novel, in large parts hand-collected, dataset that combines in-
formation from multiple sources. The observational units are savings and
cooperative banks in Southern Germany. This bank data is merged with
information on municipal, state-level and federal elections as well as with
macro-economic and demographic data on the district level.
3.4.1 Bank data
The source of our bank data is Hoppenstedt, a business data provider that
hosts the largest commercial database for balance sheets and annual re-
ports in Germany. The main advantage of Hoppenstedt, compared to other
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commercial databases such as Bankscope, are the ample N and T dimen-
sions their sample provides: It covers virtually all savings banks and a very
large fraction of cooperative banks that operated in Germany between 1987
and 2009.8 For the four Southern German states we have initially picked for
our analysis (see section 3.4.2), this amounts to a total of 268 savings banks
(4,568 bank-year observations) and 722 cooperative banks (6,181 bank-
year observations). Note that these numbers include a sizeable amount of
banks that exited or entered the sample due to bank mergers. The average
time, savings banks remain in the sample is 17 years, whereas the average
cooperative bank is only observable for roughly 9 consecutive years. This
reflects that our panel is considerably less balanced for cooperative banks,
as a large fraction is only covered by the sample since the early 2000s. To
ensure that our results are not driven by these sample characteristics, we
perform robustness checks by varying the degree of panel balancedness in
section 3.7.2.
All information is taken from official balance sheets. The key variables
are the bank’s overall lending position, the amount of non-performing loans,
total assets and the capital ratio. All monetary positions are deflated and
measured in 1995 EUR. A look at the panel characteristics reveals that for
all items between-variation is substantially greater than within-variation.
Note that the use of balance-sheet data has the disadvantage of render-
ing prediction 5 untestable within the scope of this paper, as we are unable
to determine the time period in which non-performing loans were granted.
If marginal credits from pre-election periods were truly more default-prone,
this could still take its toll 5, 10, or 15 years after the loan was granted,
making it empirically impossible to causally tie the eventual default to the
election in question.9
3.4.2 Election data
A database that combines information on German municipal elections in
any comprehensive way does not exist. Even on the state-level, the collec-
tion of local electoral data is the clear exception. For this reason, we have
begun to create our own unique dataset by gathering all relevant infor-
8We ran several internal consistency checks to ensure that the Hoppenstedt data be of
comparable quality to that of Bankscope.
9To test prediction 5, we additionally applied for access to officially kept loan-level bank
data at the Federal Savings Banks Association and at the German Bundesbank that would
have provided information on the exact timing and the eventual (non-)performance of
credit contracts. While these data have been made available for academic research in the
past, neither institution has granted us access, once we described our research project.
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mation ourselves. To this end, we have contacted regional statistical offices,
the respective communities, and historical archives all over Germany. Given
the enormous labor intensity of this project, data collection is still ongoing.
So far, we were able to complete our search for the following Southern Ger-
man states: Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, and Rhineland-Palatinate.
By focussing on neighboring states, we are confident that regional differ-
ences be kept to a minimum, improving the comparability of cross-state
observations. Together, these four states account for more than half of all
German counties and urban districts (202 out of 399). As data collection
progresses, we will gradually extend our sample until all of Germany is
covered.
The Southern German municipal election data already gathered, covers
the years between 1970 and 2009. Yet, since this political data is merged
with the aforementioned bank data, the maximum interval for our anal-
ysis is effectively reduced to 1987–2009 as well. During this time span,
Bavaria held 4, and the other states 5 elections of legislative bodies. The
pattern for executive elections is a lot more irregular: Districts in Bavaria
and Hesse experienced an average of 4 elections, Rhineland-Palatinate and
Baden-Württemberg’s urban municipalities just 2 to 3, and finally counties
in Baden-Württemberg – qua institution – none.
Our dataset contains information on election dates, election results
(measured in vote shares), names and party affiliations of incumbents and
winners, election types (direct vs. indirect), whether runoffs were neces-
sary and whether there was a change in executive power. Overall, data
quality is better for legislative elections than for executive elections if the
latter were held in indirect fashion through municipal parliaments, since for
these votes information is unavailable. In fact, we do not even know when
such indirect elections of regional executives occur. We only observe if the
identity of the person in power changes. Whether this is due to electoral de-
feat, retirement, or death, however, is unknown. For this reason, our main
analysis focusses on legislative elections and their effect on savings bank
lending. While there are good reasons to believe that this election type is in
fact the more relevant one for the mechanism under study, this is ultimately
an empirical question that we defer to section 3.7.1.
To enable empirical testing of prediction 2, we have also added dates
and outcomes of state and federal elections.
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3.4.3 District data
Finally, to warrant better control for confounding factors and to increase
statistical precision, we augment our sample with macro-economic and de-
mographic information at the district level, which are available at the Ger-
man Federal Statistic Office (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland). These
include population size, GDP, unemployment, public spending and expendi-
ture, public debt, as well as firm creation, closures and bankruptcies. Once
again, all monetary values are converted to 1995 EUR. Available time spans
vary significantly among these variables so that the addition of certain con-
trol variables would result in significant loss of sample size. The longest
time series are available for GDP, population size and unemployment, span-
ning from the early 1990s to 2009. The collection of the other variables
by the Statistic Office sets in considerably later. As a result, the effective
time-span covered by our preferred econometric specification presented in
section 3.5 covers the years 1993 to 2009, whereas longer time spans are
analyzed for robustness in section 3.7.
3.4.4 Descriptive statistics
Summary statistics of variables used in our analysis are presented in ta-
ble 3.1. Overall, our data is substantially right-skewed, which is why our
preferred empirical specification presented below makes use of log-transformed
data. As is evident from panel A, savings banks are on average larger than
their cooperative counterparts, which reflects the wave of mergers that
took place among German savings banks throughout the years. Judging
from the ratio of loans and total assets, both bank types clearly set their
business focus on lending operations: The average loan position of savings
banks makes up 70% of the entire balance sheet, while that number is even
slightly higher for cooperative banks, which devote 75% of their operations
to providing credit. Furthermore, the capital ratio seems to be mildly, but
systematically, larger for cooperative banks.
A look at panel B reveals that municipalities in Baden-Württemberg and
Bavaria are clearly dominated by conservative parties – Bavaria’s Christlich-
Soziale Union (CSU) and its sister party, Christlich Demokratische Union
(CDU), which competes in the rest of Germany – whereas the other two
states see a closer gap between the main political rivals: For one, Germany’s
largest left-of-center party, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD),
generally fares very poorly in the two former states. In addition, incum-
bent dominance appears to be much stronger, suggesting a rather static
political environment. As an illustration, consider that only about 6% of all
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Table 3.1. Variables used for analysis
Summary statistics
Variables Total BW BV HS RP
N=10,738 N=3,624 N=4,229 N=1,639 N=1,246
Panel A: Banks
Savings banks
- No. of banks 268 73 103 52 40
- Total assets 1.936 2.295 1.658 2.485 1.464
(1.950) (1.920) (1.579) (3.095) (0.790)
- Loans 1.346 1.588 1.148 1.749 1.023
(1.357) (1.332) (1.078) (2.176) (0.599)
- Capital ratio 0.046 0.043 0.048 0.044 0.046
(0.010) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010)
Cooperative banks
- No. of banks 722 241 316 95 70
- Total assets 0.651 0.655 0.623 0.758 0.575
(1.581) (0.687) (2.408) (0.881) (0.641)
- Loans 0.488 0.484 0.468 0.565 0.451
(1.230) (0.467) (1.892) (0.665) (0.556)
- Capital ratio 0.057 0.056 0.058 0.058 0.056
(0.017) (0.012) (0.017) (0.028) (0.014)
Panel B: Municipal elections
No. of elections 19 5 4 5 5
Vote share CDU/CSU 38.97 36.83 42.45 35.35 40.64
(7.39) (7.07) (6.00) (7.02) (7.75)
Vote share SPD 26.33 21.06 23.42 38.55 34.46
(9.80) (5.09) (8.27) (7.76) (8.18)
Vote share swing 9.30 8.21 8.99 10.25 12.19
(2.56) (2.30) (2.42) (1.67) (1.85)
Party change 0.105 0.059 0.065 0.245 0.171
(0.160) (0.115) (0.158) (0.153) (0.172)
Panel C: Municipal districts
No. of districts 199 44 94 26 35
Population 33,364 10,754 12,539 6,067 4,004
Real GDP 6.644 8.339 5.731 7.901 3.226
(8.646) (5.134) (11.369) (8.305) (2.089)
Unemployment rate 7.01 6.11 6.81 8.35 8.48
(2.56) (1.84) (2.58) (2.74) (2.72)
Notes: Reported are total numbers (for the state level) and means (for the district
level) respectively. For the latter, standard deviations are in brackets. BW, BV, HS,
and RP denote the states of Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, and Rhineland-
Palatinate, respectively. N stands for the number of available bank-year observa-
tions. Election data refers to municipal elections of legislative bodies. CDU/CSU
are the conservative parties and SPD the social-democratic party of Germany. “Vote
share swing” denotes the average swing in vote shares (cumulated over all parties)
that results from a given election. “Party change” indicates the share of elections
that result in a change of the winning party. State population is measured in million
habitants (as of 2010). All monetary values are measured in 1995 EUR billion.
municipal elections in Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg result in a change
of the winning party, whereas Hesse and Rhineland-Palatinate experience
such changes in power after 25% and 17% of all elections, respectively.
Note that these summary statistics are for pooled data and represent an
average over time. To better assess the dynamics of German bank lending,
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Figure 3.1. Time trends in bank lending 1
Savings bank lending across states
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Notes: Depicted are time series from a balanced panel of average savings bank lending
for Baden-Württemberg (BW), Bavaria (BV), Hesse (HS) and Rhineland-Palatinate (RP).
Loans are measured in 1995 EUR billion.
figure 3.1 plots the time series of average savings bank lending, stratified by
state. Clearly, our loan data is subject to an upward trend. For this reason,
section 3.5 proposes two alternative approaches to account for the effect of
time: a year dummies specification and quadratic time trends. Overall, sav-
ings banks in all four states appear to be on similar time trends which pro-
vides good news for a DD identification strategy such as ours (see Angrist
and Pischke, 2009). If anything, Hesse’s trend becomes a bit idiosyncratic
after the turn of the century, which is why results that seem exclusively
driven by Hesse may be taken with a grain of salt. Finally, figure 3.2 shows
that time trends are also comparable for both bank types (averaged over
all states in our sample), which provides further evidence that cooperative
banks are indeed a valid control group for savings banks.
3.5 Methodology
Our strategy to identify any causal effect of elections on savings-bank lend-
ing, relies on the fact that we should only observe politically motivated
lending before election years, only in municipalities in which elections are
held at this point in time, and – importantly – only for politically connected
savings banks. Identification is facilitated by the different timing of elec-
tions across states and the existence of a control group of cooperative banks
that operate in the same electoral districts as savings banks. Furthermore,
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Figure 3.2. Time trends in bank lending 2
Savings bank versus cooperative bank lending
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Notes: Depicted are time series from a balanced panel of savings bank (SB) and cooperative
bank (CB) lending, averaged over all four states in our sample. Loans are measured in 1995
EUR billion.
given the statutory nature of legislative elections at the municipal level, for
which early elections are largely non-existent, we certainly need not worry
about any endogeneity in (the timing) of our key regressor. Econometri-
cally, we conduct difference-in-difference (DD) as well as triple-difference
(DDD) estimation embedded in a fixed-effects panel data setup.
Testing prediction 1: Election effect
A natural starting point for testing prediction 1 that savings-bank lending
increases in the wake of elections, is the following empirical specification:
Yist = X
′
istβ1+ S
′
sγ1+ T
′
tλ1+δ1ELEC
M
st + εist , (3.1)
where Yist is a measure for loans from savings bank i, operating in state s at
time t. The parameter of interest, δ1, estimates the causal effect of munici-
pal election seasons, which are indicated by the dummy variable ELECMst .
10
To ensure identification of δ1, we control for the following covariates and
fixed effects: Ss donates a full vector of state effects to control for secular
lending differences across states. Similarly, time effects, Tt, are included
to capture any national trends or year shocks. Note that we use two al-
10Note that the way model 3.1 is written down, corresponds to the case of legislative
elections, ELECMst , as these vary at the state level. For election of executive representatives
(dealt with in chapter 3.7.1), ELECMist would be permitted to also vary at the district (and,
hence, individual) level.
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ternative specifications to capture the effect of time: The first consists of
introducing a full set of year dummies, whereas the second – with the pur-
pose of reducing the number of parameters to be estimated – controls for
quadratic time trends instead. Finally, Xist is a vector of bank- and district-
specific variables that may directly influence the outcome variable. The in-
clusion of these covariates should considerably improve the predictability
of Yist , which will in turn reduce the sample variance of our estimates.
Estimation of model 3.1 by OLS ensures that both T- and N-variation are
exploited. The former compares the same banks across time, as each bank
will be subject to recurring election “treatments”. The latter contrasts dif-
ferent banks at a given time, as municipal elections dates vary across states.
Yet, while a positive estimate of δ1 would speak in favor of prediction 1 and
suggest that savings banks are indeed systematically easing credit before
elections, we cannot yet say anything about the reasons for this behavior.
For instance, it could well be that banks simply react to increased demand
for credit if – for some reason – local GDP were positively correlated with
the timing of elections. Even though we are able to shield ourselves from
such confounds by adding macro-economic district variables to the list of
controls Xist, a fundamental problem remains: So far, we have no way of
gauging whether the responsibility for the credit boost lies with local politi-
cians and their involvement with the savings banks’ board of directors. The
latter hypothesis, however, would be substantially strengthened if the de-
tected pattern were to apply to savings banks alone.
The control group of cooperative banks allows us to identify this: If
our hypothesis is true, we should not observe increased cooperative-bank
lending before elections, as politicians have no institutional sway over their
credit policies.11 Therefore, a more convincing way of testing prediction 1
consists of applying the following DD model to a sample that includes both
types of banks:
Yisbt = X
′
isbtβ2+S
′
sγ2+T
′
tλ2+µ2Bb+θ2ELEC
M
st +δ2ELEC
M
st ∗Bb+εisbt . (3.2)
Model 3.2, which is also estimated by OLS, differs from specification 3.1
inasmuch as bank-type effects, Bb, are needed to control for perpetual dif-
ferences between savings and cooperative banks. Bb is defined as a dummy
variable that takes on the value of 1 if the individual unit is a savings bank.
In addition, we interact the election dummy with the bank-type indicator
11This, of course, can – and will – be individually tested by applying specification 3.1
to the sample of cooperative banks. This time, we would expect δ1 to not be significantly
different from zero for our prediction to hold.
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such that ELECMst ∗ Bb switches on if and only if Yisbt measures lending activ-
ity of a savings bank during election season.
The parameter of interest is denoted δ2 and arguably provides improved
identification over δ1, since the representation of counterfactual lending in
the absence of election is more encompassing. The estimate from model 3.1
measures the difference in lending behavior between savings banks in elec-
tion periods and savings banks in non-election periods. The DD estimate
from model 3.2, on the other hand, captures the difference between election-
induced increase in savings-bank lending (which is expected to be pos-
itive after controlling for time trends) and election-induced increase in
cooperative-bank lending (which is expected to be zero after controlling
for time trends).
Testing prediction 2: Election kind
Our main hypothesis would be further strengthened if prediction 2 – that
only municipal elections have a systematic impact on savings-bank lending
– were to survive empirical testing as well. Recall that it is local politicians
who are granted membership in the bank’s board of directors. While a few
exceptions from this rule (with members of state parliaments being granted
access as well) certainly exist, any potential effect should at least be consid-
erably weaker than that of municipal elections.
Empirical testing of prediction 2 is straightforward if state elections are
concerned, as model 3.2 can be applied almost verbatim since both, legisla-
tive municipal elections and state elections (which are always for the state
legislature) vary at the state level. The only difference to the specification
used for prediction 1 is that ELECMst is replaced with an indicator for state
election seasons, ELECSst . The case of federal elections (which are also par-
liamentary), however, requires a slightly altered specification, as there is
no more cross-state variation in treatment:
Yisbt = X
′
isbtβ3+S
′
sγ3+T
′
tλ3+µ3Bb+θ3ELEC
F
t +δ3ELEC
F
t ∗Bb+εisbt . (3.3)
Note that ELECFt , which indicates federal election periods, only varies in the
time dimension, taking the value of 1 every 4 years. As a consequence, the
effect of federal elections will not be identified in case year dummies are
used to control for time effects. For this reason, Tt will have to be repre-
sented by quadratic time trends when specification 3.3 is used.
Testing prediction 3: Pre- and post-election lending
Another way of solidifying support for our hypothesis is to look at pre- and
post-election periods, as the increase in lending should be confined to the
104
3.5. Methodology
immediate election season. Particularly, we expect lending policies to imme-
diately return to their steady-state level once ballots are cast. In case higher
default rates on the marginally granted credits need to be compensated,
we may even expect overly prudent lending behavior in the aftermath of
elections. Prediction 3 can be tested with the following specification to be
estimated with OLS:
Yisbt = X
′
isbtβ4+ S
′
sγ4+ T
′
tλ4+µ4Bb + θ4ELEC
M
st−τ+δ4ELEC
M
st−τ ∗ Bb + εisbt ,
(3.4)
and τ = (1,2,3,4).12 To study post-election periods, the dummy variable
ELECMst−τ indicates whether there was an election in state s, τ years ago.
We expect the estimate of δ4 to be either close to zero or, in case of bind-
ing credit constraints, negative. For the analysis of pre-election periods,
ELECMst−τ will be replaced with a corresponding ELEC
M
st+τ indicator variable.
Once again, we would interpret a zero estimate of δ4 as supportive evi-
dence for prediction 3.
Testing prediction 4: Electoral competition
The test for prediction 4 can be implemented with the following DDD
model, estimated with OLS:
Yisbt = X
′
isbtβ5+ S
′
sγ5+ T
′
tλ5+µ5Bb +ψ5 Ii t + θ5ELEC
M
st + . . . (3.5)
+φ15 Bb ∗ Ii t +φ
2
5 Bb ∗ ELEC
M
st +φ
3
5 Ii t ∗ ELEC
M
st + . . .
+δ5ELEC
M
st ∗ Bb ∗ Ii t + εisbt ,
where Ii t is the respective indicator variable of interest: In case current
electoral competition is investigated, Ii t = Ci t is an indicator for whether
the present election is contested. The ruling party’s dominance (or alter-
natively: the lack of electoral competition in general) is measured with
Ii t = Di t .13 In line with our predictions in section 3.3, the former indicator
switches on if the election is competed, while the latter takes the value of
one in case the political process is not contested. The first line of model 3.5
contains the usual controls as well as all main fixed effects. Line 2 contains
the full set of first-order interactions which are necessary to identify the
causal effect of interest, captured by the DDD estimate of δ5 in line 3 (see
Gruber, 1994).
12Higher-order lags exceeding 4 years should not be used, since this would blur the line
between post-election periods of the past and pre-election periods of the next campaign.
13Note that we use several alternative measures for electoral contestedness and party
dominance (see section 3.6). While in general Di t may change its value depending on the
competitiveness of the election under consideration, DGi is defined to be time-constant in
case we want to capture the general electoral competition of the district, bank i operates in.
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Testing prediction 5: Increased default rates
As previewed in section 3.4.1, prediction 5 is untestable with the balance-
sheet data at hand, as it shows the entire stock of non-performing loans at
year’s end that also reflects lending activities outside of election seasons.
Since we do not know when a given non-performing loan was granted, we
will, for the scope of this paper, have to leave the question about the welfare
cost of politically induced lending unanswered and adjourn this analysis to
future research, in hope that access to loan-level data will eventually be
granted.
3.6 Results
All results presented here are estimates from an unbalanced panel to which
we apply our preferred empirical specification with the following proper-
ties: The dependent variable, Yi t , is defined as the natural logarithm of the
loan sum of bank i as reported in the balance sheet for year t. This facil-
itates interpretation of coefficients – which represent (semi-)elasticities –
and accounts for the right-skewedness of our data. The pre-election indica-
tor, ELECst , is defined as follows: It takes on the value of 1 if there is an elec-
tion in either the final two quarters of the same year, or the first two quar-
ters of the following year.14 The vector of control variables, Xist, includes
bank-specific (total assets and capital ratio, to account for bank size and
degree of capitalization, respectively) and district-specific (population size
and real GDP) covariates. To account for the possibility that the bank vari-
ables are only sequentially exogenous, we use their lagged values instead
(see Dinç, 2005). All elements of Xist are log-transformed. Finally, standard
errors are clustered on the bank level (as opposed to the bank-year level),
to correct for substantial serial correlation. Note that our results are not
driven by these modeling choices. As section 3.7 demonstrates, the main
conclusions are insensitive to varying definitions of key variables, sets of
controls, sample compositions, and assumptions regarding the error-term
structure.
14This definition ensures that election-induced lending is reflected in the balance sheet
of the actually relevant year: If an election takes place in, say, January, pre-election lending
will arguably leave its mark in the balance sheet of the previous year, which is why the
latter will switch on ELECst , whereas ELECst = 0 for the actual election year. By contrast, if
the election is held around year’s end, the balance sheet of the preceding year is probably
less informative than that of the election year, for which reason the pre-election indicator
would then coincide with the year of the election. Note that results, not reported here,
based on alternative definitions of ELECst , are comparable to those presented in this paper.
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In a nutshell, all of our testable predictions withstand empirical scrutiny,
which corroborates our hypothesis that local politicians exploit their mem-
bership in savings banks’ directing boards to sway their electoral fortunes.
Not only do all estimated effects have the correct sign, they are also statis-
tically significant at the 5% level and, in the majority of cases, even at the
1% level. Effect sizes are estimated to be in the range of 1%–3% election-
induced increase in the stock of lending. Note that this increase is relative
to the total stock in bank lending. If we were to model the extension of
new credit contracts alone, relative effect sizes would certainly be larger.
To provide a better sense for the actual magnitude of the effect, consider
that its absolute size amounts to an average of EUR 30.6 million extra stock
in lending per bank, when our preferred empirical specification is used.
Prediction 1: Do savings banks expand lending prior to elections?
The empirical tests of prediction 1 are summarized in table 3.2, which con-
tains OLS estimates of the key parameters from models 3.1 and 3.2, as well
as regression coefficients of control variables. The first four columns display
results from variants of model 3.1 being applied to savings banks. Estimates
of the key parameter, δ1, can be found in the first row. Results in column
(A) suggest that savings banks increase lending by about 1.6% in the wake
of municipal elections. This result is largely unchanged by the inclusion of
state fixed effects in column (B). As the comparison of results in columns
(C) and (D) shows, estimates are somewhat sensitive to the way, time ef-
fects are accounted for: If quadratic time trends are used, effect sizes are
roughly twice as large as those coming from a year-dummy specification.
While these results are certainly encouraging, our hypothesis would be
greatly invigorated if the election effect were exclusively present for savings
banks. This enhanced prediction is under study in columns (E) through (H)
of table 3.2. The first two of those repeat the analysis of columns (C)
and (D) for the subsample of cooperative banks. As predicted, there is
no evidence for these politically unconnected banks adjusting their lend-
ing in response to elections. The last two columns contain the DD results
of model 3.2 being applied to a sample that includes both bank types. Ap-
parently, the presence of a control group strengthens results considerably,
suggesting that savings banks’ lending increases by 2% to 3% in the wake
of elections. These δ2 estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level.
Moreover, the sensitivity of results to the way time effects are incorporated
is no longer present, as both controlling for time trends and including year
dummies, yield almost identical results.
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Since we believe that DD model 3.2 provides improved identification
of the causal election effect over model 3.1, the remainder of this section
describes results that only make use of the former specification. Yet, since
the superiority of the DD model critically depends on the assumption that
cooperative banks are indeed an appropriate control group, for robustness
we also tested predictions 2, through 4 with model 3.1 that only uses differ-
ences between savings banks. As results in appendix 3.A demonstrate, our
main conclusions are largely insensitive to which of the two specifications
we use.
Besides these causal effects of interest, there is only one additional co-
variate with a statistically significant impact on lending: a bank’s (lagged)
total assets. In fact, the relationship between these two variables proves to
be extremely strong. Not only are estimated effects very sizeable, the inclu-
sion of total assets to the set of regressors leaves barely any variation in the
data unexplained, as is evidenced by R2 exceeding 0.95. Note that this is
not an indication for overfitting. Much rather, this tight connection is not
surprising since German financial regulation mandates that a bank’s lending
position be backed by equivalent net equity. Given this quasi-mechanical re-
lationship between these variables, we repeat our analysis for robustness
without total assets in section 3.7.1.
Prediction 2: Does lending react to other elections?
To further back up our theory of local politicians being the driving force
behind electoral cycles in bank lending, we now turn to the second predic-
tion that credit policy should react only to municipal elections. A look at
table 3.3 suggests that this seems to indeed be the case. This table contains
estimates for δ2 and δ3 when DD models 3.2 and 3.3, respectively, are ap-
plied to our full sample. In line with our premise, we find no evidence that
lending reacts in any systematic way to either state (see columns (A) and
(B)) or general (see column (C)) elections. These findings are corroborated
by an additional specification which jointly regresses on all three election
types. As results in column (D) show, savings bank lending is in fact only
responsive to elections at the municipal level, whereas elections at higher
government levels have practically no influence.
Prediction 3: What happens to lending before and after election seasons?
Prediction 3 suggests that the increase in lending should be limited to the
immediate election season. Particularly, the positive effect should instantly
disappear, or even become negative, once the election was held. We have
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Table 3.2. Results for prediction 1
Dependent variable: Log loans
Explanatory OLS regression coefficients (Empirical p-values in brackets)
variables (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H)
Key regressors
- ELECMst 0.016 0.017 0.010 0.018 -0.001 0.006 -0.008 0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.032) (0.000) (0.795) (0.310) (0.137) (0.913)
- ELECMst ∗ Bb – – – – – – 0.027 0.024
(0.001) (0.004)
Bank controls
- Total assets 0.988 0.988 0.999 0.991 0.959 0.959 0.977 0.976
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
- Capital ratio -0.015 -0.024 0.011 0.013 0.020 0.023 0.037 0.039
(0.599) (0.389) (0.758) (0.719) (0.512) (0.466) (0.102) (0.083)
District controls
- Population -0.003 0.005 0.004 0.004 -0.028 -0.031 -0.016 -0.018
(0.890) (0.825) (0.865) (0.858) (0.504) (0.452) (0.548) (0.502)
- Real GDP 0.025 0.025 0.024 0.024 0.053 0.056 0.043 0.045
(0.195) (0.203) (0.222) (0.219) (0.145) (0.122) (0.080) (0.067)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Time trends Yes Yes Yes
Bank type FE Yes Yes
Banks in sample SavB SavB SavB SavB CoopB CoopB All All
N 3,083 3,083 3,083 3,083 4,033 4,033 7,116 7,116
R2 0.969 0.969 0.970 0.969 0.966 0.966 0.978 0.978
Notes: Results are for our preferred empirical specification (see text). Key regressors are
ELECMst for columns (A) to (F), and ELEC
M
st ∗Bb for columns (G) and (H), respectively. The
index M denotes a municipal election. Boldfaced numbers indicate statistical significance
at the 5% level.
tested this hypothesis by estimating the effect of municipal elections on
savings-bank lending in the four years preceding and following a munici-
pal election. The results are depicted in figure 3.3, which provides a visual
representation of the electoral lending cycle. The solid line represents DD
estimates of the effect elections have on lending in the eight years surround-
ing said election. The dotted lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Note
that these δ4 estimates come from 9 distinct regressions, for which τ is
accordingly varied in model 3.4.15
As is evident from the graph, lending stays relatively flat before elec-
tion season, only to spike upwards in the immediate wake of an election
year. This increase is statistically significant at the 1% level (and identi-
cal to the estimate in column (G) of table 3.2). As expected, the effect
quickly dissipates after the election, returning to its steady state level or
even slightly below. Three years after the election, the election effect dips
15The empirial specification used for this graph controls for time via year fixed effects.
Notably, the depicted pattern also holds if DD model 3.4 is combined with quadratic time
trends instead.
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Table 3.3. Results for prediction 2
Dependent variable: Log loans
Explanatory OLS regression coefficients
variables (Empirical p-values in brackets)
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Key regressors
- ELECMst – – – 0.002
(0.836)
- ELECMst ∗ Bb – – – 0.027
(0.006)
- ELECSst -0.005 0.002 – 0.004
(0.358) (0.643) (0.491)
- ELECSst ∗ Bb 0.007 0.003 – 0.011
(0.245) (0.670) (0.142)
- ELECFt – – -0.005 -0.006
(0.344) (0.285)
- ELECFt ∗ Bb – – -0.005 -0.004
(0.357) (0.486)
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes
Time trends Yes Yes Yes
Bank type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Banks in sample All All All All
N 7,116 7,116 7,116 7,116
R2 0.977 0.977 0.977 0.977
Notes: Results are for our preferred empirical spec-
ification (see text). Key regressors are ELECMst ∗ Bb,
ELECSst ∗ Bb, and ELEC
F
t ∗ Bb, respectively. The indexes
M, S, and F denote municipal, state, and federal elec-
tions, respectively. Boldfaced numbers indicate statis-
tical significance at the 5% level.
into statistically significant negative territory (at the 5% level). We take this
as weak evidence for overly prudent lending policies after elections, consis-
tent with a binding credit constraint that banks face as they have to make
up for excessive pre-election lending. Importantly, the spike in lending ap-
pears to be too abrupt and short-lived to reflect an increase in demand for
credit in response to real economic growth around election years, as the
latter would arguably result in a much smoother pattern. Thus, figure 3.3
provides strong evidence for the political nature of the increase in loan
extensions.
Prediction 4: What is the role of electoral competition?
Finally, prediction 4 suggests that electoral competition may have two partly
offsetting effects. For one, the increase in lending may depend on the abil-
ity to manipulate the bank’s policies and hence be more pronounced, the
clearer the general (or historical) dominance of the incumbent party. This
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Figure 3.3. Results for prediction 3
Visualization of the lending cycle
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Notes: Results are for our preferred empirical specification (see text). The solid line depicts
DD estimates of δ4 coming from model 3.4 with year fixed effects. Dottet lines indicate
the corresponding 95% confidence intervals. Time is measured on the abscissa: A value of
zero denotes an election season. Negative and positive values stand for years before and
after an election, respectively.
hypothesis is under consideration in table 3.4. We use two alternative mea-
sures to capture the strength of the ruling party. The first, DGi , is an indicator
variable that switches on if the electoral district, bank i operates in, experi-
ences relatively few changes in party power.16 As column (A) of table 3.4
indicates, there is some evidence that stability of incumbency may in fact be
a precondition for electoral cycles in lending: Despite being barely impre-
cisely estimated, savings banks in politically stable areas increase lending
by 2.6% in the wake of elections relative to districts that see more frequent
changes in power. For the latter, this election effect is – albeit positive and
amounting to 1.3% – statistically insignificantly different from zero.
A similar picture emerges for our second measure of incumbent domi-
nance, Di t−1, that reflects results of the preceding election, hence capturing
16To construct this measure, we create a normalized index that counts the number of
times the strongest party has changed within a district. DGi indicates whether the electoral
district under consideration ranks in the bottom quartile of the distribution of said index.
Note that a change in relative party strength may not necessarily translate into a change
in power, as the party with the plurality of votes may fail to reach an outright majority,
in which case it may have to accept opposition status if the other parties agree to form a
coalition government. This notwithstanding, DGi should provide a reasonable approximation
to the general stability of incumbency, we are ultimately interested in.
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Table 3.4. Results for prediction 4
Dependent variable: Log loans
Explanatory OLS regression coefficients
variables (Empirical p-values in brackets)
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
DDD Interaction
- ELECMst ∗ Bb ∗D
G
i 0.026 – – 0.026 –
(0.082) (0.049)
- ELECMst ∗ Bb ∗ Di t−1 – 0.028 – – 0.035
(0.088) (0.048)
- ELECMst ∗ Bb ∗ Ci t – – 0.007 0.016 0.015
(0.583) (0.234) (0.318)
DD Main effect
- ELECMst ∗ Bb 0.013 0.023 0.024 0.003 0.015
(0.385) (0.010) (0.004) (0.831) (0.190)
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
First-order interactions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Banks in sample All All All All All
N 7,116 7,084 7,116 7,116 7,084
R2 0.977 0.977 0.977 0.977 0.977
Notes: Results are for our preferred empirical specification (see text).
DGi indicates whether political contestedness is generally low in the
district, bank i operates in. Di t−1 indicates whether the preceding elec-
tion was close. Ci t measures the contestedness of the current election.
Boldfaced numbers indicate statistical significance at the 5% level.
the relative strength of the sitting government during its expiring term.17
Results in column (B) indicate that lending increases by – again, barely im-
precise – 2.8% in districts with clear majorities relative to all other districts,
for which the electoral effect already amounts to 2.3%.
The converse effect of current electoral competition, which may in-
crease incentives to induce a lending cycle, is under study in the last three
columns of table 3.4. Since pre-election polling is generally unavailable for
municipal elections, we have to rely on an ex-post measure when assessing
the contestedness of the electoral campaign: the actual election outcome.
Given rational expectations and a reasonable feeling of local politicians for
the mood of their electorate, we argue that the closeness of the final result
should provide a reasonable proxy for the perceived closeness of the con-
test itself. On this account, our indicator of current electoral competition,
17Similar to the first measure, Di t−1 is a bottom-quartile indicator for a normalized index
that measures both, the absolute vote share of the winning party, as well as its margin of
victory.
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Ci t , takes on the value of 1 if the winner’s final vote share is either below
40% or if the winning margin is less than 5%.18
According to estimates in column (C), there is no compelling evidence
of current electoral competition exerting any systematic influence on the
strength of the election effect, which is estimated to be 2.4%. Yet, given
that our measure of present contestedness may in part capture the diamet-
ric effect of party dominance as well, we refine our empirical specification
by additionally controlling for general and historical contestedness, respec-
tively. Results are displayed in columns (D) and (E) and they suggest that,
given overall party dominance, there is at least some indication that lend-
ing cycles may indeed be more likely if the upcoming election promises
to be close. According to our point estimates, savings banks in districts
that fall into this category, increase their lending by roughly 1.5% relative
to a situation with little competition. However, given the apparent lack
of precision of these estimates, we refrain from interpreting these results
as anything more than suggestive evidence. Notably, earlier results that in-
cumbent dominance can be viewed as a precondition for politically induced
lending, are soundly reconfirmed, as statistically significant election effects
appear to be exclusively present in districts with high degrees of political
stability and current incumbent strength, respectively.
3.7 Robustness
As mentioned above, results presented in section 3.6 are based on our pre-
ferred empirical specification being applied to the full data sample. To en-
sure that conclusions are not driven by these choices, we present a number
of robustness checks that demonstrate that the election effect, as measured
by δ2, is immune to varying definitions of key variables, sets of controls,
sample compositions, and assumptions regarding the error-term structure.
Note that the following results should be compared to the baseline esti-
mates in columns (G) and (H) of table 3.2, which suggest politically in-
duced lending increases of 2.7% and 2.4% (relative to the bank’s total loan
sum), respectively.
18Note that we have also experimented with alternative combinations of cutoff points –
namely vote shares of 37% and 43% as well as winning margins of 3%, 7% and 10% – but
that results are largely insensitive to these variations. The same holds true when instead
applying a quartile indicator that follows the same logic as the index-based measure of past
incumbent dominance, Di t−1.
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Table 3.5. Alternative dependent variables
Dependent variables: See table notes
Explanatory OLS regression coefficients
variables (Empirical p-values in brackets)
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Key regressor
- ELECMst ∗ Bb 30.593 26.057 0.019 0.016
(0.001) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000)
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
Time trends Yes Yes
Bank type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7,116 7,116 7,116 7,116
R2 0.977 0.977 0.135 0.131
Notes: Dependent variables for columns (A) and (B)
are bank’s loans in 1995 EUR and logs of (loans/total
assets) for columns (C) and (D). Boldfaced numbers
indicate statistical significance at the 5% level.
3.7.1 Alternative choices of variables
Alternative dependent variables
We start by gauging the robustness of the election effect to the choice of
the dependent variable. Columns (A) and (B) of table 3.5 contain esti-
mates of model 3.2, when applied to loan data in real values instead of
log-transformed data. Apparently, our results in section 3.6 are not driven
by the log-transformation of variables, as sign and significance of estimates
are very similar to those in corresponding columns (G) and (H) of table 3.2.
As a side effect, these estimates provide a better feel for the average size (in
absolute terms) of the election effect, which is estimated to lie in the range
of EUR 26.0 million and 30.6 million per bank, depending on the way time
effects are controlled for.
Yet another specification can be found in tables (C) and (D) of table 3.5.
Here, loans are normalized by total assets before being transformed into
logs, so that loan sum sizes are put into perspective with the size of the
respective bank. Once again, the election effect is positive and highly sig-
nificant at the 0.1% level.
Alternative control variables
The following two tables provide evidence that the election effect is also
robust to variations in the set of covariates used for the analysis. Table 3.6
displays results for specifications that drop certain variables from the list
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Table 3.6. Alternative control variables 1: Fewer covariates
Dependent variable: Log loans
Explanatory OLS regression coefficients (Empirical p-values in brackets)
variables (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
Key regressor
- ELECMst ∗ Bb 0.187 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.116 0.015 0.069
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000)
Bank controls
- Total assets – 0.974 0.978 0.983 – 0.990 –
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
- Capital ratio -1.023 – 0.038 0.042 – 0.048 –
(0.000) (0.089) (0.062) (0.036)
District controls
- Population -0.691 -0.017 – 0.028 -0.751 – –
(0.000) (0.511) (0.000) (0.000)
- Real GDP 0.936 0.045 0.031 – 1.002 – –
(0.000) (0.070) (0.000) (0.000)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7,116 7,116 7,116 7,116 7,714 8,880 9,934
R2 0.714 0.977 0.977 0.977 0.524 0.977 0.411
Notes: Combinations of explanatory variables are excluded from the vector of
controls as indicated by “–”. Boldfaced numbers indicate statistical significance
at the 5% level.
of regressors, whereas specifications in table 3.7 are augmented with addi-
tional control variables, not used in our preferred empirical model.
As is evident from columns (A) through (D) of table 3.6, the election
effect remains significant at the 1% level if any of the four control variables
is individually excluded from the set of regressors. In fact, this robustness
check suggests that results presented in section 3.6 represent rather conser-
vative estimates of the true effect. As previewed above, once we exclude a
bank’s total assets – which have a quasi-mechanical relationship with loans
and leave hardly any variation in the data unexplained – R2 drops signifi-
cantly to 0.714 and the estimate of the election effect increases to 18.7%.
A similar picture emerges if all bank controls are excluded from our regres-
sion (column (E)) and if model 3.2 is implemented as pure DD without
any additional controls (column (G)), with estimates for δ2 ranging within
a 7% and 12% increase in lending. On the other hand, results are slightly
weakened if we fail to control for district controls (column (F)), as the elec-
tion effect drops to 1.5%, which still represents an increase that is statisti-
cally significant at the 5% level. Given that our analysis certainly benefits
from controlling for variables that may impact lending decisions irrespec-
tive of electoral timing, we attach higher credibility to specifications that
account for both bank-specific factors and district-level macroeconomic fac-
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tors. We are nonetheless pleased that the election effect is found in all of
the aforementioned specifications and apparently not just the artificial re-
sult of omitted-variable bias or bad control.
To examine whether the further addition of covariates has a dampen-
ing effect on our δ2 estimates, we include a multitude of district-level con-
trol variables to the set of regressors. As results in table 3.7 demonstrate,
neither information on local public debt, (un)employment, real earnings,
real wages, nor firm creation have a notable impact on the election effect,
with the latter remaining in a narrow interval of 2.5% to 2.7%. Note that,
while firm creation seems to have a statistically significant effect on banks’
lending behavior, we decided to exclude this variable from our preferred
specification, since it is unavailable for the time before 1998, which would
needlessly reduce sample size and preclude the analysis of bank lending for
most of the 1990s.
Alternative municipal election types
As argued in section 3.4.2, our main analysis concentrates on municipal
elections of legislative bodies since our data provides more informational
detail for this type of election than for municipal elections of executive rep-
resentatives. This notwithstanding, we additionally test whether savings
bank lending also reacts to direct elections of mayors and county represen-
tatives, which, as a rule, do not coincide with the election of municipal
parliaments.19 As results in columns (A) and (B) of table 3.8 show, this is
indeed the case, even though the effect is a bit smaller – ranging between
2% and 2.5% – than that generated by legislative elections.
Since direct municipal elections were not the norm until the mid-1990s
and are still not implemented in Baden-Württemberg’s rural counties, these
results are based on a lower number of electoral events than was the case in
section 3.6. Moreover, they may not be based on the most useful measure of
elections of executive representatives because a substantial fraction of the
latter is indirectly determined by the regional parliament. As a consequence,
the fate of this kind of executive depends on legislative elections, as well.
For this reason, we create an alternative variable, ELECMXPist , that indicates
both the occurrence of a legislative election if the executive is appointed
by the legislative body, and the occurrence of a direct executive election
in case the respective district stipulates this electoral rule. We expect this
indicator to be a more appropriate measure of politically relevant elections
19Note that, since executive elections are usually not held at the state level, the respective
indicator variable, ELECMXist , is allowed to vary at the district level, which was not the case
for the legislative election dummy, ELECMst .
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Table 3.7. Alternative control variables 2: Additional covariates
Dependent variable: Log loans
Explanatory OLS regression coefficients (Empirical p-values in brackets)
variables (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
Key regressor
- ELECMst ∗ Bb 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.025 0.025
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007)
Bank controls
- Total assets 0.976 0.977 0.977 0.974 0.974 0.970 0.968
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
- Capital ratio 0.034 0.037 0.036 0.030 0.033 0.022 0.018
(0.134) (0.101) (0.111) (0.184) (0.154) (0.352) (0.435)
District controls
- Population -0.001 -0.016 -0.010 -0.161 -0.015 -0.138 -0.236
(0.773) (0.584) (0.773) (0.003) (0.599) (0.003) (0.072)
- Real GDP 0.049 0.040 0.047 0.039 0.021 0.028 -0.059
(0.037) (0.267) (0.030) (0.135) (0.663) (0.328) (0.252)
- Public debt -0.012 – – – – – -0.014
(0.356) (0.258)
- Employment – 0.003 – – – – 0.042
(0.948) (0.680)
- Unemployment – – -0.011 – – – 0.020
(0.567) (0.464)
- Real earnings – – – 0.137 – – 0.122
(0.000) (0.144)
- Real wages – – – – 0.023 – 0.047
(0.585) (0.501)
- Firm creation – – – – – 0.126 0.092
(0.000) (0.006)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6,435 7,116 7,116 6,435 6,087 5,394 5,394
R2 0.978 0.977 0.977 0.978 0.978 0.977 0.978
Notes: Combinations of explanatory variables are excluded from the vector of con-
trols as indicated by “–”. Boldfaced numbers indicate statistical significance at the
5% level.
of local executives. According to results displayed in the two final columns
of table 3.8, our earlier conclusion that executive politicians also induce
electoral lending cycles (that may be mildly less pronounced than those by
their legislative counterparts) is confirmed.
3.7.2 Alternative sample compositions
Alternative panel balancedness
Our main results from section 3.6 come from the entire available data sam-
ple. As mentioned in section 3.4.1, however, our bank data is quite un-
balanced since many banks entered the sample some time after 1993. At
the same time, the sample is subject to mild attrition that is mainly due
to mergers of savings banks. To ensure that our results are not driven by
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Table 3.8. Alternative municipal election
types
Dependent variables: Log loans
Explanatory OLS regression coefficients
variables (Empirical p-values in brackets)
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Key regressor
- ELECMXist ∗ Bb 0.022 0.024 – –
(0.014) (0.010)
- ELECMXPist ∗ Bb – – 0.020 0.021
(0.011) (0.017)
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
Time trends Yes Yes
Bank type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7,116 7,116 7,116 7,116
R2 0.977 0.977 0.977 0.976
Notes: The index MX stands for direct municipal elec-
tions of the executive, and MX P denotes politically
relevant elections for executive representatives. Bold-
faced numbers indicate statistical significance at the
5% level.
these data characteristics, we re-estimate DD model 3.2 on a completely bal-
anced panel. This alternative sample consists of 159 savings banks (2,703
bank years) and 104 cooperative banks (1,678 bank years) and represents
roughly 25% of the original sample.20
As is evident from column (A) of table 3.9, the election effect proves to
be immune to even such extreme reductions in sample size: Based on banks
that remained in the sample from 1993 to 2009, the estimated increase in
savings bank lending amounts to 3% and is statistically significant at the
1% level.
Alternative time intervals
To investigate the stability of the election effect across time, we divide the
whole sample into two panel sets of equal length, with the first covering the
years between 1993 and 2001 and the second covering the time between
2001 and 2009. As can be seen in columns (B) and (C) of table 3.9, lending
increases of roughly 2.5% occur in both the 1990s and the 2000s and are,
hence, unlikely to be driven by any temporal anomalies not captured by
20Note that in additional robustness checks not reported here, we have also experimented
with earlier and later cut-off points than 1993 to create balanced panels. Estimations based
on these, however, have not yielded any different conclusions.
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Table 3.9. Alternative sample compositions
Dependent variable: Log loans
Explanatory OLS regression coefficients (Empirical p-values in brackets)
variables (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G)
Key regressor
- ELECMst ∗ Bb 0.030 0.024 0.027 0.020 0.014 0.044 0.028
(0.001) (0.036) (0.009) (0.033) (0.079) (0.000) (0.001)
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Balanced panel Yes No No No No No No
Year range 93-09 93-01 01-09 93-09 93-09 93-09 93-09
Dropped state None None None BW BY HS RP
N 3,945 2,767 4,353 4,730 4,077 6,002 6,304
R2 0.970 0.969 0.978 0.975 0.984 0.975 0.977
Notes: Abbreviations are as follows: Years: 93=1993; 01=2001; 09=2009. States:
BW=Baden-Württemberg; BY=Bavaria; HS=Hesse; RP=Rhineland-Palatinate.
Boldfaced numbers indicate statistical significance at the 5% level.
our set of covariates and time dummies. The fact that the election effect for
the later time interval is estimated with increased precision, is most likely
attributable to the higher number of bank years: Recall that the represen-
tativeness of Hoppenstedt’s cooperative bank data greatly improves during
the early 2000s, as many smaller banks whose balance sheets were not col-
lected before, are added to the sample around this time. On this account,
it is encouraging that the election effect is robust to this kind of sample
selectivity as well.
Alternative regional compositions
Finally, to assess the generality of results, we apply model 3.2 to four sub-
samples that individually exclude one of the four states our main sample
consists of. As columns (D) through (G) of table 3.9 show, the strength of
the election effect appears to be sensitive to the choice of states used for
analysis. While results are broadly unchanged by the exclusion of Rhineland-
Palatinate, the election effect is weakened if either Baden-Württemberg or
Bavaria are dropped from our sample, suggesting that politically induced
lending is especially pronounced in the two latter states. On the other hand,
the estimate of δ2 is considerably higher if Hesse is omitted from the work-
ing sample.21
21While this may reflect the absence of electoral lending cycles in Hesse, it is also possible
that this observation is simply an artefact of Hesse’s idiosyncratic time trends mentioned in
section 3.4.4, which may disqualify Hesse as a viable control state.
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Finding an explanation for these cross-state differences is certainly de-
sirable, as this may further our understanding of the interplay of institu-
tional features in limiting the extent of politically induced lending. One po-
tential reason for the observed pattern could be found in the role of incum-
bent dominance, which – as argued in section 3.6 – may be a precondition
for the ability of politicians to manipulate bank policies. Considering that
electoral contests in Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg are historically much
less contested than those in Hesse, the differences among states may well
be driven by this feature.22 Other possible explanations for this regional het-
erogeneity may, for instance, be found in the aforementioned differences in
electoral laws, minor variations in states’ savings bank regulation, partisan
effects, or – as is the case for Hesse – the concentrated presence of private
banks that changes the operational environment for savings and coopera-
tive banks.
A meaningful cross-state analysis that discriminates among such hy-
potheses, however, proves to be infeasible with just 4 states at our disposal.
It is not only the low number of states that poses problems, but also the
limited cross-state variability of certain features that is cause for concern:
Recall that the states chosen for analysis are all from the southern part of
Germany. While this regional proximity improves the identification of the
election effect since DD relies on states being on reasonably similar time
trends, it is unlikely to provide sufficient variation in institutional and other
state-specific characteristics. For example, it would be impossible to tell
whether the differences across states are driven by electoral competition
or, say, partisan effects because the two states with the highest incumbent
dominance – Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg – are also historically domi-
nated by the same party.23 Hence, distinguishing between these alternative
hypotheses would require the addition of states which are dominated by
parties that represent the opposite of the political spectrum.24 For these
reasons, we are currently augmenting our dataset with several states from
22This pattern holds for all indicators we constructed to capture the degree of electoral
competition in a district. To give one example, 19% of all municipal elections of legislative
bodies in Hesse are lost by the incumbent party. While this number is only a bit lower for
Rhineland-Palatinate (17%), Baden-Württemberg (7%) and Bavaria (4%) are characterized
by considerably higher party dominance.
23Recall from section 3.4.4 that, while Bavaria’s ruling party, CSU, is legally indepen-
dent from its sister party, CDU, which dominates politics in Baden-Württemberg, they are
generally considered the same organizational entity, covering the conservative spectrum of
German politics.
24An obvious candidate appears to be the state of North Rhine-Westphalia whose political
system is largely dominated by left-of-center SPD.
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other parts of Germany to obtain a more representative sample than cur-
rently available. Besides enabling us to study cross-state heterogeneity, this
step will also determine whether electoral lending cycles are a general phe-
nomenon or if our results are instead driven by regional outliers.
3.7.3 Alternative assumptions on the error structure
The final robustness analysis presented here, assesses the stability of results
to varying modes of statistical inference. The growing literature on cluster-
robust inference (see Bertrand et al., 2004; Angrist and Pischke, 2009; and
Cameron and Miller, 2010 for an overview) highlights the importance of
accounting for potential serial correlation and regional clustering in panel
data. Both phenomena implicate a violation of one of the main assumptions
traditionally imposed when working with cross-sectional data: the indepen-
dence of observations. While OLS will still be consistent, precision is likely
overestimated if these issues are ignored.
Serial correlation
Serially correlated errors, εist , are a typical problem of panel data appli-
cations and there is little reason to believe that the present study is an
exception. Formally, Cor(εist ,εisu) = ρε 6= 0, for t 6= u, where ρε denotes
the intraclass correlation of the error. That is, the individual (here: bank
i) is thought of as a cluster whose observations over time are not indepen-
dent of one another. A rough estimate of ρε – the average autocorrelation
over 5 lags of OLS residuals coming from model 3.2 – equals 0.412 and
suggests that our data is indeed subject to substantial serial correlation.
For this reason, and in line with Bertrand et al. (2004), Khwaja and Mian
(2005), and Cameron and Trivedi (2010), our preferred empirical specifica-
tion already corrects for serial correlation by clustering standard errors on
the bank level instead of the bank-year level.
An alternative way of dealing with autocorrelated errors consists of es-
timating model 3.2 with a random-effects (RE) specification (see Cameron
and Trivedi, 2010). The individual-effects model provides the following ra-
tionale for serial correlation: If the error εist = αi + rist , then the presence
of a bank-specific effect, αi, induces correlation over time, even if the id-
iosyncratic, rist , is iid. If these assumption on the error structure are correct
and as long as αi is truly random, RE is more efficient than OLS, which is
why we present results for regression 3.2, fitted by FGLS in column (B) of
table 3.10. When compared to our baseline specification in column (A), the
estimated election effect is virtually unchanged by this alternative approach
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Table 3.10. Alternative error assumptions
Dependent variable: Log loans
Explanatory Regression coefficients
variables (Empirical p-values in brackets)
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Key regressor
- ELECMst ∗ Bb 0.027 0.028 0.022 0.027
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes n.a. Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank type FE Yes Yes n.a. Yes
Estimator OLS RE FE OLS
Cluster Bank Bank Bank District
N 7,116 7,116 7,116 7,116
R2 0.978 0.976 0.954 0.978
Notes: Abbreviations are as follows: OLS=Ordinary
Least Square; RE=Random Effects; FE=Fixed Effects
(Within estimator). “Cluster” indicates whether stan-
dard errors are clustered on the bank or the district
level. “n.a.” denotes that time-constant variables are
omitted. Boldfaced numbers indicate statistical signif-
icance at the 5% level.
of correcting for serial correlation. The estimated standard deviation of the
individual effect, σ̂α, equals 0.104 and is roughly as large as that of the
idiosyncratic error, σ̂r = 0.120. Furthermore, intraclass correlation is esti-
mated to equal 0.427, which is in line with our ad-hoc estimate, mentioned
above.
Of course, the RE estimator is only consistent if αi is uncorrelated with
regressors. If we wish to relax this assumption, the individual effect needs
to be eliminated with a fixed-effects (FE) specification that only relies on
variation over time. Even though we are not particularly worried about
correlated effects, results for model 3.2 when fitted by a within estimator
are presented in column (C) of table 3.10. While the election effect appears
to be somewhat smaller than before (amounting to 2.2%), it is still very
precisely estimated. We take this as encouraging evidence that our results
survive, even when identification is based on within-variation alone.
Regional clustering
If data has a group structure, independence may not only be violated for
observations of one individual bank over time, but also across banks that
are part of the same regional cluster. In this case, εist will contain some
variation that is likely to be common to banks in the same geographical
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area and year, for instance, a regional business cycle. An obvious solution to
this problem is to correct standard errors for clustering on the geographical
level, these region-year shocks are most likely to occur.
In our context, there are two candidates for such regional clusters: the
municipal district (which typically contains one savings bank and one to
four cooperative banks) and the state. While clustering standard errors on
the district level is straightforward, this methodological fix is infeasible for
the state level, since robust inference requires a larger number of clusters
than is available in our data.25 As the non-trivial issue of inference with
few clusters is still under study in the literature, we content ourselves with
implementing what is methodologically feasible at present and provide es-
timates of model 3.2 with standard errors clustered at the district level in
column (D) of table 3.10. Evidently, precision is only marginally reduced –
with standard errors rising from 0.0079 to 0.0087 – suggesting that district-
level clustering is not much reason for concern.
3.8 Conclusion
We exploit a particularity in the German public banking system where local
politicians are by law actively involved in the management of savings banks’
lending decisions to test the hypothesis that incumbent politicians pursue
policies that benefit their re-election probability but might be socially sub-
optimal. Our identification strategy relies on the fact that we should only
observe politically motivated lending around election years, only in munic-
ipalities in which elections are held at this point in time, and – importantly
– only for savings banks that are by law politically connected. Econometri-
cally, we conduct difference-in-difference (DD) as well as triple-difference
(DDD) estimation embedded in a fixed-effects panel data setup.
We use a unique, largely hand-collected dataset that combines detailed
information on German municipal elections, macro-economic data on the
district level, and balance-sheet information on bank lending. We find that
savings banks systematically extend more credits in pre-election periods.
This effect is not only statistically significant but also economically rele-
vant. Given that savings banks are holding the largest market share in the
private customer deposit market and they are the most important lender
to the Mittelstand (SMEs) that is considered the backbone of the German
25Note that this problem cannot by solved by simply increasing the number of states in
our dataset, since the natural limit will be the total number of 16 German states, whereas
the literature suggests a minimum number of around 40 to 50 groups (see Angrist and
Pischke, 2009 and Cameron and Miller, 2010).
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economy, it is potentially worrisome to find their policies distorted. The
pre-election excess-lending effect is robust to various specifications. Impor-
tantly, this effect is not present with cooperative banks that are very similar
to savings banks but that lack the political connectedness of savings banks.
Furthermore, and in line with our hypothesis, lending cycles only occur
with municipal but not with state or federal elections. In addition, we find
weak evidence for overly prudent lending policies after elections, consis-
tent with a binding credit constraint that banks face as they have to make
up for excessive pre-election lending.
Our evidence suggests that the ability of politicians to influence the lend-
ing policies of their respective savings bank depends on the dominance of
the incumbent party, since electoral cycles are less common in districts with
frequent changes in power and historically close elections. Whether incen-
tives to induce socially inefficient lending increases are influenced by the
contestedness of the current electoral campaign, is inconclusive and may
become answerable once test power increases in the course of gradually ex-
tending our dataset for further research: On the one hand, we are currently
adding municipal election results for additional German states to better un-
derstand the interplay of various institutional features in limiting the extent
of politically induced lending cycles. On the other hand, we are hopeful to
eventually be granted access to more detailed credit-contract data that will
allow us to test more nuanced hypotheses such as prediction 5, as this will
shed more light on the social costs of interfering with bank policies for
political gain.
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3.A Appendix: Predictions 2 to 4 with model 3.1
As argued in section 3.6, we believe DD model 3.2 to provide improved
identification of the causal election effect over model 3.1. However, for
robustness, this appendix also tests predictions 2 through 4 with model 3.1
that only exploits differences between savings banks. Overall, our main
results are confirmed, even though effect sizes appear to be a bit smaller.
As is evident from table 3.11, municipal elections are once again the
only type of election with a statistically significant impact on savings bank
lending, which confirms prediction 2, that state-level and federal elections
should play less of a role. The electoral lending cycle, as estimated without
a control group of politically unconnected banks, is visualized in figure 3.4
and roughly follows the pattern depicted in figure 3.3, with a significant
spike just before an election and weak evidence for credit crunching in
the years thereafter. The evidence for the effects of electoral competition
is a little more mixed (see table 3.12). As before, current contestedness
does not seem to systematically influence politically induced lending. Now,
this result even holds if incumbent dominance is controlled for. As far as
the latter is concerned, there is still evidence that the ability to induce
lending cycles increases with the decisiveness of the past electoral victory,
even though the significance level has increased to roughly 10%. Note that,
while results in columns (A) and (D) of table 3.12 do no longer suggest
that general incumbent stability facilitates electoral cycles, this result does
indeed survive if we run separate regressions – not presented here – on two
subsamples that are stratified by overall competitiveness of the electoral
district.
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Table 3.11. Results for prediction 2 (Model 1)
Dependent variable: Log loans
Explanatory OLS regression coefficients
variables (Empirical p-values in brackets)
(A) (B) (C) (D)
Key regressors
- ELECMst – – – 0.021
(0.000)
- ELECSst -0.000 0.003 – 0.010
(0.942) (0.362) (0.102)
- ELECFt – – -0.003 -0.003
(0.294) (0.350)
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes
Time trends Yes Yes Yes
Banks in sample SavB SavB SavB SavB
N 3,083 3,083 3,083 3,083
R2 0.970 0.969 0.969 0.969
Notes: Results are for our preferred empirical spec-
ification (see text). Key regressors are ELECMst ∗ Bb,
ELECSst ∗ Bb, and ELEC
F
t ∗ Bb, respectively. The indexes
M, S, and F denote municipal, state, and federal elec-
tions, respectively. Boldfaced numbers indicate statis-
tical significance at the 5% level.
Figure 3.4. Results for prediction 3 (Model 1)
Visualization of the lending cycle
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Notes: Results are for our preferred empirical specification (see text). The solid line depicts
estimates of δ1 coming from model 3.1 with year fixed effects. Dottet lines indicate the
corresponding 95% confidence intervals. Time is measured on the abscissa: A value of
zero denotes an election season. Negative and positive values stand for years before and
after an election, respectively.
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Table 3.12. Results for prediction 4 (Model 1)
Dependent variable: Log loans
Explanatory OLS regression coefficients
variables (Empirical p-values in brackets)
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
DD Interaction
- ELECMst ∗D
G
i 0.009 – – 0.008 –
(0.376) (0.434)
- ELECMst ∗ Di t−1 – 0.022 – – 0.022
(0.093) (0.108)
- ELECMst ∗ Ci t – – -0.003 0.000 0.001
(0.767) (0.969) (0.963)
Main effect
- ELECMst 0.004 0.007 0.011 0.004 0.006
(0.605) (0.196) (0.071) (0.674) (0.375)
Bank controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Banks in sample SavB SavB SavB SavB SavB
N 3,067 3,059 3,067 3,067 3,059
R2 0.970 0.970 0.970 0.970 0.970
Notes: Results are for our preferred empirical specification (see
text). DGi indicates whether political contestedness is generally
low in the district, bank i operates in. Di t−1 indicates whether
the preceding election was close. Ci t measures the contestedness
of the current election. Boldfaced numbers indicate statistical
significance at the 5% level.
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